McLaughlin v. Hold Public Schools Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 24 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-1521.,01-1521. |
| Citation | 320 F.3d 663 |
| Parties | Carl and Mary Sue McLAUGHLIN, individually and on behalf of their daughter, Emma McLaughlin, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HOLT PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; Tom Davis, Superintendent; and Tom West, Director of Special Education, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Jason D. Kolkema (briefed), Johnson, Rosati, LaBarge, Aseltyne & Field, Lansing, MI, Myra S. Dutton-Johnson (argued and briefed), N. Muskegon, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Michael L. Bevins (briefed), Lapointe & Associates, Okemos, MI, James S. Jamo (argued and briefed), Grua, Jamo & Young, Lansing, MI, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before: SILER and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge.*
The plaintiffs, Carl and Mary Sue McLaughlin, filed suit in district court pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., seeking to overturn the order of a state hearing review officer in favor of the defendant school board in a dispute over the Individualized Education Program (IEP) for their daughter, Emma McLaughlin, that had been proposed by Holt Public Schools for the 1999-2000 school year. The district court reversed the administrative ruling, holding that the school system must afford the child the appropriate educational program outlined in the IEP at the school in her neighborhood rather than the facility some distance from her home that was identified by the defendants as the most appropriate educational setting for a student with Emma's particular needs. This placement, the district court ruled, constituted the "least restrictive environment" under the requirements of the Act.
Because we conclude that the district court's analysis of the "least restrictive environment" mandate was flawed, and because the court applied the incorrect burden of proof and failed to give due weight to the administrative decision on issues of educational policy, we find it necessary to reverse the judgment below.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act provides federal funds to help states educate disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411. A state receiving funds under the Act is required to provide a "free appropriate public education ... to all children with disabilities residing in the State." Id. at § 1412(a)(1). Under the Act, an Individualized Education Program must be developed for each child with a disability, including statements of (1) the child's present level of educational performance, (2) measurable annual goals, and (3) the special education and related services as well as supplementary aids and services that will be provided to the child. Id. at § 1414(d)(1)(A). The plan is developed by the IEP Team, which includes the child's parents, as well as regular and special education teachers and others. Id. at § 1414(d)(1)(B). The Act contains a requirement that the IEP for a disabled child educate that child in the "least restrictive environment":
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id. at § 1412(a)(5). Educational placement decisions are based on the IEP.
The Act also establishes procedural safeguards to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents can "present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." Id. at § 1415(b)(6). Upon presenting such a complaint, the parents or guardians have the procedural right to an "impartial due process hearing" conducted by the appropriate state or local educational agency. Id. at § 1415(f). In Michigan, there is a two-tier review system: a dispute is first presented to a local hearing officer, and if an aggrieved party chooses to appeal, to a state hearing review officer. See Michigan Administrative Code Rule 340.1724. After the administrative appeals, an aggrieved party "shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented" in the administrative review process. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).
Emma McLaughlin was born on December 12, 1992, and diagnosed with a condition commonly known as Down Syndrome shortly thereafter. Because of this condition, Emma is a "child with a disability" as defined in the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1402(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7, and she has received special education services since she was two months old. She lives with her parents in Dimondale, Michigan, and is currently eligible for special education services as a child who falls into the category of "educable mentally impaired."
Until June 1996, Emma's parents signed IEP plans in agreement with the school district's proposals each year. Since that time, however, the parties have had a series of disagreements about how to structure Emma's education. After the 1995-1996 school year, in which Emma attended a pre-primary special education classroom operated by Holt Public Schools, her parents refused to continue classroom services through Holt, and they chose to enroll Emma for the 1996-1997 school year in the Michigan State University's Child Development Lab School at their own expense. The Holt School District continued to provide ancillary and related services. The McLaughlins re-enrolled Emma at the Lab School during the 1997-1998 school year, again with the Holt School District providing certain ancillary and related services.
In May 1998, Emma's parents disagreed with the plan proposed for the 1998-1999 school year and requested a hearing. While the hearing was pending, a three-year reevaluation was due at the same time as the next annual IEP. Hence, the hearing on the 1998 IEP was postponed to allow completion of those tasks, and it was agreed that any issues surrounding the 1998 IEP would be subsumed in any new hearing request after the reevaluation and the 1999 IEP () were completed. The IEP Team meeting was held on April 21 and 23, 1999, and a plan was developed that provided various goals and objectives for Emma. Everyone attending the meeting agreed Emma would fully participate in the general education kindergarten setting, which was a half-day program, with paraprofessional support. It was also agreed that Emma would need a full day program, meaning she would receive special education classroom support during the other half day. The parties disagreed as to what type of classroom was appropriate for Emma: a categorical classroom or a resource room.1
The school officials on the IEP Team determined that a categorical classroom was necessary to meet Emma's individual goals and education needs. Because Emma's parents disagreed with that determination, they filed a dissenting report to the 1999 IEP indicating that they felt Emma's special education needs could be met in a resource room rather than a categorical classroom. They noted in the dissenting report that Emma qualified for the resource room because her needs did not require more than half of her instructional day in special education, which was the cutoff for allowing the delivery of special education services through a resource room. See Michigan Administrative Code Rule 340.1749a (1987). The primary reason for their disagreement with the categorical classroom placement was that the categorical classroom placement required Emma to attend Sycamore Elementary School rather than Dimondale Elementary School, her "neighborhood school."
The Holt Public School District operates six elementary schools, including Dimondale Elementary and Sycamore Elementary, the two schools at issue in this case. Dimondale Elementary was the closest school to Emma's house — and the one she would have attended if not disabled. Sycamore Elementary was 7.3 miles further away from her house. Dimondale Elementary has a resource room but not a categorical classroom; therefore, to receive special education services in a categorical classroom, Emma would have had to attend Sycamore Elementary.
In response to the McLaughlin's objection to Emma's placement, a local hearing officer held a due process hearing in July 1999 to determine which special education classroom setting was appropriate to address Emma's individual needs and found that the appropriate placement for Emma was the categorical classroom. Emma's parents appealed, and in September 1999, a state hearing review officer affirmed the local hearing officer's decision that Emma should participate in the categorical classroom instead of the resource room.
Subsequent to that decision, the McLaughlins filed the current action in federal district court and, ultimately, received a ruling in their favor. It is from that judgment that the current appeal by the school system arises.
In actions filed pursuant to the IDEA, there are two parts to a court's inquiry. First, the district court must determine whether the state has complied with the procedural requirements of the Act. See Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Second, the court must decide whether the IEP developed through the Act's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. See id. at 206-07, 102...
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