McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft

Decision Date21 October 1983
Citation148 Cal.App.3d 203,195 Cal.Rptr. 764
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesDonald R. McLAUGHLIN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 26118.

McInnis, Fitzgerald, Rees, Sharkey & McIntyre, James R. Milliken and James E. Chodzko, San Diego, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, Rudi M. Brewster and Stephen T. Landuyt, San Diego, for defendants and respondents.

LEWIS, * Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Donald R. McLaughlin and David Claude Hieter appeal a judgment after a jury returned a special verdict in favor of Sikorsky Aircraft in this products liability case for personal injury damages. The case was tried exclusively on a theory of strict liability due to alleged defective design. First and primarily, plaintiffs alleged defective design of the flight control system because the 1963 Sikorsky-made HH-3A combat and rescue helicopter which crashed in 1976 did not have redundant self-locking fasteners in the flight control linkage system. Second, as to Hieter alone, a design defect was alleged in that the co-pilot's seat of the helicopter was not crashworthy because it could not withstand sufficient G-forces in a crash. With Navy personnel McLaughlin in the rear of the helicopter and Hieter in the co-pilot's seat, the flight control linkage which controls the fore and aft pitch axis of the helicopter disconnected during flight. The linkage connections by design were a bolt, castellated nut and cotter pin which is a safe, serviceable and reliable linkage system with the three components in place. However, Navy maintenance personnel had not replaced the cotter pin during servicing so that the nut could vibrate loose permitting the bolt to come out of the linkage. 1 Thus occurred the crash which seriously injured McLaughlin and Hieter.

We conclude it was error not to permit Sikorsky to assert its defense of government contractor immunity. This error would not have been prejudicial since Sikorsky prevailed. However, in the trial of the issue of whether there was a defect in the product on the theory of strict liability, error prejudicial to plaintiffs was committed which requires reversal.

I. STRICT LIABILITY--DEFECTIVE PRODUCT

Plaintiffs contend the court prejudicially erred in admitting evidence Sikorsky complied with military specifications in designing the aircraft. Under plaintiffs' theory of strict product liability, such evidence was irrelevant to the claim of defect in the design and manufacture of the aircraft, and therefore inadmissible. 2

Under general rules of strict product liability, "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897.) The plaintiff need only establish product defect. Once the plaintiff proves the product's design proximately caused his injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the benefits of the design outweigh its inherent dangers (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 431, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443). The test for defective design "explicitly focuses the trier of fact's attention on the adequacy of the product itself, rather than on the manufacturer's conduct" (id. at p. 432, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 447). Thus, in strict liability cases, the immediate focus is on the product itself and not on the system that produced it (Montez v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Cal.App.3d 315, 319, 161 Cal.Rptr. 578).

Before trial, plaintiffs sought and received a ruling that, based on this court's decision in Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal.App.3d 890, 896, 159 Cal.Rptr. 119, compliance with owner specifications is not a defense to claims of strict liability in tort. Plaintiffs' principal claim of product defect was the failure to include self-retaining bolts in the flight control linkage of the aircraft. Plaintiffs further objected, again before trial, to the introduction of evidence Sikorsky recommended self-retaining bolts but the Navy refused this recommendation. The court then ruled such evidence would be admissible for purposes of determining whether there was a defect.

On the issue of whether there was a defect in the product, the court improperly allowed the jury to consider the Navy specifications as even a factor in determining whether the aircraft's design was defective.

Sikorsky claims it was plaintiffs who first introduced evidence of military specifications in an effort to prove Sikorsky's noncompliance, and therefore any error was "invited" by them. However, the record reveals that before the jury was impaneled, the court ruled it would permit Sikorsky to present evidence of military specifications on the issue of defect. Plaintiffs objected and, only in response to this ruling, introduced evidence of military plans and specifications to prove a defect existed. In compliance with the court's ruling and in anticipation of Sikorsky's evidence, plaintiffs were entitled to refer to military specifications as a necessary and proper trial tactic without waiving the error. "An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous adverse ruling, after making appropriate objections, does not waive the error in the ruling by introducing responsive evidence to offset or explain the erroneously admitted evidence so far as possible." (Hoel v. City of Los Angeles, 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 310, 288 P.2d 989.) Plaintiffs neither invited nor waived the error.

Plaintiffs further contend failure to instruct the jury that compliance with government specifications is not a defense to the claim the product was defective was reversible error. Plaintiffs proffered, and the court refused, the following instruction:

"It is not a defense to a claim that a product is defective that the manufacturer built the product, in this case the helicopter, in accordance with government standards or specifications."

Generally, the jury need only be instructed on a particular point where such instruction finds support in the evidence (LeMons v. Regents of University of California, 21 Cal.3d 869, 875, 148 Cal.Rptr. 355, 582 P.2d 946). Had the court precluded all evidence of government specifications, plaintiffs' proffered instruction may not have been warranted. However, because the court allowed evidence of military specifications on the issue of whether the aircraft was defective, plaintiffs' instruction was essential to the jury's understanding of strict product liability. Further, Sikorsky's counsel argued at length, in spite of the court's in limine ruling, Sikorsky complied with Navy specifications in designing the aircraft, and that this was a factor showing the product was not defective. Without a proper instruction, the jury was given the erroneous impression Sikorsky's following of government plans and specifications was evidence there was no defect in the product. The "feasibility of alternative design" factor described in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, allows a consideration of physical or mechanical feasibility, rather than administrative or bureaucratic feasibility, and does not include the necessity to comply with owner specifications. The court's refusal to instruct the jury on this essential point was prejudicial error and requires reversal.

Plaintiffs next contend evidence that Sikorsky designed and constructed the helicopter in accord with the existing state of the art was irrelevant and prejudicial to their case. The contention is not properly cognizable on appeal since it was plaintiffs' own expert Gaines who, in the words of the trial court, "gratuitously added this state-of-the-art business" and only plaintiffs' witnesses used "state of the art" phraseology. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed on the "risk-benefit" standard under Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, to the effect that once a plaintiff proves the product's design proximately caused injury, the burden of proof is on the defendant "to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design" (id. at p. 432, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443). Among the relevant factors, and peculiarly within the manufacturer's knowledge, are the feasibility and cost of alternative designs (id. at p. 431, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443). It seems apparent that evidence the design comported with the state of the art is relevant to a proper determination of such cost and feasibility factors (see Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal.App.3d 868, 878-879, 148 Cal.Rptr. 843; Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal.App.3d 533, 547, 132 Cal.Rptr. 605). In reaching this conclusion, we recognize the rule, not involved in this case, that evidence of industry custom and usage is irrelevant in a products liability case (see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 803, 804, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348; and see Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d 413, 426, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443). The distinction between what are the capabilities of an industry and what practice is customary in an industry must be kept in mind. There was no error here in admitting the state of the art evidence showing industry capability.

Hieter also unmeritoriously contends the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Sikorsky expert witness Gary Fowler after Hieter's own expert witness, Thomas J. Murphy, changed his opinions on the stand from those disclosed by his deposition, taking a point of view more harmful to Sikorsky than it was in the deposition. Hieter claims surprise because he was not told Fowler would be an expert for Sikorsky. 3

In light of the surprise...

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