McLaughlin v. State

• Decision Date: 28 June 1991
• Docket Number: CR-89-443
• Citation: 586 So.2d 267
• Parties: James Larry McLAUGHLIN, Jr. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 267

586 So.2d 267

James Larry McLAUGHLIN, Jr. v. STATE.

CR-89-443.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 28, 1991.

James M. Wooten, Birmingham, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and David B. Karn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

James Larry McLaughlin, Jr., was indicted for capital murder, was convicted of murder, and was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment. On this appeal of that conviction, he raises five issues.

One of those issues, the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter, has merit and entitles the appellant to a new trial. In the interest of judicial economy, we also address the remaining issues which are likely to occur on retrial.

I

The victim in this case was 33-year-old Cynthia Carr, the appellant's mother-in-law. Several years prior to the events at issue here, the appellant had a romantic relationship with the victim, who was then Cynthia Butler. He moved in with Ms. Butler, her 8-year-old twin sons, and her 12-year-old daughter, Barbara. The appellant and Cynthia Butler later "broke up," but the appellant continued to live in the same house with Ms. Butler, her new boyfriend (and later husband) Frankie Carr, and her three children. The appellant became romantically involved with 12-year-old Barbara Butler, the victim's daughter. The appellant and Barbara Butler ran away together and lived in Georgia for a time. When they returned to Alabama, Barbara was pregnant with the appellant's child. Several months after the birth of Shea Butler in 1985, the appellant and Barbara Butler were married. They lived together until May 26 or 27, 1989, when Barbara left the appellant because he was "beating her." Barbara and three-year-old Shea went to live with Barbara's mother and step-father, Cynthia and Frankie Carr.

On May 30, 1989, the day the victim died, the appellant went to the Carr residence several times to see his wife and daughter. The first time, about 9:00 a.m., he spoke with Frankie Carr, who told the appellant to "hit the road." The second time, about 1:30 p.m., Frankie Carr ordered the appellant to get off his property. The appellant began cursing and left. The appellant was seen driving by the residence on at least one other occasion that day.

About 7:00 p.m., the appellant's sister, Karen Ponds, drove up to the Carr home, spoke to Barbara McLaughlin and Cynthia Carr, and asked to see Shea. The two women refused to allow the appellant's sister to see the child. According to Karen Ponds, Cynthia Carr stated that none of the appellant's family was welcome there and said, "If [your] damn brother come[s] over here [I'll] blow a hole through him." Barbara McLaughlin denied that her mother, the victim, made that statement. Karen Ponds left, told the appellant what happened, and the two of them went to Danny Osment's house.

The appellant obtained a gun from Danny Osment and returned to the Carr residence. He got out of his car with the gun in his hand and started toward the Carr's front porch, where Cynthia Carr, Barbara and Shea McLaughlin were sitting. Cynthia Carr picked up the child and ran into the house as Barbara McLaughlin tried to close and lock the front door. The appellant wedged the gun into the doorway, flung open the door, and followed Cynthia Carr, who was still holding Shea, to the kitchen. As Cynthia Carr and the appellant reached the kitchen, Carr's twin sons and several of their friends rushed out the back door. Barbara McLaughlin, who had been thrown against the wall when the appellant burst through the door, was on the living room floor.

There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting. Barbara McLaughlin, the twin boys, and their friends heard the appellant say to Cynthia Carr, "Bitch, stay out of my business," or words to that effect, and then, within a matter of seconds, they heard a gunshot.

The appellant left the scene with Shea. He was arrested eight hours later at his sister's home, and Shea was returned to her mother. Cynthia Carr died of a gunshot wound to the head. The medical evidence also revealed that she had a large bruise on the top of her foot and a cut on her bottom lip.

The appellant testified in his own behalf. He admitted that he pointed the gun at Cynthia Carr's head, but denied that he intended to kill her. He testified that he struggled with Ms. Carr in an attempt to wrest his daughter Shea away from her, that he and Ms. Carr hit the floor, and that the gun accidentally discharged.

The appellant said that he returned to the Carr residence with a loaded gun because he wanted to see his daughter and he was scared after hearing from his sister of the threat made by Cynthia Carr that he could "just forget seeing Barbara or Shea," and that "if he c[a]me over [t]here and trie[d] to get his baby, [the victim was] going to blow a hole in him." The appellant testified that as he exited his vehicle, the gun, which had been in his back pocket, began to fall out, so he held onto the firearm as he approached the Carr residence.

The trial court instructed the jury on the charged capital offense and on the lesser included offenses of intentional murder, reckless murder, felony murder, and sudden heat of passion manslaughter. The court refused to charge on reckless manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and accident.

The requested instructions on criminally negligent homicide and accident were properly refused because they were not supported by the evidence. However, the court erred by charging on reckless murder and by failing to charge on reckless manslaughter.

A person commits the crime of reckless murder if "[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another person." Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(2). Although reckless murder may, under some circumstances, be an included offense of murder committed during the course of a burglary, see § 13A-5-40(b) (Supp.1990) ("Subject to the provisions of section 13A-5-41, [reckless] murder as defined in section 13A-6-2(a)(2) ... may be a lesser included offense of [a] capital offense"), there was no rational basis for a charge on reckless murder here.

An instruction on reckless murder is not warranted if the accused's "conduct was directed toward one individual rather than human life in general." Thomas v. State, 517 So.2d 640 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). "The element of 'extreme indifference to human life' by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally." Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), cert. quashed, 413 So.2d 1172 (Ala.1982). "[A] reckless murder charge is not applicable where the acts resulting in death are directed to one or more particular persons." Walker v. State, 523 So.2d 528, 538 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (emphasis added). Because it was undisputed that the appellant pursued and pointed a gun at a particular victim, the evidence did not support the reckless murder charge.

Although the trial court's charge on reckless murder was error, the error was invited by the appellant's specific request for the charge and therefore does not constitute grounds for reversal. "The doctrine of invited error has been specifically applied to possible error resulting from the defendant's request for a particular jury instruction." Leverett v. State, 462 So.2d 972, 977 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), and authorities cited therein.

In contrast, the court's failure to give the appellant's requested charge on reckless manslaughter does constitute grounds for reversal. Reckless manslaughter may be a lesser included offense of intentional murder. Gray v. State, 574 So.2d 1010 (Ala.Cr.App.1990); Paige v. State, 494 So.2d 795 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). "A person commits the crime of manslaughter if [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person." § 13A-6-3(a)(1).

"A defendant who recklessly causes another's death commits manslaughter if he 'consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would cause that result.' Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 210.03, Comment 4 (1980). The difference between the circumstances which will support a murder conviction and the degree of risk contemplated by the manslaughter statute is one of degree, not kind. From a comparison of Sections 210.03 and 210.02 of the Model Code, it appears that the degree of recklessness which will support a manslaughter conviction involves a circumstance which is a 'gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation,' but is not so high that it cannot be 'fairly distinguished from' the mental state required in intentional homicides."

Ex parte Weems, 463 So.2d 170, 172 (Ala.1984).

An instruction on reckless manslaughter should have been given in this case because the jury could have found that the appellant acted recklessly, rather than intentionally, when he shot Cynthia Carr. Medical evidence indicating that Cynthia Carr's body had a recent bruise on her foot and a cut on her lip supported the appellant's version of the facts that he and the victim struggled before the gun discharged. The jury could have determined that the appellant disregarded a known risk of harm by pointing a loaded gun at Ms. Carr and by struggling with her while the gun was in his hand. See Ex parte Weems, 463 So.2d at 173, wherein the court held that the accused's carrying a loaded pistol into a cafe amounted to a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and "present[ed] a clear case" of reckless manslaughter when the pistol discharged and hit an unintended victim. See also Anderson v. State, 507 So.2d 580 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court held that reckless manslaughter charge should have been given in case where accused armed himself and returned to the scene of a prior...