McLaughlin v. State
Decision Date | 17 December 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 91488.,91488. |
Citation | 721 So.2d 1170 |
Parties | Daniel Marcus McLAUGHLIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Respondent.
We have for review McLaughlin v. State, 698 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), based on conflict with C.L. v. State, 693 So.2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash McLaughlin.
United States Federal Protection Service officers Martinez and Aho were drinking coffee outside a convenience store in downtown Miami at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 26, 1995, when they heard gunshots. Although the federal officers did not routinely respond to local disturbances,1 they decided on this occasion to investigate the gunshots themselves rather than call City of Miami police. Officer Martinez saw McLaughlin walking along the street with a gun in his waistband and engaged him in conversation. McLaughlin pulled the gun, pointed it at Martinez, and then ran behind a jitney.
Officers Martinez and Aho subdued McLaughlin and in the process Aho's can of Mace accidently opened, dousing Aho with concentrated cayenne pepper spray ("It burns like hell."). McLaughlin was charged inter alia with two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.021 (aggravated assault) and 784.07 (enhancement provision for assault on a law enforcement officer), Florida Statutes (1995). He was convicted on both counts and the district court affirmed, holding that Federal Protection Service officers are law enforcement officers for purposes of section 784.07.
Section 784.07 provides that when an assault or battery is committed against a law enforcement officer the offense shall be reclassified upward one degree, e.g., an aggravated assault is enhanced from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony. The statute sets forth a comprehensive list of "law enforcement officers":
§ 747.07, Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added).
Chapter 943, Fla. Stat. (1995), entitled "Department of Law Enforcement," contains the key definition of "law enforcement officer." This definition is limited to state and local officers:
(1) "Law enforcement officer" means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof; who is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests; and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state. This definition includes all certified supervisory and command personnel whose duties include, in whole or in part, the supervision, training, guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency.
§ 943.10, Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added). McLaughlin contends that Federal Protection Service Officers are not state or local officers for purposes of the enhancement statute. We agree.
Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (emphasis omitted) (quoting American Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)).
Where criminal statutes are concerned, the rules are even stricter: State v. Camp, 596 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.1992) (citation omitted). This principle is codified in Florida Statutes:
Applying the above principles to the present statutes, we note that section 784.07(1)(a) states that "the term `law enforcement officer' includes a law enforcement officer ... [as] defined in s. 943.10." Section 943.10 provides at the outset that "`[l]aw enforcement officer' means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
LAWNWOOD Med. Ctr. INC. v. SADOW
...is clear and unambiguous, then the court has no further reason to apply the rules of statutory construction). 13. McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 14. Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.2000); ......
-
Closet Maid v. Sykes, 1D98-660.
...according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, and may not resort to extrinsic aides to statutory construction. See McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998); Rhodes v. State, 704 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Although the phrase "major contributing cause" is not defined in the Work......
-
Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida
...the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). In determining that intent, we have explained that "we look first to the statute's plain meaning." Moonlit Waters Apart......
-
State v. Kliphouse, 4D99-1608.
...to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998). One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary me......
-
After Chicone: blasting the bedrock of the criminal law.
...is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense). (6) Id. at 744. (7) Id. at 741-744. (8) McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998), citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. (9) Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d at 219. (10) But see Wright v. State, 920 So. ......