McLaughlin v. State, No. 91488.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the CourtSHAW, Justice.
Citation721 So.2d 1170
PartiesDaniel Marcus McLAUGHLIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Docket NumberNo. 91488.
Decision Date17 December 1998

721 So.2d 1170

Daniel Marcus McLAUGHLIN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent

No. 91488.

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 17, 1998.


721 So.2d 1171
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, for Petitioner

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Respondent.

SHAW, Justice.

We have for review McLaughlin v. State, 698 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), based on conflict with C.L. v. State, 693 So.2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash McLaughlin.

United States Federal Protection Service officers Martinez and Aho were drinking coffee outside a convenience store in downtown Miami at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 26, 1995, when they heard gunshots. Although the federal officers did not routinely respond to local disturbances,1 they decided on this occasion to investigate the gunshots themselves rather than call City of Miami police. Officer Martinez saw McLaughlin walking along the street with a gun in his waistband and engaged him in conversation. McLaughlin pulled the gun, pointed it at Martinez, and then ran behind a jitney.

Officers Martinez and Aho subdued McLaughlin and in the process Aho's can of Mace accidently opened, dousing Aho with concentrated cayenne pepper spray ("It burns like hell."). McLaughlin was charged inter alia with two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.021 (aggravated assault) and 784.07 (enhancement provision for assault on a law enforcement officer), Florida Statutes (1995). He was convicted on both counts and the district court affirmed, holding that Federal Protection Service officers are law enforcement officers for purposes of section 784.07.

Section 784.07 provides that when an assault or battery is committed against a law enforcement officer the offense shall be reclassified upward one degree, e.g., an aggravated assault is enhanced from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony. The statute sets forth a comprehensive list of "law enforcement officers":

784.07 Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other
721 So.2d 1172
specified officers; reclassification of offenses; minimum sentences.—
(1)(a) As used in this section, the term "law enforcement officer" includes a law enforcement officer, a correctional officer, a correctional probation officer, a part-time law enforcement officer, a part-time correctional officer, an auxiliary law enforcement officer, and an auxiliary correctional officer, as those terms are respectively defined in s. 943.10, and any county probation officer; employee or agent of the Department of Corrections who supervises or provides services to inmates; officer of the Parole Commission; and law enforcement personnel of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the Department of Environmental Protection, or the Department of Law Enforcement.

§ 747.07, Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added).

Chapter 943, Fla. Stat. (1995), entitled "Department of Law Enforcement," contains the key definition of "law enforcement officer." This definition is limited to state and local officers:

943.10 Definitions....

(1) "Law enforcement officer" means any person who
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78 practice notes
  • LAWNWOOD Med. Ctr. INC. v. SADOW, No. 4D08-1968.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • March 24, 2010
    ...is clear and unambiguous, then the court has no further reason to apply the rules of statutory construction). 13. McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 14. Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.2000); ......
  • Closet Maid v. Sykes, No. 1D98-660.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • February 15, 2000
    ...according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, and may not resort to extrinsic aides to statutory construction. See McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998); Rhodes v. State, 704 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA Although the phrase "major contributing cause" is not defined in the Workers' Co......
  • State v. Kliphouse, No. 4D99-1608.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 27, 2000
    ...to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998). One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary me......
  • Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, No. SC00-1910.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2004
    ...polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). In determining that intent, we have explained that "we look first to the statute's plain meaning." Moonlit Waters Apartment......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
77 cases
  • LAWNWOOD Med. Ctr. INC. v. SADOW, No. 4D08-1968.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • March 24, 2010
    ...is clear and unambiguous, then the court has no further reason to apply the rules of statutory construction). 13. McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 14. Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.2000); ......
  • Closet Maid v. Sykes, No. 1D98-660.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • February 15, 2000
    ...according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, and may not resort to extrinsic aides to statutory construction. See McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998); Rhodes v. State, 704 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA Although the phrase "major contributing cause" is not defined in the Workers' Co......
  • State v. Kliphouse, No. 4D99-1608.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 27, 2000
    ...to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998). One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary me......
  • Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, No. SC00-1910.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2004
    ...polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). In determining that intent, we have explained that "we look first to the statute's plain meaning." Moonlit Waters Apartment......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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