McLaughlin v. Steele

• Decision Date: 22 March 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:12CV1464 CDP
• Citation: 173 F.Supp.3d 855
• Parties: Scott McLaughlin, Petitioner, v. Troy Steele, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

173 F.Supp.3d 855

Scott McLaughlin, Petitioner,

v.Troy Steele, Respondent.

Case No. 4:12CV1464 CDP

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

Signed March 22, 2016

Kent E. Gipson, Kansas City, MO, Laurence E. Komp, Laurence E. Komp Attorney at Law, Manchester, MO, for Petitioner.

Caroline M. Coulter, Stephen D. Hawke, Attorney General of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CATHERINE D. PERRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Scott McLaughlin is currently on death row at the Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri, for the murder of Beverly Guenther. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in St. Louis County of first-degree murder, forcible rape, and armed criminal action. The jury found him not guilty of a second count of armed criminal action. After the jury deadlocked on punishment, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to death for the murder. The judge also imposed consecutive life sentences for the rape and armed criminal action convictions.

This action is before me now on Petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Two of Petitioner's claims warrant relief. First, in what is referred to here as Petitioner's Claim 1A, petitioner alleges that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate investigation into a psychiatrist he intended to call as an expert witness during the penalty phase of the case. Because of the inadequate investigation, counsel decided at the last moment not to call the psychiatrist, and so did not present any medical evidence on the statutory mitigating factors of extreme emotional disturbance and that petitioner lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Post-conviction counsel failed to raise this claim, and so it was not considered on the merits by the Missouri courts. But the evidence shows that postconviction counsel knew of this issue and its significance well in advance of the relevant deadline, planned to address it in his postconviction motion, and then inexplicably failed to raise it in accordance with Missouri's postconviction procedure. The omission prejudiced Petitioner, who to date has received no merits adjudication of the underlying claim. Postconviction counsel's error constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which—under Martinez v. Ryan , ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) —requires this court's review of the underlying claim. In conducting that review, I find that trial counsel's cursory investigation of psychiatrist Dr. Caruso was such a grievous oversight that it both failed to comport with professionally prevailing norms and also prejudiced Petitioner at sentencing. These errors together violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and require resentencing.

Second, because of the wording of the special verdict form used in this case, the court could not have known whether the jury concluded that the mitigating circumstances surrounding the murder outweighed the aggravating circumstances. That weighing is a finding of fact that Missouri state law requires and the Sixth Amendment reserves for a jury. The judge's imposition of a death sentence without a jury finding on this mandatory factual predicate was a violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as described in Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Mills v. Maryland , 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). The Supreme Court of Missouri's affirmation of Petitioner's death sentence was based on an objectively unreasonable application of Ring and was contrary to Ring and Mills. This error, raised in Petitioner's Claim 3, also requires resentencing.

Petitioner raises 10 other grounds for relief. These remaining claims and subclaims are procedurally barred or fail on the merits.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following recitation of facts comes from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri affirming the conviction and sentence in this case:

The evidence at trial, considered in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, shows that Scott McLaughlin and Beverly Guenther began a tempestuous relationship shortly after they met in 2002. For several months, the two lived together, but their cohabitation was marked by break-ups that were sometimes so serious that Ms. Guenther would obtain a restraining order against Mr. McLaughlin. In the spring of 2003, they ended their amorous relationship, but continued to see each other on social occasions. Throughout their relationship, Mr. McLaughlin frequently called and visited Ms. Guenther at her place of employment.

On October 27, 2003, Mr. McLaughlin was arrested and charged with burglarizing Ms. Guenther's home. He claimed that he was reclaiming things that he left at her house after they stopped living together. He was arraigned on the burglary charge on November 18, 2003. Based on this incident, Ms. Guenther sought and received an order of protection against Mr. McLaughlin. On November 20, 2003, while the protective order was still in effect, he drove to Ms. Guenther's place of employment and waited for her to get off of work. When she emerged from the office, he spoke with her as she walked towards her truck.

The state presented expert testimony that the blood spatters and other physical evidence in the parking lot and truck suggested that Mr. McLaughlin at that point forced Ms. Guenther to the ground and raped her, then stabbed her repeatedly, causing a fan-shaped blood stain on the parking lot, and then dragged her body to his car and placed it in the hatchback. Mr. McLaughlin then drove to the river with the intention of disposing of her body. He tried to deposit her body in the river, but ran into some thick underbrush along the bank and left her corpse there. He then returned to sleep in his parked car because one of the tires had become flat when he stopped to dispose of the body.

The next day, Mr. McLaughlin cleaned out the inside of his car with bleach. As the day went on, he became increasingly hyperactive and nervous. Eventually, Mr. McLaughlin asked a friend to take him to a hospital in St. Charles so that he could get some medication for his mental disorder. The police were informed that Mr. McLaughlin was going to be at the hospital, and he was arrested when he arrived.

State v. McLaughlin , 265 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Mo. banc 2008), cert. denied , 556 U.S. 1165, 129 S.Ct. 1906, 173 L.Ed.2d 1057 (2009).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Based on his actions described above, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and forcible rape. The jury deadlocked partway through Missouri's multistep capital sentencing process and completed a special verdict form. The trial judge then imposed a sentence of death for the murder and consecutive life sentences for the rape and armed criminal action. Petitioner appealed certain aspects of his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected Petitioner's direct appeal in August 2008 and denied rehearing the following month. Id.

Petitioner then brought a motion in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, for postconviction relief under Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15. The motion court granted in part and denied in part a motion for an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's postconviction claims. After a four-day hearing on several of Petitioner's claims, the motion court denied in full the Rule 29.15 motion. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the denial and again denied rehearing. McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328 (Mo. banc 2012).

Petitioner then filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

III. GROUNDS RAISED

Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds:

1. Defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase of trial for:

A. failing to conduct an adequate investigation into Dr. Caruso, and as a result, failing to present testimony from a psychiatrist (Claim 1A),

B. failing to investigate, retain, and present expert testimony from a neuropsychologist that Petitioner suffered from brain damage and other neuropsychological impairments at the time the murder was committed (Claim 1B), and

C. failing to investigate and present available school, medical, and jail records regarding Petitioner's mental illnesses and intellectual impairments (Claim 1C).

2. The trial court violated Petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by instructing the jury they could not consider Petitioner's school, medical, and jail records as substantive mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of trial (Claim 2A), and his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to these instructions (Claim 2B).

3. The trial court's imposition of a death sentence violated Petitioner's Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because Missouri's sentencing statute and jury instructions permitted the trial court, rather than the jury, to make findings of fact required to render Petitioner eligible for the death penalty.

4. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence that Petitioner's brother raped the victim.

5. The trial court improperly admitted hearsay statements of the victim, which violated Petitioner's Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

6. The prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument was constitutionally improper because he compared the jurors to soldiers in wartime, expressed personal opinions, and referred to facts not in evidence (Claim 6A), and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object (Claim 6B).

7. The trial court violated Petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of felony murder.

8. The “depravity of mind” aggravating circumstance upon which the State relied in seeking Petitioner's death sentence is impermissibly vague and excessively broad under the Eighth and...