McLaughlin v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Tiverton
| Decision Date | 20 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017–156–Appeal,NC 11–535,2017–156–Appeal |
| Parties | William C. MCLAUGHLIN v. ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW OF the TOWN OF TIVERTON et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
For Plaintiff: Daniel Calabro, Jr., Esq.
For Defendants: Peter F. Skwirz, Esq., Anthony DeSisto, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
When, close to a decade ago, William C. McLaughlin built a garage on his property in Tiverton, he did so in violation of the setback requirements set forth in Tiverton's Zoning Ordinance. As the record indicates, and as is not in dispute, a portion of McLaughlin's garage was within seven feet of his property boundary, twenty-three feet short of the side yard setback requirement of thirty feet. Those twenty-three feet have triggered a yearslong process that McLaughlin now seeks to partially unwind.
McLaughlin appeals from a September 2, 2016 order of the Superior Court denying his motion to vacate an earlier court order, entered on April 7, 2014, that compelled him to remove the garage from his property. As it stands now, over eleven years after McLaughlin first set out to build a garage, the Town of Tiverton has had the garage removed, and it holds a $69,300 lien on McLaughlin's property arising from contempt fines that were imposed by a trial justice in August 2015.1 In this appeal, we are tasked with resolving the following issues: whether to vacate the April 7, 2014 order under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; whether to vacate it under Rule 60(b)(6) ; and whether McLaughlin is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from pursuing either of those two avenues.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the Superior Court order denying McLaughlin's motion to vacate the April 7, 2014 order.
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute, but they tell a rather complicated tale. In 2007, McLaughlin applied for and received a permit from the municipal Building Inspector to build a 40–by–60 foot garage on his property. As he would later admit to the Tiverton Zoning Board of Review and in a letter seeking a zoning variance, that permit was based on an erroneous site plan that McLaughlin had provided to the town. That plan, which McLaughlin himself prepared, inaccurately described the boundaries of his property. Whether this error was inadvertent or intentional is unknown, but it is clear that McLaughlin's garage was built well short of the side yard setback required by the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance.
In 2010, spurred to action by a notice of violation issued by the zoning official, McLaughlin applied for a zoning variance from the Zoning Board of Review.2 After a number of continuances, the zoning board held a hearing on McLaughlin's variance request on September 7, 2011. At that hearing, McLaughlin, who was represented by counsel, argued that the zoning board should grant him a variance from the setback requirement because he had exercised reasonable care in locating the area on which to build the garage. The financial hardship associated with moving the garage, McLaughlin asseverated, justified relief from the literal requirements of the ordinance.
After hearing from McLaughlin and also after taking testimony from one of McLaughlin's abutting neighbors, the zoning board unanimously denied the variance application. In a letter dated October 3, 2011, the zoning board explained, among other things, that not only was McLaughlin's garage in violation of the side yard setback requirement, but also that the garage was in violation of the front yard setback requirement.
Shortly after his variance request was denied, McLaughlin, now pro se , appealed to the Superior Court for relief. But there, too, his appeal for zoning relief was unsuccessful. In an October 4, 2013 bench decision, a justice of the Superior Court affirmed the zoning board's denial of McLaughlin's variance request. That justice concluded that the only hardship McLaughlin faced was purely financial in nature, and the hearing justice held that such self-created financial hardship was not a sufficient ground justifying a variance. McLaughlin, still unsatisfied, then appealed that judgment to this Court. However, in January 2014, his appeal was dismissed as procedurally improper.3
It is at this juncture that this seemingly run-of-the-mill zoning matter went astray. That is so because on October 4, 2013, just after rendering his decision affirming the zoning board, the hearing justice and counsel for the zoning board had engaged in the following colloquy:
That colloquy, raising the specter of a forthcoming "separate motion," was a foreshadowing of things to come.
On March 11, 2014, the same assistant town solicitor who represented the board in defending McLaughlin's zoning appeal filed a motion entitled "Motion for Order to Comply." That motion was filed in this case, captioned NC 11–535, the same case in which, as discussed above, the hearing justice had affirmed the zoning board's denial of the variance. In moving for an order to comply, the zoning board asked the Superior Court to order McLaughlin to "either move or remove the [garage] to comply with local zoning in accordance with the Decision of the [zoning board], affirmed by this court[.]" As a penalty, the zoning board suggested "that if [McLaughlin] does not effectuate such compliance by either moving or removing the structure within ninety (90) days of this Order[,]" then he "shall be adjudged in contempt and subject to a fine for each day thereafter that the [garage] remains out of compliance[.]"
Furthermore, in its memorandum supporting the motion, the zoning board requested that the Superior Court invoke its equitable powers under G.L. 1956 § 8–2–13 and order McLaughlin to comply with the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance by moving or removing his garage. The matter was scheduled for a hearing on April 7, 2014. Significantly, McLaughlin does not dispute that he received notice of that hearing.
However, McLaughlin did not appear on April 7. A brief hearing was presided over by the same hearing justice who heard and denied McLaughlin's zoning appeal. It went as follows:
And with that, the April 7 hearing concluded. An order entered, granting the zoning board's motion and setting a ninety-day clock for McLaughlin to comply with the setback requirements of the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance.
On the very next day, April 8, 2014, McLaughlin filed a motion of his own. He denominated his filing as a "Motion to Vacate Judgment/Reconsider[.]" However, a letter accompanying that motion referred to his pleading as a "[m]otion to reconsider judgment * * *." A hearing on the motion was held on May 9, 2014.
At the beginning of that hearing, the hearing justice sought to clarify what McLaughlin was seeking in his motion.4 After McLaughlin raised a host of grievances, many of which related to his already-decided zoning appeal, the hearing justice told McLaughlin:
McLaughlin replied, "Yes, sir."5
After another back-and-forth with the hearing justice, McLaughlin then addressed what appears to be the foremost reason that he wanted the hearing justice to reconsider his order of April 7, 2014. According to McLaughlin, the notice he received appeared to inform him that the hearing was to be held on April 17, a mix-up that, in his view, warranted the hearing justice reconsidering the order.6 Toward the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice finally pinned down what McLaughlin's core concern was: He needed more time to comply with the April 7 order. Thus, McLaughlin assented to a partial remedy; the zoning board agreed to reset the ninety-day timeline. Thereafter, on May 20, 2014, the hearing justice entered an order affirming that McLaughlin would be required to move or remove his garage in compliance with the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance. However, the order also gave him ninety days from the May 9, 2014 hearing to do so.
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