McLaurin v. McLaurin

• Citation: 853 So.2d 1279
• Decision Date: 02 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-00730-COA.,2002-CA-00730-COA.
• Parties: Ann Hatcher McLAURIN, Appellant, v. John H. McLAURIN, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi

853 So.2d 1279

Ann Hatcher McLAURIN, Appellant, v. John H. McLAURIN, Appellee.

No. 2002-CA-00730-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

September 2, 2003.

Lawrence Primeaux, Meridian, attorney for appellant.

Jack W. Brand, Jackson, and Roger Googe, attorneys for appellee.

Before SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE and GRIFFIS, JJ.

GRIFFIS, J., for the court.

¶ 1. Ann and John McLaurin were divorced on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. They filed a consent to divorce agreement and submitted several issues to the chancellor for resolution. After the chancellor divided the marital assets and entered a final judgment, Ann now appeals arguing that the chancellor erred in denying her alimony and in dividing the marital assets. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. The McLaurins were married on August 2, 1956. The McLaurins' three children were emancipated at the time of their divorce. After forty-five years of marriage, the McLaurins separated on December 28, 2000.

¶ 3. Ann has been employed with Newton County Farm Bureau since 1968. She serves as both office manager and secretary. Ann's net income from Farm Bureau is $1, 456.21 per month. Ann has a high school education.

¶ 4. John is a retired fireman. His total retirement income is $1,788 per month. He receives an additional $250 per month in proceeds from a financed sale of timberland. After deducting health insurance, John's net income is $1,348.57 per month. John has a high school education.

¶ 5. On July 26, 2001, John and Ann executed and filed an agreement, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 93-5-2 (Rev.1994), to consent to an irreconcilable differences divorce. The parties specifically agreed to the division of certain marital property, namely two automobiles. Debra received the 1997 Cadillac, and John received the 1998 GMC truck. Each agreed to be responsible for the costs and debt associated with their vehicle.

¶ 6. During the course of the proceedings, John and Ann agreed to sell the marital home, sell John's interest in the remaining parcels of real property that he owned jointly with B.C. Broughton, pay all associated costs of the sales, and divide the proceeds equally between them. John also agreed to provide medical coverage to Ann, under COBRA, at a cost of $338 per month for twelve months.

¶ 7. At the conclusion of the trial which was held on March 26 and 27, 2002, the chancellor rendered a bench opinion. Thereafter, on April 1, 2002, the chancellor entered a supplemental opinion in which he determined that the personal property in question was marital property because both parties were gainfully employed during the marriage and because both parties substantially contributed to the accumulation of the personal property. The personal property included items such as cash, monetary accounts, furniture and accessories, sporting goods, vehicles, tools, jewelry, appliances, and china. The chancellor then valued the assets and distributed the marital property. Ann received marital property valued at $102,581.96, and John received marital property valued at $86,611.97. Of the cash available, less outstanding liabilities, the chancellor evenly distributed Ann and John $9,747.97 each.

¶ 8. The chancellor estimated the cash that was to be received from the sale of the home was $130,000, the four parcels of land from the joint venture was $242,558, and he then determined that each party would receive one-half of the total, approximately $186,279. The chancellor considered Ann's medical coverage through COBRA, for a period of twelve months, and according to the parties' agreement awarded her the sum of $4,056 to pay the cost of that coverage.

¶ 9. The chancellor determined that John would receive total assets valued at $282,638.76 and that Ann would receive total assets valued at $302,664.75. The chancellor concluded that this division, with Ann receiving 51.7% of the marital assets and John receiving 48.3%, was equitable and would adequately provide for the needs of both parties. The chancellor decided that the division of assets was proper after taking into consideration their standard of living, their income and expenses, the non-existence of non-marital property, and the cash division to be received by each from the sale of the home and timberland. The chancellor noted that he had not, as requested by the parties during trial, "equally" divided their marital assets because this property division eliminated the need for periodic payments and other potential sources of friction between the parties. The chancellor's findings of fact and conclusions of law were memorialized in a judgment for divorce entered on April 15, 2002.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10. This Court employs a limited standard of review of the division and distribution of property in divorces. Reddell v. Reddell, 696 So.2d 287, 288 (Miss. 1997). The chancellor's division and distribution of property "will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence." Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So.2d 901, 904 (Miss.1994). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor "[e]ven if this Court disagree[s] with the lower court on the finding of fact and might ... [arrive] at a different conclusion." Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss.1978). The chancellor's findings will not be disturbed "unless the Chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss.1990).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Whether the court erred in rejecting the parties' agreement at trial to equally divide the assets.

¶ 11. Ann contends that the chancellor erred by rejecting the parties' agreement, during the trial, to "equally" divide the assets. The Mississippi Supreme Court has declined to interpret "equitable" distribution to mean "equal" distribution. Trovato v. Trovato, 649 So.2d 815, 818 (Miss.1995). "It is well-settled law that the courts, when making an equitable distribution of marital property, are not required to divide the property equally. Love v. Love, 687 So.2d 1229, 1232 (Miss.1997). `Mississippi is not a community property state ... This point cannot be stressed enough.'" Owen v. Owen, 798 So.2d 394, 399(¶ 14) (Miss.2001) (quoting Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 863-64 (Miss.1994)). Divorcing parties have no right to equal distribution even where the parties jointly accumulated the property. Pierce v. Pierce, 648 So.2d 523, 526 (Miss. 1994). The consent to divorce agreement controlled the issue before the chancellor. In that document, the parties asked the chancellor to determine an "equitable division of the marital estate." We also recognize that the chancellor's final decision was in fact very close to being equal, as argued by Ann. Therefore, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion and that this assignment of error is without merit.

2. Whether the chancellor erred in denying alimony.

¶ 12. Ann next argues that the chancellor erred in denying her demand for periodic alimony. Ann claims that the division of marital assets was unfair and has left her with little cash assets. In Mississippi, the award of alimony lies within the sound discretion of the court. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993). When alimony is not awarded at all or is considered inadequate, normally we will affirm unless "the decision is seen as so oppressive, unjust or grossly inadequate as to evidence an abuse of discretion." Id.

¶ 13. "Alimony is not a completely independent financial issue in a domestic case, in which its consideration is hermetically sealed from other financial matters." Buckley v. Buckley, 815 So.2d 1260, 1262(¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). Alimony together with equitable distribution of property work together to provide for the parties after divorce. Id. "Therefore, where one expands, the other must recede." Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 929 (Miss.1994). "If the marital assets, after equitable division and in light of the parties' non-marital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, then `no more need be done.'" Id. If an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party's non-marital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony should be considered. Id.

¶ 14. Here, there were no non-marital assets to be considered. The chancellor found that a "deficit" did not exist because the division of marital assets was sufficient to provide for Ann's needs and that such division eliminated the need for periodic alimony payments. Therefore, in order to determine whether alimony was improperly denied, we must first look at whether the equitable division of the marital assets was sufficient to provide for both parties.

3. Whether the court erred in the division of marital property.

a. Whether the division was equitable.

¶ 15. Ann claims that the division of marital assets was inequitable and unfair because John received cash equivalent assets and she received non-cash equivalent assets, such as furniture. Ann further claims that she was entitled to half of the funds in each joint account and half of the proceeds from the timber sales, because the sales were a result of a joint asset. John received life insurance policies (valued at $40,090 and $3,594), an IRA account (valued at $5,154.97), 2001 timber sale proceeds (of $9,866), a boat (valued at $4,500), and an ATV (valued at $3,000) among other things.

¶ 16. Upon review, we note that Ann asked for the furniture. We also find that Ann received cash equivalent assets such as the American Express 401k account (valued at $62,000), the Union Planters Bank checking account (valued at $5,093), the joint account at Newton County Bank (valued at $2,116), as well as the John Deere lawn mower (valued at $300), china (valued at $200) and jewelry (valued at $2,255), in addition to the home furnishings and appliances (valued at $14,642). Ann will also receive her share of the...