McLean County v. Kickapoo Creek, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 44033,44033
• Parties: The COUNTY OF McLEAN, Appellee, v. KICKAPOO CREEK, INC., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 720

282 N.E.2d 720

51 Ill.2d 353

The COUNTY OF McLEAN, Appellee, v. KICKAPOO CREEK, INC., et al., Appellants.

No. 44033.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 30, 1972.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 25, 1972.

Thomson, Thomson & Mirza, Bloomington, Jerome Mirza, Bloomington, of counsel, for appellants.

Paul R. Welch, State's Atty., for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice:

This is an appeal from judgments of the circuit court of McLean County entered after a consolidated bench trial finding defendants, Kickapoo Creek, Inc., and its president, L. David Lewis, guilty of criminal contempt. The corporation was fined $20,000 and Lewis was sentenced to one year in the county jail and fined $10,000. Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but contend that they never waived their right to a jury trial.

On Wednesday, May 27, 1970, the circuit court restrained and permanently enjoined the defendant corporation and its officers from proceeding with a planned rock festival which was to be conducted over the Memorial Day weekend, 1970, on a farm held in trust, with L. David Lewis as trustee. The rock festival occurred and thereafter contempt proceedings were instituted against the defendants. At trial no jury was present nor were opening statements made or requested. The trial court did not inquire if defendants desired a jury nor did defense counsel expressly state that a jury trial was waived.

The evidence indicated that at the festival there was nudity, illicit drug usage, and apparent damage to surrounding property caused by some spectators whose numbers were estimated to be in the thousands. The traffic conditions surrounding the farm were apparently chaotic due to the lack of proper parking facilities and the police had to tow many of the spectators' vehicles in an effort to alleviate traffic congestion. Evidence establishing the expenditure of funds from public agencies patroling the area was also introduced. Lewis testified that he took no affirmative action to curtail the festival activities.

During closing arguments the State's Attorney recommended that if defendants were adjudged guilty, the corporate defendant be severely fined and defendant Lewis be severely fined and incarcerated for six months in his capacity as an officer and director of the corporate defendant and an additional six months as trustee. At this juncture of the proceedings, defense counsel for the first time intimated that he believed that 'this was a petty offense hearing,' and that 'we have not waived a jury trial in these proceedings.' He then concluded, 'We withheld our consent to proceed without a jury trial in this case. We never consented to proceeding.'

All parties in the instant case characterize the proceedings as being in the nature of criminal contempt. We agree. Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court (People ex rel. Kazubowski v. Ray, 48 Ill.2d 413, 272 N.E.2d 225), and its penalty is purely punitive.

We further agree with defendants' contention that the penalties imposed classify the contempts as being of a serious nature. In Illinois, no maximum punishment is prescribed for convictions of criminal contempt. (People v. Stollar, 31 Ill.2d 154, 201 N.E.2d 97.) Where no maximum penalty is authorized, the seriousness of the charge is to be determined by the severity of the actual sentence (Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522; Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629). In Cheff the court relied upon a Federal statute (18 U.S.C., sec. 1) which defined a petty offense as '(a)ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500 or both * * *,' to differentiate between 'petty' and 'serious' criminal contempts. In Cheff the court held that a sentence of up to 6 months incarceration may be imposed for criminal contempt without affording the defendant a jury trial.

Applying this criteria to the facts of the instant case, we find that Lewis was convicted of a serious offense entitling him to a jury trial unless waived and this right is also afforded to the corporate defendant for its fine exceeded $500. United States v. R. L. Polk and Company (6th Cir. 1971), 438 F.2d 377.

In Bloom, the court concluded: 'Criminally contemptuous conduct may violate other provisions of the criminal law; but even when this is not the case convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact on the individual defendant is the same.' (391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481, 20 L.Ed.2d 528.) Recognizing this similarity we perceive no justification for not imposing the standards for jury waiver required in other forms of criminal proceedings.

A defendant who is informed and who expresses his desire may waive his right to a jury trial. (People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill....