McLean Piece Dye Works v. Verga

• Decision Date: 02 May 1935
• Citation: 178 A. 625
• Parties: McLEAN PIECE DYE WORKS v. VERGA.
• Court: New Jersey Circuit Court

178 A. 625

McLEAN PIECE DYE WORKS

v. VERGA.

Circuit Court of New Jersey, Passaic County.

May 2, 1935.

Proceeding in the matter of the application to vacate arbitration award by McLean Piece Dye Works against Sam Verga.

Application denied.

Evans, Smith and Evans (by John P. Evans), all of Paterson, for applicant.

Harry Joelson, of Paterson, for respondent.

PORTER, Judge.

The motion is to vacate an arbitration award. It appears that the respondent, Verga, was in the employ of the applicant, McLean Piece Dye Works; that on February 26, 1935, he was discharged from such employment by Garry Iozia, one of the officers and general manager of the applicant, after an argument or disagreement between them. It further appears that in December, 1934, exact date not given, an agreement was entered into in writing between the applicant and the Federation of Silk and Rayon Dyers and Finishers of America whereby, among other things, it is provided, in paragraph 6, that no worker shall be discharged without cause; that if an employee who has been discharged is of the opinion that the discharge was "unjust," said employee shall have the right to have that question decided by a tribunal of two, consisting of a representative of the union and a representative of the employer, who, if unable to agree, shall choose "a disinterested person whose decision shall be final."

It further appears that the respondent did, in pursuance with this agreement, appeal from the employer's action, and an arbitration hearing was held on March 6, 1935, by two men duly selected for that purpose. These men were unable to agree, and they appointed on that date George I. Grabow to act as umpire, whereupon he heard the witnesses produced by each party and rendered an award in writing, without date, but apparently announced his decision at the close of the hearing. In his findings he reviews the testimony and states his conclusions and reasons therefor. He finds as a fact that the respondent was guilty of improper conduct in the shop on the occasion in question, but that his motives were not improper, and that his misconduct "was not sufficient to warrant his discharge."

The clear meaning of this award is that the discharge was unjust.

Eighteen separate grounds are urged in support of the contention that the award is improper and should be vacated.

One group of reasons urged is that the award is defective on various technical grounds, viz., that it is contrary to the law and the contract, that no authority vested in the arbitrators or the umpire, that the award is not in proper form, and that the umpire was not properly appointed.

I think there is no merit to these contentions. The contract under which this arbitration was made is binding on the parties tinder the Arbitration Act, P. E. 1923, c. 134 (page 291 [Comp. St. Supp. 1924, § 9—21 et seq.]). Moreover, the act provides that awards incorrect as to form may be modified or corrected "so as to effect the intent thereof, and promote justice between the parties." Section 10 (Comp. St Supp. 1924, § 9—30).

Nor...