McLean v. Mathews

• Decision Date: 19 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 76 Civ. 1572.,76 Civ. 1572.
• Parties: Willie McLEAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. David MATHEWS, in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, W. J. Usery, Jr., in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, Phillip Ross, Individually and in his capacity as Industrial Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor, and Stephen Berger, Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

466 F. Supp. 977

Willie McLEAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. David MATHEWS, in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, W. J. Usery, Jr., in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, Phillip Ross, Individually and in his capacity as Industrial Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor, and Stephen Berger, Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Defendants.

No. 76 Civ. 1572.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

May 19, 1976.

The Legal Aid Society of Westchester County by Steven A. Hitov, New Rochelle, N. Y., for plaintiff.

Robert B. Fiske, Jr., U. S. Atty. by Walter S. Mack, Jr., Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of State of N. Y. by Mark C. Rutzick, New York City, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

STEWART, District Judge:

Plaintiff, Willie McLean, brings this action on behalf of himself and others,¹ seeking to enjoin the enforcement of certain federal and state regulations, promulgated under the Work Incentive Program "WIN" of the Social Security Act "SSA", 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. Named as defendants are David Mathews, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare "HEW", W. J. Usery, Jr., the Secretary of Labor, the "federal defendants", Phillip Ross, the Industrial Commissioner of the New York Department of Labor, and Stephen Berger (then) Commissioner of the New York Department of Social Services "the state defendants".

Plaintiff claims that both federal and state regulations, See 29 CFR § 56.50, 29 CFR § 56.51, and 29 CFR § 56.77 and 18 NYCRR § 388.9(a) and (d), set forth in Appendix A, which deregister, for fixed time periods, individuals who have failed, without good cause, to participate in the WIN program, conflict with express provisions of the SSA specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A) and 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F), set forth in Appendix B and with the intent of the legislation as expressed in 42 U.S.C. § 630 See Appendix C. Plaintiff also asserts that, by establishing fixed time period sanctions, the regulations create an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption as to the duration of an individual's failure to participate without good cause. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the regulations violate his rights under both the SSA and the constitution and asks for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, prohibiting the enforcement of the regulations.²

The federal defendants, arguing against plaintiff's motion for preliminary relief, assert that this court is without jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. Similarly, the state defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("F.R.Civ.P."). We consider these jurisdictional questions before we turn to plaintiff's motion for preliminary relief.

Plaintiff asserts that this court has jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 5 U.S.C. § 701-§ 704 over the federal defendants. We agree with plaintiff that 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides us with jurisdiction to hear his claims. Plaintiff asserts that defendants Mathews and Usery have a non-discretionary ministerial duty to issue regulations which do not conflict with the statutory provisions of the SSA. Plaintiff finds such an obligation in the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1302, which states that the Secretaries of HEW and Labor

"shall make and publish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which each is charged under this chapter."

Plaintiff claims that the regulations quoted above conflict with statutory provisions in the chapter and are thus promulgated in violation of § 1302. As § 1302 does establish a statutory obligation to regulate consistently with the chapter, and as mandamus is a proper remedy for breach of such a duty,³ we conclude that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of § 1361 jurisdiction to permit us to proceed to the merits of plaintiff's claim. We note that our conclusion as to jurisdiction is not a decision of the merits but only permits us to consider whether the interpretation of the statute urged upon us by plaintiff is correct.⁴ See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) and Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 156-157 (3d Cir. 1975), appeal pending ___ U.S. ___ (1976).

Plaintiff also asserts that we have jurisdiction over the federal defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As the cause of action clearly arises under the laws of the United States, the principal controversy between the parties as to the viability of § 1331 jurisdiction is whether the $10,000 jurisdictional amount has been met. Plaintiff claims that he, and the class he seeks to represent, share a common interest in the distribution of a single fund, the state welfare monies, which exceeds $10,000. See, e. g. Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F.Supp. 945 (S.D. N.Y.1971), vacated as moot, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Moore v. Betit, 511 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1975).

Defendants dispute the applicability of the "common trust" theory to the present action and argue that certain elements necessary to find a "trust" are not present. As we have already found jurisdiction under § 1361, and as we have deferred class determination,⁵ we believe that it is proper not to decide the applicability of the Bass doctrine at this point. Similarly, we decline to decide whether the Administrative Procedure Act, ("APA") 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., also urged by plaintiff as a jurisdictional basis, provides an independent source of jurisdiction. We note that the law on this question is unsettled but that some district courts within this circuit have premised jurisdiction upon the APA. See generally Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974) and cases cited therein. See also Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1975) and Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975).

Turning to the state defendants, we find jurisdiction is proper under the theory of pendent jurisdiction.⁶ See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Here, the federal and state claims arise from the same factual setting and involve the same legal question — whether deregistration from the WIN program for a fixed time period is a sanction permitted under the SSA. In making the determination of whether the federal regulations are consistent with the Act, we will necessarily implicate the validity of the state regulations.⁷ Thus, it is appropriate to consider the questions of the validity of the federal and the state regulations together.

New York State, arguing against the discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction, asserts that it has independent legislative authority to issue regulations which are complementary to the federal law and that, even if we were to find the federal regulations unlawful, the state regulations may still stand. See New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973). Assuming that the New York regulations must be considered separately from the federal regulations, declining to permit pendent jurisdiction here would we believe, unjustifiably tax both the parties and the courts.⁸ See Astor-Honor Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629-630 (2d Cir. 1971).

Finally, we note that here we have decided to permit both claim and party pendency, a decision sanctioned by this circuit in Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944, 92 S.Ct. 962, 30 L.Ed.2d 815 (1972).

Because we find jurisdiction over the federal defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and jurisdiction over the state defendants under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, we deny defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We also deny the state defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Taking the allegations of the complaint as true Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts and raised substantial legal claims to require this court to consider the merits of his claim.⁹

Turning now to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief,¹⁰ a more complete explanation of the factual setting of this action is required. Willie McLean and his family receive benefits under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program. Registration in the WIN program is a condition of eligibility in the program. In 1974, McLean complied with this requirement and registered with the WIN program. However, later in that year, the Secretary of Labor made a determination that McLean had failed, without good cause, to participate in WIN. The sanction of a 90-day deregistration (as described in 18 NYCRR 388.9 and in 29 CFR § 56.50 and § 56.51) was imposed and the McLean family's AFDC allotment was reduced by the amount of Willie McLean's proportionate share.

In July of 1974, McLean re-registered with the WIN program; later that year he received further sanctions after he had been found to have refused to participate without good cause.¹¹ The instant action arises out of the imposition on December 5, 1975, of the six month deregistration, pursuant to 18 NYCRR § 388.9(a) and (d) and 29 CFR § 56.77(a). As a result of this sanction, the McLean family's AFDC grant has been reduced from $264.80 to $212.60. See 18 NYCRR § 388.9(d)(3).

McLean premises his claim that the fixed time periods of deregistration violate the SSA upon two sections of the statute. First, quoting the legislative "Statement of purpose" at 42 U.S.C. § 630,¹² McLean argues...