McLeish v. Rochdale Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | WCC No. 2011-2658 |
| Citation | 2011 MTWCC 18 |
| Parties | ARY McLEISH Petitioner v. ROCHDALE INSURANCE COMPANY Respondent/Insurer. |
| Court | Montana Workers Compensation Court |
Summary: Respondent moves this Court for summary judgment. Respondent argues that Petitioner's injury does not arise out of his employment as required by § 39-71-407(1), MCA, because it resulted from an idiopathic fall onto a level surface. Petitioner argues that his injury is compensable because the event resulting in the injury occurred at work.
Held: Respondent's motion is granted. Section 39-71-407(1), MCA, requires that a claimant's injury "arise out of" his employment in order to be compensable. An injury which results from an idiopathic fall onto a level surface does not arise out of one's employment.
¶ 1 Respondent Rochdale Insurance Company (Rochdale) moves for summary judgment. Rochdale contends that Petitioner Ary McLeish's injury is not compensable because, although McLeish's idiopathic fall and resultant injury occurred at work, the injury did not arise out of his employment as required by § 39-71-407(1), MCA. McLeish contends that his injury is compensable because it occurred at work.
¶ 2 McLeish is employed as a line cook at Nelson Enterprises d/b/a Airport Restaurant and Lounge (Nelson Enterprises).
¶ 3 McLeish's employer is enrolled under Compensation Plan No. 2 of the Workers' Compensation Act, and its insurer is Rochdale.
¶ 4 On or about April 7, 2010, McLeish appeared for work at approximately 11:00 a.m. At approximately 7:15 p.m., McLeish suffered an undetermined medical event and fell to the concrete floor. McLeish believed this to be a seizure, but does not specifically remember the incident.
¶ 5 At the time of the incident, McLeish was the only employee working in the hot kitchen, and was at the end of his shift.
¶ 6 Directly before this undetermined medical event, McLeish was standing near a mop bucket that contained floor/multi-purpose cleaner or degreaser.
¶ 7 As a result of this undetermined medical event and subsequent fall, McLeish sustained a fractured right clavicle.
¶ 8 McLeish is a long-term alcoholic who has suffered from hallucinations, paranoia, and seizures prior and subsequent to the seizure of April 7, 2010.
¶ 9 McLeish has been experiencing alcohol withdrawal-related seizures since at least 2003. McLeish experienced alcohol-related seizures in: December 2004, resulting in a closed head injury; August 2005; October 3, 2005; February 2006; and May 12, 2010.
¶ 10 On February 8, 2011, McLeish saw Dr. Lennard Wilson, board-certified neurologist, for an independent medical examination. Dr. Wilson concluded that on April 7, 2010, McLeish had a generalized, secondary generalized seizure that caused him to fall and likely resulted in his clavicle fracture.
¶ 11 Dr. Wilson further concluded, on a more-probable-than-not basis, that McLeish's seizures are caused by alcohol withdrawal or are idiopathic in nature.
¶ 12 Dr. Wilson issued his opinion well after the incident of which he had no first-hand knowledge, and was based on an evaluation and interview of McLeish, his review of the medical records, and his review of the videotape of the incident.
¶ 13 No evidence exists to suggest that McLeish's seizure condition is caused by, precipitated by, or otherwise related to his employment with Nelson Enterprises. Dr. Wilson concluded that the etiology of McLeish's seizure condition is not work-related.
¶ 14 McLeish and Rochdale disagree as to whether McLeish suffered a compensable injury. McLeish believes that it is enough that he fell at work, and that the fall resulted inhis injury. Rochdale believes that McLeish suffered a seizure; that the seizure was the cause of his resultant fall and broken clavicle; and that, because the seizure was not caused or precipitated by his work activities, McLeish cannot establish the requisite causation. Therefore, the sole issue before the Court is whether Rochdale must accept liability for McLeish's injury based exclusively on the fact that McLeish's seizure and resultant fall occurred at work.
¶ 15 This case is governed by the 2009 version of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act since that was the law in effect at the time of Petitioner's industrial accident. 2
¶ 16 For summary judgment to be granted, the moving party must establish that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 The material facts necessary for disposition of this case are undisputed. This case is appropriate for summary disposition.
¶ 17 As set forth in their Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, the parties agree that the sole issue before the Court is whether Rochdale must accept liability for McLeish's injury based exclusively on the fact that McLeish's idiopathic seizure and resultant injury occurred at work.4
¶ 18 At the outset, the procedural posture of this motion must be clarified. McLeish argues that he is the non-moving party and, accordingly, entitled to all reasonable inferences. Rochdale argues that this motion is essentially a joint motion for summary judgment because the parties submitted a Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and agreed that the only issue before this Court is a legal question.5 Rochdale argues, therefore, that the Court need not give any reasonable inferences to either party.6
¶ 19 This is not a joint motion for summary judgment. Rochdale moved for summary judgment. McLeish opposes Rochdale's motion. McLeish did not waive his status as the non-moving party by stipulating to the Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Facts. As the non-moving party, McLeish is entitled to all reasonable inferences in his favor.
¶ 20 Section 39-71-407(1), MCA, provides in pertinent part: "For workers' compensation injuries, each insurer is liable for the payment of compensation, in the manner and to the extent provided in this section, to an employee of an employer . . . that it insures who receives an injury arising out of and in the course of employment . . . ."
¶ 21 The requirements that an injury arise out of employment and occur in the course of employment are separate and discrete requirements. The Montana Supreme Court noted in Pinyerd v. State Comp. Ins. Fund: "The language 'in the course of employment,' generally refers to the time, place, and circumstances of an injury in relation to employment."7 The requirement that an injury "arise out of" employment is related to the concept of causation.8 Referencing Landeen v. Toole County Refining Co.,9 the Pinyerd Court noted that the words "out of" point to the cause of the accident and are descriptive of the relationship between the injury and employment.10 In general, if the claimant's employment is one of the contributing causes which placed him in the path of harm and without which the injury would not have followed, the claimant is entitled to compensation.11
¶ 22 In this case, the injury for which McLeish seeks compensation is the fractured right clavicle which resulted from his undetermined medical event and subsequent fall. Rochdale does not dispute that McLeish's injury occurred in the course of his employment. The determinative issue is whether McLeish's injury arose out of his employment. In that regard, the Court must examine the relationship between McLeish's injury and his employment.12
¶ 23 It is undisputed that McLeish's fractured clavicle resulted from the "undetermined medical event" which caused him to fall.13 The Court first examines, then, whether the "undetermined medical event" is work-related. In that regard, the uncontroverted facts which support a finding that the "undetermined medical event" is not work-related are as follows:
¶ 24 Notwithstanding his medical history, Dr. Wilson's medical opinion, and his stipulation that no evidence exists to suggest that McLeish's seizure condition is caused by, precipitated by, or otherwise related to his employment with Nelson Enterprises, McLeish argues that "it is unclear what precipitated this [undetermined medical] event as [McLeish] was both working in a hot kitchen and near a mop bucket containing chemicals, more specifically a multi-purpose cleaner or degreaser."14 McLeish argues that the Court should consider "the theory that the hot kitchen or the chemicals in the mop bucket may have precipitated this 'undetermined medical event.'"15 McLeish appears to argue that this theory constitutes a reasonable inference which should be drawn in his favor as the non-moving party, and which precludes summary judgment. McLeish contends: "[A] question of fact exists as to whether the hot kitchen or the chemicals [McLeish] was working around contributed, in any way, to [McLeish's] seizure."16
¶ 25 The problem with...
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