McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 85-338-2-MAC (WDO). |
| Parties | O.L. McLENDON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GEORGIA KAOLIN CO., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
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Hugh C. Wood, Wood & Meredith, Decatur, Ga., for plaintiffs.
John B. Harris, Jr., William C. Harris, Harris & Harris, Macon, Ga., for defendant.
This case concerns a series of conveyances of interests in a tract of land in Wilkinson County, Georgia, from the heirs of Edward D. Smith (most of whom are represented by plaintiffs in this action) to defendant, Georgia Kaolin Company, Inc. These conveyances took place in 1969 and 1971.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court of Bibb County in 1985 shortly after learning that the property which they conveyed to defendant allegedly contains a large kaolin deposit.1 In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendant purchased their interests in the property through fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment. Plaintiffs also claim that defendant has engaged in price-fixing of kaolin and conspiracy.
Defendant removed the case to federal court and has now filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima facie case of either fraud, price-fixing, or conspiracy and that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits and other documents in opposition to defendant's motion.
In 1916, Edward D. Smith died intestate, leaving a 325-acre tract in Wilkinson County, Georgia ("Smith property"), to his heirs-at-law.2 In 1965, the following people were the holders of undivided interests in the Smith property:
These holders, except Edward Banner, Louella Banner Shavers, Sidney Smith, Jr., and Evie Barksdale Solomon,3 are represented by the plaintiffs in this action.
The plaintiffs can be divided into four groups. The first group consists of the holders of interests in the Smith property who are still living and who sold their interests in the property to defendant in 1969. Pearl Smith Hines, Lula Courtney, Viola Smith Griffin, Jerry Day, Tommy Day, Bernice Tift Newton, Charles S. Smith, Robert Lee Smith, Bessie Cornelia Hughes, Willie L. Day, and James E. Day are the members of this group.
The second group consists of the personal representatives of the estates of the holders of interests in the Smith property, other than Tommy Smith, who sold their interests to defendant in 1969 and are now deceased. O.L. McLendon represents the estate of his wife, Juanita McLendon; Archie Anderson represents the estate of his grandmother, Mamie Hollingsworth; Molly Mae Hill represents the estate of her husband, James H. Hill; Mary E. Day represents the estate of her husband, W.C. Day; and Carl Senior represents the estate of his mother, Lillie Belle Teal.
The third group consists of the estate of Tommy Smith. Tommy Smith must be put in a separate category because of his unique relationship to the transactions at issue. His estate is represented by his niece, Dorothy Ann Cooper.
The last group consists of Grant Smith, who was adjudicated incompetent in 1924. His interest was conveyed to defendant in 1971 through circumstances separate from those involving the conveyances of the interests of the other holders. Hence, the court will address his claim in a separate order to avoid confusion.
When the Smith holders conveyed their interests to defendant in 1969, most of them had received little education. In addition, Tommy Smith was the only holder who was actually living on the Smith property during all of the events of concern in this case. Most of the other Smith holders were living outside the state of Georgia.4
Defendant Georgia Kaolin Company, Inc. ("GKC") is one of seven kaolin companies which operate in the state of Georgia. It is a New Jersey corporation. During the time period when the transactions at issue took place, defendant was known as Yara Engineering Corporation ("Yara"). Defendant's name was changed to Georgia Kaolin Company, Inc. in 1981.
Another entity that plays a role in this case is Georgia Kaolin Company ("GKC2"), a subsidiary of defendant. GKC2, a New Jersey corporation, was defendant's operating company until it was liquidated into defendant in 1976.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all doubts, draw all inferences, and view all disputed facts in favor of the party opposing the motion. United States v. An Article of Food Consisting of 345/50-Pound Bags, 622 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1980); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985).
However, a party opposing the motion may only rely on competent and admissible evidence to defeat the motion. E.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.1980). Hence, the following facts are those which are undisputed, and where there is a dispute, plaintiffs' version is adopted. However, the facts do not include that which could only be established through inadmissible or incompetent evidence.
In the mid 1960's, Tommy Smith and Juanita McLendon proposed to the other Smith heirs5 that they sell the Smith property. The Smith heirs agreed to sell, and Tommy Smith, as the only heir who lived on the property and the one most familiar with its value, was made responsible for the negotiations and management of a possible sale of the property. Plaintiffs' Exhibits A1-A15.6 The other heirs trusted and relied on Tommy Smith's judgment because he was a close relative and, while most of the Smith heirs lived outside of Georgia, Tommy Smith lived on the property and farmed it as his own. Id.
In August of 1965, Tommy Smith hired an attorney, Fred M. Hasty, to represent the Smith heirs in the sale. Stipulation of March 16, 1990. Hasty contacted A.G. Bowman, head of defendant's land department, on September 21, 1965, to see if defendant were interested in purchasing the property. Id.
Defendant already had a lease interest in the mineral rights of the Smith property through its subsidiary Georgia Kaolin Company ("GKC2"). Tommy Smith had executed this lease to GKC2 on May 10, 1948. Plaintiffs' Exhibit E.7 The lease named Tommy Smith as lessor, but it gave no indication that there were other owners of the property or that Tommy Smith held only a partial interest in the property.8 GKC2 did not check the title on the Smith property until several years later.
GKC2 drilled on the Smith property in 1949 under the lease and allegedly determined that there was a valuable kaolin deposit there, but never removed any kaolin or other minerals from the property.9 The other Smith heirs were neither aware of the lease nor that GKC2 had drilled on the property. Plaintiffs' Exhibits A1-A15. GKC2 and defendant did not learn that the 1948 lease was only valid for a partial interest in the property until sometime after the negotiations with Hasty began in 1965.10
Hasty's negotiations with defendant for the sale of the Smith property were ultimately unsuccessful. Stipulation of March 16, 1990.11 Tommy Smith discharged Hasty's services in the summer of 1966. Id.
A.G. Bowman and Tommy Smith continued their negotiations for the sale of the Smith property after Hasty's services were discharged. Plaintiffs' Exhibit B.12 According to a letter from Bowman to defendant's president, dated February 21, 1967, the following terms were reached:
Plaintiffs' Exhibit B.13
Sometime in early 1967, defendant retained Alex S. Boone, Jr. as its attorney to help in the purchase of the Smith property. Alex Boone had previously represented Tommy Smith's wife, Agnes Smith, in...
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McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 85-338-2-MAC (WDO).
...summary judgment. Defendant's first motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. See McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., Inc., 782 F.Supp. 1548 (M.D.Ga.1992). The case grew out of numerous conveyances of interests in a tract of land in Wilkinson County, Georgia, from plai......
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