McLendon v. Horry Cnty. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 25 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 4:13-cv-3403-BHH |
| Parties | Charles McLendon, Plaintiff, v. Horry County Police Department, Scott Rutherford. Johnny Harrelson, Kristin Dawn Harmon, Saundra Rhodes, Christopher John Arakas, Phillip Thompson, and Horry County Sheriff's Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
On December 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to his previous employment as an officer with the Horry County Police Department ("HCPD"), his December 2012 arrest for criminal domestic violence ("CDV") and misconduct in office, and his May 2013 arrest for violation of a court order.1 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Kaymani D. West, for consideration of pretrial matters. The Magistrate Judge prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation ("Report") which recommends that Defendants'2 motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 101.) Specifically, she recommendsdismissing Arakas from the case on the basis of judicial immunity. She further recommends granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 causes of action and Plaintiff's conversion claim pursuant to § 1983.3 However, she recommends denying summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining causes of action on the basis that Defendants rely solely on an inapplicable United States Supreme Court case to argue for summary judgment. Defendants and Plaintiff filed timely objections to the Report. (ECF Nos. 103; 104.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts the Report in part and dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims.
The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law, and the Court incorporates them and summarizes below only in relevant part. Plaintiff filed this matter on December 5, 2013, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and state law claims. (ECF No. 1-1.) Specifically, Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against the movant Defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights as a result of his arrests. (ECF No. 43 at 8.) Plaintiff also brings state law claims for: (1) intentional interference with a contract against Harrelson and Rutherford; (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy against HCPD; (3) abuse of process against Rutherford; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants; (5) conversion against one unspecified Defendant; and (6) assault and slander against Harmon. (Id. at 10-15.) Finally, Plaintiffbrings a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim of retaliation against HCPD and Rutherford. (Id. at 10-16.)
On March 17, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 77.) After consideration of the response filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 88) and Defendants' reply (ECF No. 96), the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 101.) The Court has reviewed the objections to the Report, and finds merit in Defendants' objections. Therefore, it will grant Defendants' objections and dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims.4
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility for making a final determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report and Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or may recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the Magistrate Judge's conclusions are reviewed only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
As noted above, both Plaintiff and Defendants filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report, which the Court has carefully reviewed. The Court will address the objections in turn. Plaintiff has objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that: (1) Arakas is entitled to judicial immunity and should be dismissed form this litigation; (2) summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim as it relates to his claims against Rutherford for the 2012 arrest, Arakas for the May 2013 arrest, and Thompson for Plaintiff's treatment in the detention center; and (3) summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 103 at 2-8.)
Respectfully, Plaintiff's objections are largely restatements of arguments made to, and rejected by, the Magistrate Judge. See Hendrix v. Colvin, 2013 WL 2407126, at *4 (D.S.C. June 3, 2013); see also Jackson v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1883026 ; Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). "Examining anew arguments already assessed in the report of a magistrate judge would waste judicial resources; parties must explain why the magistrate judge's report is erroneous, rather than simply rehashing their prior filings and stating the report's assessment was wrong." Hendrix, 2013 WL 2407126, at *4. Absent proper objections, the district court must "'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept therecommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory Committee's Note).
Looking to the function Arakas served during the events at issue, the Magistrate Judge found that 6 (ECF No. 101 at 17 (quoting § 16-25-20(D)(1)).) Accordingly, Arakas "performed a function normally performed by a judge"—there is no basis to find that Arakas acted without jurisdiction in issuing Plaintiff's arrest warrant. King, 973 F.2d at 356-58. This objection is therefore overruled.
The Magistrate Judge next recommended that summary judgment be granted on Plaintiff's claim that his December 2012 arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 101 at 23.) Under this claim, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested for CDV "in violation of the law" in December 2012 when it was clear from the facts that Harmon was the aggressor. (ECF No. 88 at 33.) Here, the Magistrate Judge first correctly noted that the only individual Defendant even arguably involved in this incident was Rutherford, and any claims against Rhodes, Harrelson, or Thompson, would need to proceed based on their supervisory relationship to Rutherford. (Id.) She correctly found that Plaintiff's pleadings did not attribute any actions to Rhodes, Harrelson, or Thompson, and failed to set forth any allegations that the claimed wrongs were the result of the effectuating of any official policy or practice of HCPD or HCSD. (Id. at 24.) Thus,she properly dismissed any § 1983 claims relating to the December 2012 arrest against these Defendants. (Id.)
As for Rutherford, the Magistrate Judge noted that "Plaintiff has acknowledged that only Officer [Jodi] Ridgeway was involved in the decision to charge Plaintiff with CDV" and "[i]t is undisputed that Ridgeway, not Rutherford, effected Plaintiff's arrest." (Id.) Here, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that "it is undisputed that Ridgeway instigated the arrest." (ECF No. 103 at 5.) In support, Plaintiff rehashes allegations already considered at length by the Magistrate Judge, including his allegation that ...
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