McLendon v. Stough

• Decision Date: 01 November 1928
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 355
• Citation: 218 Ala. 445,118 So. 647
• Parties: McLENDON et al. v. STOUGH et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

118 So. 647

218 Ala. 445

McLENDON et al. v. STOUGH et al.

4 Div. 355

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 1, 1928

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1928

Appeal from Probate Court, Crenshaw County; R.T. Sirmon, Judge.

Petition of J.C. McLendon and Henry Stephens to probate the will of S.A. Merritt, deceased, with contest by Carl Stough and others. From a decree for contestants, proponents appeal. Affirmed.

Frank B. Bricken, of Luverne, for appellants.

W.H Stoddard, of Luverne, for appellees.

BROWN J.

The probate of the will in question was contested on two grounds--want of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The evidence was clearly insufficient to sustain the alleged undue influence, and we will confine our treatment of the question related to the other ground.

It is too well settled to permit of question that an insane delusion, often denominated "partial insanity" or "monomania," is sufficient to avoid a will, if the will is "the direct offspring and fruit of such insanity." Cotton v. Ulmer, 45 Ala. 378, 6 Am.Rep. 703; Florey's Ex'rs v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241; Batson et al. v. Batson et al., 217 Ala 450, 117 So. 10; 28 R.C.L. 104, § 55.

While as a general rule the capacity of a testator to dispose of his estate does not depend on the justice of his prejudices and the fact that the disposition he makes of his property may be said to be unreasonable and unjust, this alone is not sufficient to deny testamentary capacity. Yet, if the manifested prejudices of the testator against the natural objects of his bounty can be explained on no other theory than that of insane delusion, and the will is the direct offspring and fruit of such insane delusion, this is sufficient to avoid it. Carnahan v. Hamilton, 256 Ill. 508, 107 N.E. 210, Ann.Cas.1916C, 21; 28 R.C.L. 107, § 59; Dibble et al. v. Currier, 142 Ga. 855, 83 S.E. 949, Ann.Cas.1916C, 1, and note page 10, subd. (b), and authorities there cited.

The witness Dr. Naftel testified that he had been a practicing physician since 1880, more than 40 years, and had much experience with nervous and mental diseases as a general practitioner; that he had known and been intimately acquainted with the testator and his family during that period, having been his family physician up until about 10 years before testator's death, and treated the testator up until a short time before his death; and, further, that:

"When one's mind is off on one particular subject, it is monomania. He may not be a raving maniac, very often he displays this against one member of his family, may be some one else, but on one subject. It is not only possible, but quite frequently happens in human affairs, that a person may be insane on one subject and very sane on every other subject. One rarely finds a man or woman that is insane on every subject. I could talk to one for two or three days and never discover it unless I touch the weak point. A man may be perfectly crazy when you mention his family, but sane on every other subject. You will find that recognized by medical authorities."

The witness then stated that it was his opinion or judgment, based on his observation and long acquaintance, that the testator was a man of that kind--insane on the subject related to his family; that "his mind was deranged on that particular subject."

Other witnesses, nonexperts, were examined, and testified to long acquaintance with the testator and dealings with him, his characteristics, that he was subject to fits of violent anger in his attitude and relation to his family, and gave their opinion to the effect that he was not of sound mind in respect to dealings with his family. While proponent adduced testimony to the contrary, we are of opinion that the evidence, taken as a whole, when considered in connection with the will which in effect disinherited all of testator's children, except two daughters, presented a jury question, and justified the refusal of the affirmative charge requested by the proponent. Pollard v. Pollard, 207 Ala. 270, 92 So. 488.

In submitting the question of testamentary capacity to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury in the oral charge that:

"All that the law requires is that the testator shall have

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