McLennan County v. Stanford
| Decision Date | 21 September 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 3893,3893 |
| Citation | 350 S.W.2d 208 |
| Parties | McLENNAN COUNTY et al., Condemnors and Appellants, v. Tom R. STANFORD et al., Condemnees and Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
W. C. Haley, Waco, for appellants.
Dunnam & Dunnam, Waco, for appellees.
Condemnee in this partial-taking eminent domain proceeding owned tracts of 350 acres and 27 1/2 acres, some distance apart. Several years before date of taking he purchased a long, narrow connecting strip of land joining these tracts in order to move his cattle between them for feeding, watering and grazing purposes, and 'so he could tie them together and have an all-weather, year-around way to handle cattle.' Each of the two tracts was contiguous to the connecting strip. The three parcels were all owned in fee by condemnee, and the evidence is undisputed that all this land was operated in its entirety as one unit for the single purpose. The narrow parcel condemned for highway purposes is taken from the 27 1/2 acres, and severs practically all of the latter from the strip which had joined it to the 350-acre tract. There is no controversy as to these facts.
The court elicited findings from the jury as to value of the total remainder of condemnee's land (including the 350 acres, the connecting strip and the residue of the 27 1/2 acres) before and after the taking, basing judgment on the difference. Condemnor says this was error; that the 350 acres was a separate parcel, and damages thereto were not recoverable as a matter of law; or, alternatively, the question of whether the tracts were a unit was a fact issue and should have been submitted to the jury.
The law seems to be firmly settled against the contentions. Where separate, but contiguous tracts are integral parts of an entity under common ownership in such physical and functional relationsihp that they are joined by unity of use by the same proprietor into a single property, they will be treated as a whole in assessing damages to the remainder in the taking of a part. Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Goodwine, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 925, 928, writ ref., n. r. e.; City of Denton v. Hunt, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 212, 215, writ ref., n. r. e.; Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Payne, Tex.Civ.App., 308 S.W.2d 146, 150; Texas Elec. Service Co. v. Linebery, Tex.Civ.App., 327 S.W.2d 657, 662, writ dis.; Concho, S. S. & L. V. Ry. Co. v. Sanders, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W. 693; United States v. 2477.79 acres, 5th Cir., 259...
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People ex. re. Dept. of Public Works v. Hemmerling
...Mfg. Co., 58 Kan. 197, 48 P. 860; Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Dodson, 207 Miss. 229, 42 So.2d 179; McLennan County v. Stanford (Tex.Civ.App.), 350 S.W.2d 208. We conclude that severance damages may be allowed to a parcel that has no common boundary with the parcel condemned, but......
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In re Elec. Transmission Tex., LLC
...1970); McKinney Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carlisle Grace, Ltd., 222 S.W.3d 878, 882-83 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); McLennan Cnty. v. Stanford, 350 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1961, no writ). Stated otherwise, the basis for an award of damages to a remainder tract is that there......
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...actually taken. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Company v. Linebery, 326 S.W.2d 733, 739 (Tex.Civ.App.1959, writ ref. n.r.e.); McLennan County v. Stanford, 350 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.Civ.App.1961, no writ); 27 Am.Jur.2d., Eminent Domain, § 320, 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 181; 95 A.L.R.2d 887, 890 et se......
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Gossett v. State, 4156
...the land involved but also, a unity of ownership. The following cases indicate the requirement of such unity of ownership. McLennan County v. Stanford, 350 S.W.2d 208, (Tex.Civ.App.1961, no writ history); Calvert v. City of Denton, 375 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ ref. n.r.e.); George......