McLeod v. Beaty
| Decision Date | 13 December 1996 |
| Citation | 718 So.2d 673 |
| Parties | John McLEOD v. Dr. Larry BEATY, individually and in his capacity as President of Wallace State Community College. Barbara DINKINS v. Dr. Larry BEATY, individually and in his capacity as President of Wallace State Community College. 2950284, 2950286. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Lexa E. Dowling of Buntin, Etheredge & Dowling, Dothan; and Gregory B. Stein of Stein & Brewster, Mobile, for appellants.
Edward M. George of Foshee & George, L.L.C., Montgomery; and Mark E. Fuller of Cassady, Fuller & Marsh, Enterprise, for appellee.
John McLeod, a speech and theater instructor, and Barbara Dinkins, a biology instructor, are both employed by Wallace State Community College in Dothan (the College). In 1994, the instructors filed in the circuit court separate actions for declaratory judgments and petitions for writs of mandamus directed to the College and to Dr. Larry Beaty, individually and in his capacity as president of the College. The instructors alleged that, by reason of the length of their employment with the College, they had gained tenure but had not been offered full-time nonprobationary contracts of employment.
McLeod and Dinkins claim that, as employees of a state junior college, they are protected by the provisions of the Fair Dismissal Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 36-26-100 et seq. (the FDA); that the FDA prohibits a partial termination of their employment without notice and a hearing; and that the College had partially terminated them by reducing their course teaching loads without notice or a hearing. McLeod and Dinkins sought orders directing Dr. Beaty to recognize them as tenured employees and to issue them full-time contracts of employment. In addition, McLeod and Dinkins sought back pay and damages.
The College and Dr. Beaty maintain that McLeod and Dinkins are not tenured employees and are not covered by the FDA. The College and Dr. Beaty also assert that they are immune from suit under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over these actions because McLeod and Dinkins failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them.
The circuit court entered summary judgments for the College and Dr. Beaty; McLeod and Dinkins appealed. The parties did not seek to consolidate the cases below or on appeal. However, because the same issues are presented in both cases, we have consolidated the appeals on our own motion pursuant to Rule 3(b), Ala. R.App. P.
We must first address the jurisdiction of the circuit court to adjudicate the claims of McLeod and Dinkins because, if the circuit court had no jurisdiction to consider their claims, then we have no jurisdiction to consider their appeals. See Ollis v. Ollis, 636 So.2d 458 (Ala.Civ.App.1994).
"In some instances, a complainant is not entitled to judicial relief ... unless the complainant has first exhausted his or her administrative remedies." Faulkner v. University of Tennessee, 627 So.2d 362, 365 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101, 114 S.Ct. 943, 127 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994). In this case, the trial court held that McLeod and Dinkins had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and it entered summary judgment against them. In Faulkner v. University of Tennessee, supra, our supreme court noted that a circuit court should not enter a summary judgment (which is a judgment on the merits) if the circuit court concludes that, because of the application of the exhaustion doctrine, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. 627 So.2d at 364.
Citing Ex parte Graddick, 495 So.2d 1367 (Ala.1986); Mobile & Gulf R.R. v. Crocker, 455 So.2d 829 (Ala.1984); and City of Huntsville v. Smartt, 409 So.2d 1353 (Ala.1982), the College and Dr. Beaty argue that McLeod and Dinkins failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them.
The College claims that the instructors, in order to enforce their alleged tenure rights, should first have appealed to the chancellor of the Postsecondary Education Department. The College argues that a right of administrative review of tenure decisions is inherent in the statutory authority given to the chancellor under § 16-60-111.5.
Although § 16-60-111.5 may authorize the chancellor to conduct a review, it does not require an instructor to seek such a review before resorting to other remedies. That fact distinguishes this case from those cited by the College.
When "the threshold question ... is whether [an instructor at a state community college is] tenured, [t]hat is a proper issue to be litigated in circuit court." Owen v. Rutledge, 475 So.2d 826, 827 (Ala.1985). See also Dansby v. Dale County Board of Education, 623 So.2d 1122, 1123 n. 1 (Ala.1993)(quoting Alabama Ass'n of School Boards v. Walker, 492 So.2d 1013, 1015 (Ala.1986)("When a person's 'status as a tenured teacher' is the issue in dispute, 'the circuit court is the proper forum to resolve that dispute' ")); Berry v. Pike County Board of Education, 448 So.2d 315 (Ala.1984).
The trial court erred in holding that the instructors' claims were precluded by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, but that holding is harmless because, as will be discussed below, the instructors were not entitled to the relief sought.
We need not decide whether the trial court erred by determining that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the actions against Dr. Beaty and the College, because the trial court's judgments were correct for other reasons. See Sammons v. Ritchey, 484 So.2d 409 (Ala.1986). If the judgment of the trial court is correct, it will be upheld on appeal, even if the trial judge gave a wrong or insufficient reason therefor. Bank of the Southeast v. Koslin, 380 So.2d 826 (Ala.1980); Kite v. Kite, 444 So.2d 863 (Ala.Civ.App.1983).
From March 1984 through November 1994, McLeod was employed by the College as an adjunct instructor on a quarter-by-quarter basis, for a total of 32 academic quarters. Of those 32 quarters, he was employed as a part-time instructor for 17 quarters and as a "full-time temporary" instructor for 15 quarters.
McLeod was employed part-time from 1984 until 1988. Then, in January of 1988, he signed his first contract designating him as a "full-time temporary" instructor for the winter quarter of that academic year. For the spring quarter of that year, however, he was employed part-time. Then, for the summer quarter of that year, he was again employed full-time. His quarter-by-quarter employment at the College was sometimes full-time, and sometimes part-time, until the fall quarter of 1992. Then, from the fall of 1992 through the fall of 1994, McLeod was employed as a "full-time temporary" instructor for three quarters in each of two academic years.
For each period of employment, whether full-time or part time, McLeod had an employment contract that specified a starting date and an ending date and that was subject to the following pertinent "Terms and Conditions":
Between 1978 and 1982, Dinkins was a full-time clerical employee of the College for 38 months. From 1982 through 1986, she was not employed at the College. Then, from January 1987 through May 1990, she was a part-time instructor. For the summer quarter of 1990, she taught as a "full-time temporary" instructor. From March 1992 through March 1994, she was employed for a total of seven academic quarters as a "full-time temporary" instructor pursuant to the same kinds of contracts that McLeod had.
McLeod and Dinkins claim that they are protected by the FDA. That legislation was enacted in 1983, with the stated purpose, as evidenced by the title of the Act, of providing "Dismissal Procedures for Nonteacher, Nonclassified, etc., Employees in Certain School Systems, Institutions, etc." See Act No. 644, 1983 Ala. Acts 1004, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 36-26-100 et seq. (emphasis added). The College argues that the FDA does not apply to McLeod and Dinkins (or any other junior college instructor) because, it claims, the Act covers only "nonteacher employees."
In Bolton v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 514 So.2d 820 (Ala.1987), the Alabama Supreme Court observed:
Id. at 822 (emphasis added). The supreme court has repeatedly noted that "the overall purpose of the 'Fair Dismissal Act' ... is to provide non-teacher employees a fair and swift resolution of proposed employment terminations." Id. at 824 (emphasis added). See also Ex parte Holifield, 604 So.2d 420, 422 (Ala.1991); Ex parte Alabama Institute for Deaf & Blind, 578 So.2d 1308, 1310 (Ala.1991).
This court has also frequently observed that the Act applies to "nonteacher" employees. See Gainous v. Tibbets, 672 So.2d 800, 803 ...
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