McLeod v. Business Machine & Office App. Mech. Conf. Bd.

• Citation: 300 F.2d 237
• Decision Date: 07 February 1962
• Docket Number: Docket 27317.,No. 243,243
• Parties: Ivan C. McLEOD, Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on Behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. BUSINESS MACHINE AND OFFICE APPLIANCE MECHANICS CONFERENCE BOARD, LOCAL 459 INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

300 F.2d 237 (1962)

Ivan C. McLEOD, Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on Behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. BUSINESS MACHINE AND OFFICE APPLIANCE MECHANICS CONFERENCE BOARD, LOCAL 459 INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 243, Docket 27317.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued December 28, 1961.

Decided February 7, 1962.

Everett E. Lewis, New York City (Abramson & Lewis, New York City, and Leonard Greenwald, Donald Grody, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

Winthrop A. Johns, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C. (Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Jacques Schurre, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Murray Gartner, New York City (Poletti, Freidin, Prashker & Harnett, New York City, Richard H. Borow, Noel B. Berman, New York City, of counsel), for charging party.

Before MOORE, KAUFMAN and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.

MARSHALL, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a district court order granting a petition for an injunction filed by a Regional Director of the N.L.R.B. pursuant to section 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.¹ The petition alleged, and the lower court found, there was reasonable cause to believe appellant Local 459 was engaging in conduct violative of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.²

The evidence disclosed that certain members of appellant employed by Remington Rand Univac Division, Sperry Rand Corporation (Rand), as tabulating service mechanics have been on strike since September, 1961. In the course of this strike, appellant began distributing handbills at the premises of certain businesses which lease equipment, such as tabulators and computors, from Rand. Some, or perhaps all, of this equipment is serviced by Rand employees who are thus performing the struck work. One firm, Macy's Department Store, also sells consumer products produced by Rand. There is no evidence in the record to indicate whether the other businesses sell Rand products or whether their relations are limited solely to the leasing and servicing of equipment. The handbills appealed to the public not to patronize these firms.

The district judge found there was "reasonable cause," within the meaning of section 10(l), to believe the handbilling violated section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). Because there is no dispute as to the material facts in evidence and because we are faced solely with questions of law, we need decide only whether the judge below "was wrong, not whether he was `clearly' so." Empressa Hondurena de Vapores, S. A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222 (2 Cir., Jan. 12, 1962). We believe the injunction should not have been granted because previous Board decisions construing the so-called "publicity proviso" would preclude it from finding an unfair labor practice in this case. Under these circumstances, injunctive relief under section 10(l) cannot be granted without usurping the function of the Board and violating the congressional intent behind that provision. We must, therefore, reverse.

Prior to the enactment of section 10(l), federal courts were without jurisdiction to issue injunctions in "labor disputes" under the broad prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.³ Passed in 1932, that statute was a manifestation of strong congressional disapproval of the performance of federal courts in labor disputes.⁴ It was believed the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were inappropriate remedies for such use because they often settled the dispute under the guise of merely preserving the status quo.⁵ Moreover, Congress believed the federal courts, through the injunctive process, had set themselves up as economic arbiters of labor strife, a function which Congress believed they were institutionally ill-equipped to undertake and which could lead only to the tarnishing of judicial prestige.⁶ The Legislature believed the formulation of labor policy was essentially a political question and belonged to it.⁷ The statute, therefore, "was prompted by a desire * * * to withdraw federal courts from a type of controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited and from participation in which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer."⁸

When Congress wrote the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, however, it believed Norris-LaGuardia to be so broad that certain of the new provisions of section 8(b), creating union unfair labor practices, would be rendered nullities without some use of the injunctive process. Section 10(l), essentially a compromise measure, was enacted to fill this need. Attempts to restore power to the federal courts to issue injunctions in certain labor disputes upon petition by purely private parties were abandoned because "opposition to restoring the injunctive process * * * seemed to be so strong * * *" that other provisions of the bill were endangered.⁹ One of the principal arguments employed to defeat these attempts was that the federal courts would once again become too deeply involved in labor disputes without the aid of initial adjudication by an expert agency.¹⁰ It is against this background that section 10 (l) must be read.

Section 10(l) was designed by Congress to provide a means by which temporary injunctive relief could be obtained "pending the final adjudication of the Board." Sen.Rep.No.105 (80th Cong. 1947), p. 27. H.R.Conf.Rep.No.510 (80th Cong.1947), p. 57. It does not provide relief beyond that stage, for Sections 10(e), (f) specify the procedure to be followed after the Board has rendered a decision. These sections allow temporary relief pending appeal or petition for enforcement, but only in aid of the Board order. Those attempting to upset a decision by the Board cannot obtain such relief pending their appeal. It is clear, therefore, that if the Board holds the present case does not involve an unfair labor practice, the injunction affirmed here must be dissolved forthwith, regardless of whether the charging party decides to appeal.

Because section 10(l) injunctions have only this limited purpose, a finding of "reasonable cause" must be premised on a belief there is a reasonable possibility of the Board sustaining the unfair labor practice charge. But previous Board decisions preclude it from finding an unfair labor practice here without reversing field, and, needless to say, there has been no showing there will be such a reversal. In Lohman Sales Co., 132 N.L.R.B. No. 67, the Board construed the words "product" or "produced," as used in the so-called "publicity proviso," to encompass all forms of labor or service and rejected a literal interpretation which would limit them to actual consumer goods. The Board further indicated it would not construe the proviso to "attach special importance to one form of labor over another." Under this interpretation, the handbilling here would be protected by the "publicity proviso." Subsequent cases have consistently adhered to this rationale¹¹ and have bolstered the assertion of the dissenter in Lohman that "the net result of this interpretation is to sanction the indiscriminate handbilling of virtually any business."

The Regional Director, however, believes the anticipation the Board will abandon this rationale "reasonable," because, in his view, every factual situation yet ruled upon by the Board involved a "direct connection" between services provided by the primary employer and products distributed by the secondary business.¹² He contends there is no such connection here between the tabulators and computors and the products distributed by the handbilled firms.¹³ We do not believe, however, the Board decisions in question allow for such a distinction. In Golden Dawn Foods, 134 N.L.R.B. No. 73, the Board was faced with two disputes involving two primary employers and one secondary business. The first dispute involved a refrigeration installation and maintenance contractor who employed non-union workers to install and service the refrigeration equipment in the secondary employer's super market. The Regional Director contends the refrigeration equipment makes certain products saleable and is thereby "directly connected" with them. Even if we were able to accept this as a viable distinction, it would not dispose of the other dispute which involved an electrical contractor who did all the electrical work in the building. Here indeed was the Board's golden opportunity to expound upon the "direct connection" test, for the electricity in the building had no such connection with products distributed by the secondary employer. The Board, however, merely said handbilling in both disputes was protected by the publicity proviso "for the reasons stated in the Lohman Sales case * * *". Nor has the Regional Director said why Northwestern Construction of Washington, 134 N.L.R.B. No. 46, is distinguishable on the grounds there is a "direct connection" between construction work on a building and products ultimately sold in that building.

In meeting the issues before us, we must be mindful of a key fact relating to the internal structure of the agency itself. Because the prosecutory and judicial functions have been separated within the Board,¹⁴ the General Counsel (or his representative, here the Regional Director) acts upon his own authority in issuing unfair labor practice complaints and seeking injunctions. If the General Counsel disagrees with the Board's interpretation of the statute, there is little to stop him from continuing to issue complaints in the hope of having the Board reverse itself. The decision in Golden Dawn indicates the General Counsel in fact did seek to have Lohman overruled. Whether this is such a case or not is irrelevant, for the danger is there. While we must give great weight to a Regional Director's...