McLeod v. LOCAL 282, INTERNATIONAL BRO. OF TEAMSTERS, ETC.
| Decision Date | 10 December 1964 |
| Docket Number | 64-C-852.,No. 64-C-851,64-C-851 |
| Citation | 241 F. Supp. 831 |
| Parties | Ivan C. McLEOD, Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on Behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 282, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Transit Mix Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone Corporation, Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Company, Principe-Danna, Inc., Respondents. Ivan C. McLEOD, Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on Behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 282, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Carl G. Coben, New York City, for petitioner.
Cohen & Weiss, New York City, for respondent, Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Bruce H. Simon, New York City, of counsel.
Jacob I. Goodstein, New York City, for respondents, Colonial Sand & Stone Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co. & Transit Mix Concrete Corp., Fred H. Krones, New York City, of counsel.
Kimmell & Kimmell, Mineola, N. Y., for charging party, George Negri, Inc., Leonard S. Kimmell, Mineola, N. Y., of counsel.
Harry H. Rains, Mineola, N. Y., for charging parties, Walter Michalowski and Joseph Iocca, Bertrand B. Pogrebin, Mineola, N. Y., of counsel.
In each of the proceedings, captioned as above, the Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "Director" and "NLRB" or "Board") applies to this Court by Order to Show Cause supported by petition for an order restraining the respondents from certain activities, charged as unfair labor practices, pending the final disposition of proceedings concerning these matters now before the Board.1
In the one instance the respondents designated are Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Local 282), and certain companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of concrete, asphalt and related products in the State of New York (collectively "Concrete Companies", and severally for convenience referred to as "Transit", "Colonial", "Ryan", "Hickey" and "Danna").
In the other, Local 282 is the sole respondent.
The issues involved in the two proceedings and the evidence bearing upon these issues were so closely interrelated that the application has been heard by the Court in a joint trial of both proceedings, and although the determinations herein made and directions given are addressed to each in its status as an independent cause, the facts and applicable law are presented in the following in a single exposition.
In the proceeding in which the Local alone and the Concrete Companies are the respondents the charging party is George Negri, Inc. (Negri) which brings its charges against the Local alone under Section 8(b) (4) (i) (ii) (A) and (B) of the Act, and against both Local and the Concrete Companies under 8(e).2
In the companion proceeding the charging parties are Walter Michalowski and Joseph Iocca, truckdrivers, who each owned at the relevant period a single truck ("owner-operators"). These filed their charges against the local under the same provisions of the Act.
The charges need not be detailed, for they have served their purpose in giving the Board a necessary jurisdiction to issue a complaint into which the charges are merged.3
The allegations of the complaint in turn are embodied in those which comprise the petition before this Court. These may be summarized as follows:
As to the Local jointly with the Concrete Companies (Negri's charges).
Negri, a New York Corporation with place of business in Rego Park, Queens, is a supplier of concrete and related products to building and construction sites. It had during the relevant period no plant or yard for the manufacture of concrete, filling inventory needs for resale to its own customers by purchases from the Concrete Companies. The chauffeur employees of these last were members of, or represented by the Local.
About July 1, 1963, the Local entered into a three year contract4 with the remaining respondents and others, which contained the following provision:
About May 8, 1964 the Local notified respondent companies and these others that they were evading the terms of the provision just quoted. The Local has, in the view of the petitioner, thereby in violation of the provisions of the Act earlier cited entered into contracts under which the "employers cease or refrain or agree to cease or refrain from doing business with Negri and other persons."
Additionally, at about the time mentioned, the Local entered into and thereafter maintained in force an agreement with these other contracting parties "whereby they have ceased and refrained, and have agreed to cease or refrain, from doing business with Negri and other persons who do not have plants or yards for the manufacture of concrete. Threats of ensuing work stoppages were made by the Local if such contract employers failed of obedience to the stipulated boycott. Specific instances of such threats addressed to Hickey, Ryan and Danna were cited.5 The threats to Danna were in the presence of its employees, serving thereby as basis for a charge of inducing and encouraging the employees to strike or to refuse "in the course of their employment to use, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform services."
Further, petitioner avers, "since on or about June 12, 1964, respondent Concrete Companies have ceased doing business with Negri and other persons who do not have plants or yards for the manufacture of concrete."
As to the Local alone (Charges of Michalowski and Iocca).
The petition alleges that Michalowski and Iocca are "individuals who own and operate one or more trucks which customarily are used to perform trucking services for persons engaged in the manufacture and sale of concrete, asphalt and other building materials." Lizza & Sons, Inc. (Lizza), a corporation located in Selden, New York, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of apshalt. Its chauffeurs, operators of Euclid and Turnapull equipment, were members of, or represented by, the Local. Michalowski and Iocca had regularly performed trucking services for Lizza.6 They were owner-operators, and had no employer's contract with the Local.
The petition further alleges that on or about July 1, 1963, Lizza and other persons (employers) entered into the Ready-Mix contract with the Local of which Section 12 has been quoted above. About the same time the Local entered into a second contract styled "Excavating Contract 1963-1966", with Lizza, Parisi (M. Parisi & Son of Maspeth, Queens, an excavating firm) and other persons (employers), which contained the following provision:
About April 1964 the Local threatened to strike Parisi and other persons who had been performing work at the New York World's Fair site if they continued to use trucks, the owners of which did not have contracts with the Local.
On or about May 7, 1964, a representative of the Local called upon Lizza and in the presence of its employees announced that if Lizza used owner-operators who were not under contract with the Local — (Michalowski and Iocca were non-contract owner-operators and had from time to time performed trucking services for Lizza) — they would be sent out of Lizza's yard.
Such conduct on the part of the Local — (so the petitioner maintains) — violates the relevant provisions of the Act earlier cited heren, in that said "respondent has thereby entered into contracts * * * whereby such employers cease or refrain or agree to cease or refrain from doing business with Michalowski and Iocca and other persons," and has "induced and encouraged individuals employed by Lizza and other persons * * to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on * * * materials * * * or to perform services, and has threatened, coerced and restrained Lizza, Parisi, and other persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce."
In both petitions it is alleged that an object of said actions was to compel the employers affected to cease doing business with the charging parties.
Both petitions, moreover, conclude with a prayer for broad injunctive relief pending the Board's determination of the issues of unfair labor practice.
Evidence adduced by petitioner upon the hearing largely sustains the factual assertions tendered by petitioner. Notwithstanding some omissions of detail from the overall proof and a haziness of recollection of incident by several witnesses, placed on the stand by the Board and recognized by the Court as hostile, the charges are found by the Court to have been established with a sufficient...
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