McLeod v. State
Decision Date | 11 October 1996 |
Docket Number | CR-95-1280 |
Citation | 718 So.2d 723 |
Parties | Leon McLEOD, Jr. v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
John Grow II, Mobile, for appellant.
Jeff Sessions, atty. gen., and James Prude, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Leon McLeod, Jr., was indicted and convicted for the murder of James D. McKissick, see Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-6-2. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant raises one issue on appeal. He claims that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police officers because, he says, the statement was involuntary.
The evidence tended to show that on September 27, 1994, Acadena King Carstarphen, her boyfriend, James McKissick, and Cynthia McLeod, the appellant's wife, went to the McLeod's house to "cook" some cocaine. Leon McLeod came home while Carstarphen and Cynthia McLeod were in the kitchen cooking cocaine in the microwave and McKissick was on the porch. McKissick followed McLeod into the house. McLeod asked why McKissick was there, and Cynthia McLeod told him that McKissick was Carstarphen's boyfriend. McLeod left and returned home 10 to 20 minutes later. McKissick was sitting at the kitchen table with a bulge of a gun visible in his pants pocket. McLeod again asked why McKissick was there. McLeod, seeing the cocaine activity, allegedly told Cynthia he wanted half of whatever she was getting out of it. She, Carstarphen, and McKissick chuckled, but McLeod did not. It was apparent that McLeod was not pleased, so Carstarphen said that she and McKissick were going to leave. Allegedly there were some words between McLeod and McKissick. After the verbal exchange, McLeod pulled a gun and shot McKissick in the head three times. McKissick died as a result of the wounds.
On December 1, 1994, Officer Paul Burch of the Mobile County street enforcement narcotics team served a search warrant at the McLeod's residence, based on information from a confidential informant. 1 Officer Burch recovered a 9mm. Ruger in the bedroom. When he recovered this gun, he did not have any information regarding an investigation of murder involving the McLeods. McLeod was arrested at the scene. While en route with the McLeod to the police station, Officer Burch was notified by the confidential informant that the appellant had previously provided false information to Mobile detectives in reference to a murder McLeod was involved in (presumably McKissick's murder). After arriving at the station, Officer Burch advised McLeod of his Miranda rights, which McLeod waived. Officer Burch also said that he did not make any promises of leniency other than to tell McLeod that if he wanted to cooperate, he would make his cooperation known to the district attorney and to the court. McLeod said the gun had been used in a homicide he was involved in. Forensic evidence confirmed that the weapon was the one that had been used to kill McKissick.
McLeod contends that his statement concerning the gun was involuntary because Officer Burch had told him that if he cooperated, Burch would make his cooperation known to the district attorney and the court. McLeod made a timely objection to the admission of this statement into evidence, thus preserving the issue for review on appeal.
The state relies on Gaddy v. State, 698 So.2d 1100 (Ala.Cr.App.1995), to support its argument that the appellant's statement was voluntary. In that case the court stated:
Our review of the record reveals that the police conduct complained of in this case is more like the conduct of the officer in Ex parte Weeks, 531 So.2d 643 (Ala.1988), than the conduct of the officer in Gaddy. During the suppression hearing, Officer Burch testified as follows:
(Emphasis added.) Later in open court during direct examination by the state and before McLeod renewed his motion to suppress evidence of his statement, Officer Burch testified as follows:
(Emphasis added.) Officer Burch's offer to make the appellant's cooperation known to the district attorney and the court contained a condition precedent. Unlike the unconditional promise made in Gaddy, the offer here was conditioned on McLeod's cooperation: if McLeod would cooperate, his cooperation would be made known to the authorities.
In determining whether the officer's statements to McLeod constituted an improper inducement, we must view the offer in the context of the totality of the circumstances.
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Price v. State
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Craig v. State, CR-96-1068
...an extra-judicial confession was induced by a promise. See Gaddy v. State, 698 So.2d 1100, 1113 (Ala.Cr.App.1995), and McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 723 (Ala.Cr.App.1996). The term "bargained" was used in Gaddy because in that case the defendant began confessing before the interrogating office......
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McLeod v. State
...induced by an implied promise of leniency and, therefore, that the confession should not have been admitted at the trial. McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 723 (Ala.1996). We granted certiorari review to consider that holding in light of our subsequently issued opinion in Ex parte Gaddy, 698 So.2d......
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McLeod v. State, CR-95-1280
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