Mclin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors
| Decision Date | 10 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001 CA 0830.,2001 CA 0830. |
| Citation | 818 So.2d 947 |
| Parties | Chad A. McLIN v. INDUSTRIAL SPECIALTY CONTRACTORS, INC. and CNA Insurance Companies. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Mark Zimmerman, Lake Charles, for Plaintiff/Appellant Chad A. McLin.
Kirk L. Landry, Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd., Baton Rouge, for Defendants/Appellees Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc. and CNA Insurance Companies.
Before: CARTER, C.J., PARRO, and CLAIBORNE,1 JJ.
Chad McLin appeals a judgment in favor of his former employer, Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc. (ISC), and its insurer, CNA Insurance Companies (CNA), finding his injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and dismissing his claim for workers' compensation benefits. We affirm.
The facts of this case are not disputed. McLin was employed by ISC as an electrician and was assigned to work at the BASF plant in Geismar, Louisiana. On February 17, 2000, McLin was required to attend a safety meeting at ISC's office on Highland Road in Baton Rouge. The meeting was held after regular working hours, from 6 p.m. until 8 p.m., and although though the meeting was mandatory, the participating employees were not paid for the time spent in this meeting. McLin left BASF about 5 p.m., drove to the meeting in his own car, and attended the meeting. When he left the meeting, McLin drove directly toward his home, using a route that was different from his normal travel pattern. He was involved in an automobile accident several blocks from his home at the intersection of Sherwood Forest Boulevard and Florida Boulevard in Baton Rouge. He went back to work for one day, but could not perform his job due to severe back pain; he was eventually diagnosed as having a ruptured lumbar disc. McLin's injuries prevented him from doing his pre-accident work duties, so ISC terminated his employment. ISC contended the accident did not happen during the course and scope of McLin's employment, therefore it did not pay him workers' compensation benefits and did not pay his medical bills.
On May 11, 2000, McLin filed a disputed claim for compensation.2 McLin claimed he was injured in an automobile accident while going home from a mandatory meeting, and sought wage benefits and payment of medical bills from ISC. ISC and CNA answered, denying that McLin was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his alleged injury. A trial was held on January 24, 2001, with workers' compensation judge Pamela Moses-Laramore (the WCJ) presiding. At the conclusion of the trial, the WCJ found that McLin was not in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured, and dismissed his claims with prejudice.3 In this appeal, McLin challenges that finding and also requests an award of penalties and attorney fees for the defendants' refusal to pay his claims.
An employee's personal injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it results from an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment." LSA-R.S. 23:1031; Harvey v. Bogalusa Concrete, Inc., 97-2945 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/25/98), 719 So.2d 1130, 1131. The Louisiana Supreme Court has considered the terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" in Section 1031 as dual requirements that cannot be considered in isolation from each other. In a close case, a strong showing with reference to one requirement may compensate for a weak showing with reference to the other requirement. Benoit v. Capitol Mfg. Co., 617 So.2d 477, 479 (La.1993). When there is a weak showing with respect to both requirements, the employee is not entitled to compensation benefits. Raybol v. Louisiana State Univ., 520 So.2d 724, 726 (La.1988).
To evaluate the "course of employment" requirement, the court focuses on whether the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of his duties during working hours, either on the employer's premises or at a place contemplated by employment activities. Mundy v. Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 593 So.2d 346, 349 (La.1992). This inquiry focuses on the time and place relationship between the injury and the employment. Williams v. Regional Transit Authority, 546 So.2d 150, 161 (La.1989). When considering the "arising out of employment" requirement, the court inquires into the character or origin of the risk suffered by the employee and determines whether this risk was incidental to the employment. Williams, 546 So.2d at 159. An injury arises out of employment if the risk from which the injury resulted was greater for the employee than for a person not engaged in the employment. Weber v. State, 93-0062 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 188, 192 n. 5; Pitts v. Helmrich & Payne Drilling, 98-1345 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/25/99), 739 So.2d 335, 337, writ denied, 99-2194 (La.11/5/99), 750 So.2d 187.
Generally, accidents which occur while an employee is traveling to and from work are not considered as having occurred during the course of employment. This rule is premised on the theory that ordinarily, the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his work to go home until he resumes his work. However, this rule has been subject to a number of jurisprudentially established exceptions. Lorraine v. Nolty J. Theriot, Inc., 98-0479 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/1/99), 729 So.2d 1160, 1163, writ denied, 99-1251 (La.6/18/99), 745 So.2d 30. Some of these are as follows: 1) if the accident happened on the employer's premises; 2) if the employee was deemed to be on a specific mission for the employer, such as making a trip in the interest of his employer's business or pursuant to his employer's order; 3) if the employer had interested himself in the transportation of the employee as an incident to the employment agreement either by contractually providing transportation or reimbursing the employee for his travel expenses; 4) if the employee was doing work for his employer under circumstances where the employer's consent could be fairly implied; 5) if the employee was hurt while traveling to and from one work site to another; 6) if the employee was injured while in an area immediately adjacent to his place of employment and that area contained a distinct travel risk to the employee, also known as the threshold doctrine; and 7) if the operation of a motor vehicle was the performance of one of the duties of the employment of the employee. See Brown v. Coastal Const. & Engineering, Inc., 96-2705 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/7/97), 704 So.2d 8, 10, and cases cited therein.
In this case, McLin's accident happened while he was traveling home from work and would not generally be considered as having occurred during the course of his employment with ISC. Given the facts of this case, the only possible exception among those recognized by the jurisprudence and the only exception urged by McLin is that he was involved in a specific mission for the employer, in that he was required to make the trip to and from the Highland Road office pursuant to his employer's order and in the interest of his employer's business. McLin asserts in this appeal that the WCJ misinterpreted this court's case, Johnson v. Wallace Indus. Constructors, 224 So.2d 31 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ...
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McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors
...the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no manifest error in the decision. [McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc.] 818 So.2d 947 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02) (Carter, C.J., dissenting). We granted McLin's writ application to evaluate the correctness of the conclusion that......