McMahon v. Astrue, Case No. CV 07-14-PHX-MHM.

Citation617 F.Supp.2d 869
Decision Date08 September 2008
Docket NumberCase No. CV 07-14-PHX-MHM.
PartiesDavid S. McMAHON, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Arizona

Stephanie Elizabeth Lake, Law Offices of Stephanie Lake PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.

Jaime Luna Preciado, Social Security Administration, San Francisco, CA, Michael A. Johns, US Attorney's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant.

ORDER

MARY H. MURGUIA, District Judge.

Currently before the Court is David S. McMahon's ("Plaintiff") Application for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). (Dkt. # 16). After reviewing the pleadings, the Court issues the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

This case came before the Court on Plaintiff's complaint for review of the Commissioner of Social Security's (the "Commissioner") denial of Plaintiff's claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.1 (Dkt. # 1). On August 15, 2007, the Court remanded this case to the Commissioner for further administration action pursuant to a stipulation for remand filed by the parties on August 7, 2007. (Dkt. # 14).

On September 24, 2007, Stephanie Lake, Plaintiff's counsel, filed the instant application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) ("EAJA"). (Dkt. # 16). Plaintiff's counsel requests a total of $5,665.76, representing $350.00 in costs and $5,315.76 in fees for 34.5 hours of attorney time. (Dkt. # 16, Appendix A; Dkt. # 18, Appendix A). The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff's EAJA request as "unreasonable." (Dkt. # 17, p. 1).

II. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Claimed

Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA provides that a prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States shall be reimbursed for fees and other expenses incurred by that party in the action "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). To award attorney's fees under the EAJA, the Court must determine (1) that the claimant is a "prevailing party"; (2) that the government has not met its burden of showing that its position was "substantially justified" or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) that the requested fees and costs are reasonable. See Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002). If the requested fees are not shown to be reasonable, then the Court may reduce the award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.1998) (applying Hensley to cases involving the EAJA).

The Commissioner does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under the EAJA; the Commissioner disputes the requested amount. (Dkt. # 17). Specifically, the Commissioner contends that Plaintiff's requested fees of $5,315.76, representing 34.5 hours of work, should be reduced to $3,466.80, representing 22.5 attorney hours, a reduction of 12 hours of work. (Id., p. 3). The Commissioner offers multiple objections to Plaintiff's counsel's claimed attorney hours to support this proposed reduction. The Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff's counsel's record of billing indicating a total of 30.5 hours for reviewing the record and ultimately preparing to file a summary judgment brief in this case is unreasonable. (Id., p. 2). The Commissioner supports this contention by pointing to the fact that this case was remanded based on a stipulation between Plaintiff and the Commissioner, and thus no summary judgment briefs were ultimately filed in this case. (Id.). As such, the Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff's counsel's hours relating to work on the draft brief—23.2 hours according to Plaintiff's counsel's itemization of attorney time—are unverifiable and unreasonable. (Id., p. 3). Thus, the Commissioner requests that Plaintiff's counsel's billable time be reduced by a total of 12 hours for a total reduction of $1,848.96, amounting to an EAJA fee award to Plaintiff of $3,466.80. The Commissioner supports his request to reduce Plaintiff's counsel's billable time by stating that "[o]ver 23 hours billed for briefing and editing a routine disability case seems excessive considering the fact that no brief was ultimately necessary in this Court." (Id.).

Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Commissioner's opinion as to the complexity, or lack thereof, of this case, as well as the fact that no brief was ultimately filed in this case, does not warrant a reduction in the hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel. See Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1213 (C.D.Cal.2000) (finding that counsel's expertise in social security matters and the fact that he was well-versed in the law and facts of the case did not justify a reduction in counsel's hours). Many of the arguments advanced by the Commissioner appear to be based on defense counsel's own opinion as to the time necessary for such tasks as communication with the client, drafting the complaint and preliminary matters, and research and briefing relevant to summary judgment briefing. The Commissioner does not offer any expert or other credible authority to suggest that the time billed is unreasonable. Moreover, the tasks performed by Plaintiff's counsel with respect to preparation and drafting of the complaint and communications with the client all appear directly related to the litigation and compensable as attorney tasks as opposed to administrative tasks. "Social security cases are fact-intensive and require a careful application of the law to the testimony and documentary evidence, which must be reviewed and discussed in considerable detail." Id. Indeed, contrary to the Commissioner's opinion that this case was a routine disability case, it appears that this case was ultimately remanded because the record was incomplete and unorganized, thus taking "extra hours for Plaintiff's counsel to determine whether all the evidence submitted was actually in the administrative record." (Dkt. # 18, p. 4).

In addition, the fact that "no briefs were ultimately necessary in this Court" because this case was remanded does not mean that counsel was relieved from preparing and working in anticipation of filing briefs in this Court. The Court finds no reason to doubt counsel's statement that "the basis for settling this case was unearthed in the process of drafting the summary judgment motion" and discovering that the administrative record in this case was incomplete. (Dkt. # 18, p. 4); see Kling v. Sect'y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 790 F.Supp. 145, 152 (N.D.Ohio 1992) ("This Court will not second-guess counsel about the time necessary to achieve a favorable result for his client."). Plaintiff's counsel cannot be expected to sit idly by without preparing to prosecute his or her client's case in hopes that the parties may reach an agreement to remand or settle the case. Further, although the Commissioner argues that "[o]ver 23 hours billed for briefing and editing a routine disability case seems excessive," there are plenty of cases indicating that the hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel falls within the approved range of hours spent on social security matters. See Patterson, 99 F.Supp.2d at 1214, n. 2. Further, Plaintiff cites several cases in which courts have approved EAJA fees based on hours significantly greater than those requested here. See Vaughn v. Heckler, 860 F.2d 295, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1988) (approving 77 hours upon EAJA request).

Having reviewed Plaintiff's counsel's "Itemization of Attorney Time" (Dkt. # 16, Appendix A) and the parties' respective arguments, the Court concludes that the number of hours claimed for reviewing the file, performing research, and drafting court documents is not unreasonable. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff counsel's billed time of 34.5 hours of work2 is reasonable as required under the EAJA, and thus the Court awards Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $5,665.76 as the "prevailing party" under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).3

B. EAJA Award Paid Directly to Plaintiff

In addition to the above dispute regarding the reasonableness of Plaintiff's requested attorney's fees, the Commissioner asks that the Court direct payment of any awarded EAJA attorney's fees to Plaintiff and not Plaintiff's attorney. (Dkt. #17, pp. 4-5). In support of this contention, the Commissioner cites the Court to FDL Tech., Inc. v. United States, for the proposition that "[b]y its terms, [the EAJA] states that the fee award is made to a prevailing party, not the prevailing party's attorney. . . . Thus, under the language of the statute, the prevailing party, and not its attorney, is entitled to receive the fee award." 967 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

In response, Plaintiff states that "[w]hile only Plaintiff has the right to request the payment of fees [under the EAJA], only Plaintiff's counsel has the right to receive them." (Dkt. # 18, p. 8). Plaintiff also notes that the Commissioner's position regarding the payment of attorney's fees under the EAJA has recently changed, the Commissioner having previously created a system for direct deposit of EAJA fees to pay such fees directly to attorneys. (Id., p. 5). Plaintiff posits that the Commissioner's new position interpreting the EAJA to require direct payment of EAJA attorney's fees to the plaintiff instead of his or her attorney is based on an attempt to subject attorney's fees awarded under the EAJA to administrative offset of Plaintiff's generalized federal debts pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(5). (Id., p. 8). As such, Plaintiff asks that the Court "order The Commissioner to pay the EAJA fee to Plaintiff's counsel to avoid a potential offset for federally recoverable debts." (Id., p. 10).

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2 cases
  • Unice v. Berryhill, 3:16-cv-02469
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • July 20, 2018
    ...plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for the hours of attorney time reasonably spent on an EAJA fee application. McMahon v. Astrue, 617 F. Supp. 2d 869, 873 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2008). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that the total 5.7 hours billed on the EAJA application are reasonable.......
  • Hamby v. Astrue
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma
    • October 24, 2011
    ...notes that arguments substantially similar to those raised by the Commissioner herein were rejected elsewhere, see McMahon v. Astrue, 617 F. Supp. 2d 869, 872 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("[T]he Court finds that the Commissioner's opinion as to the complexity, or lack thereof, of this case, as well as ......

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