McMahon v. Eli Lilly and Co.

Decision Date09 October 1985
Docket NumberNos. 84-2721,84-2896,s. 84-2721
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 10,668 Mary McMAHON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Robert A. Filpi, Stack & Filpi, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Steven C. Parrish, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant-appellee.

Before FLAUM and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and WEIGEL, Senior District Judge. *

WEIGEL, Senior District Judge.

In proceedings below, plaintiffs Mary McMahon and her husband Francis sued in their individual capacities and as representatives of their deceased son. They claimed that the Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly"), a pharmaceutical manufacturer, failed to warn adequately of the dangerous propensities of diethylstilbestrol (DES). 1 This failure to warn, plaintiffs claimed, rendered DES an unreasonably dangerous product, so that Lilly should be held strictly liable for injuries allegedly caused by the drug.

Mrs. McMahon has found it difficult to achieve full-term pregnancies and normal deliveries. Several of her children have been born prematurely. One premature infant son died. During each of her later pregnancies, Mrs. McMahon was bedridden throughout the final months. Plaintiffs claim that these difficulties were caused by her exposure to DES prenatally when her mother ingested the drug.

The case was tried to a jury. After the jury was unable to reach a verdict, the district court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. First, the court ruled that plaintiff "has not made out a prima facie showing that the defendant Lilly manufactured the drug she took." Second, it ruled "Plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case that Lilly knew or should have known of a risk of pre-term labor or prematurity among children of those women who in 1955 had ingested DES during pregnancy."

Plaintiffs appeal. Lilly cross-appeals, arguing that plaintiffs' claims are barred by Illinois' product liability statute of repose.

I.

A motion for directed verdict raises only a question of law--not a mixed question of law and fact. See General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 695 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir.1982). When ruling on such a motion, the trial judge does not exercise discretion, but rules as a matter of law.

In this diversity action, Illinois law governs the standard for taking a case away from the jury. Lykos v. American Home Ins. Co., 609 F.2d 314, 315 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1030, 62 L.Ed.2d 762 (1980). The Illinois standard, as formulated in Pedrick v. Peoria and Eastern R.R., 37 Ill.2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967), is that "verdicts ought to be directed ... only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand." The district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order do not reveal whether this strict standard was applied in granting Lilly's motion for directed verdict. Therefore, we undertake an independent review of the record. See General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., supra, at 286.

a. Product Identification

We consider first whether the district court correctly directed a verdict on the ground that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the DES ingested by Mrs. McMahon's mother was manufactured by Lilly. This issue turns on the proof adduced by plaintiffs and the credibility of Lilly's witnesses.

Mrs. McMahon's mother and father testified that one Dr. Eskridge, now presumably deceased, prescribed DES for Mrs. McMahon's mother during the second month of her pregnancy--approximately April 1955. She filled the prescription at the Conrad-Marr Drug Store in Midwest City, a suburb of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

No record of that purchase survives. Nor are there any records of the brands of DES stocked by the store in 1955. At trial, plaintiffs read the deposition of Daniel B. Casey, who was manager of the Conrad-Marr drug store beginning in March, 1955. Mr. Casey recalled filling prescriptions for Dr. Eskridge, although he did not remember any particular prescriptions.

Mr. Casey's managerial duties included purchasing prescription pharmaceuticals. He testified that he was certain that he had purchased DES for the Conrad-Marr store in 1955, and that he had stocked the Lilly brand. "The only brand I recall is the Lilly Brand. That is not to say that we didn't have another brand, but that's the only one I recall." He stated that the store "probably most likely" bought the DES from McKesson & Robbins, a pharmaceutical wholesaler, because "we bought the majority of our drugs from McKesson & Robbins." Mr. Casey testified tht McKesson & Robbins and Fox Vliet were "the only two wholesalers we used." He was certain the store had bought DES from McKesson & Robbins in 1955: "As I say, I don't recall specifically, but I'm sure we did because we had it in stock." He did not recall ordering DES from anybody else in 1955.

Plaintiffs put in evidence the affidavit of Stanley Chrisman, who described himself as the pharmaceutical buyer for Foremost-McKesson, Inc. from 1951 until 1957, and as "familiar with the purchases and sales made by Foremost-McKesson, Inc. at that time, including sales made to the pharmacy from whom Mary Dunne allegedly purchased DES in 1955." Mr. Chrisman stated that, to the best of his knowledge, "the DES sold by Foremost-McKesson, Inc. to the pharmacy from whom Mary Dunne purchased DES in 1955 was manufactured by Eli Lilly & Company," and that "the only DES sold by Foremost-McKesson, Inc. to any pharmacy in Oklahoma City in 1955 was manufactured by Eli Lilly & Company." 2

Finally, plaintiffs read into evidence Lilly's responses to two interrogatories. These responses indicated that Lilly had no information or records suggesting that DES manufactured by any drug company other than Lilly was sold by McKesson & Robbins, Fox Vliet, or any other wholesale pharmaceutical distributor in the area of Oklahoma City in 1954-1955.

To refute plaintiffs' claims, Lilly presented the testimony of two pharmacists from Bonham, Texas, 3 who claimed they worked at the Conrad-Marr Drug Store in Midwest City in 1955, though not during April, when the DES taken by Mrs. McMahon's mother was purchased. The first pharmacist, Seth Taylor, testified that he had been responsible for ordering drugs at the store. He stated that he worked for the store in early 1955, but was not there when Mr. Casey began in March 1955. The second pharmacist, Clarence Countryman, testified that he generally placed orders for drugs when the store manager, Mr. Casey, was unavailable. He began working at the store in fall of 1953.

Both pharmacists testified that Conrad-Marr had stocked DES manufactured by the Squibb Company and other pharmaceutical manufacturers, as well as DES produced by Lilly. They testified that Lilly's DES was available only through wholesalers, while Squibb's DES could be purchased directly from the manufacturer. 4 Both pharmacists claimed they remembered the relative prices of Squibb's and Lilly's DES in the Conrad-Marr store in 1955.

Taylor and Countryman both testified that they would have filled any prescription for DES with Squibb's DES, since Squibb's was cheaper for the customer than Lilly's. Plaintiffs' counsel challenged Taylor's credibility on cross-examination, and on redirect, Taylor changed his testimony, asserting that Squibb's DES had been cheaper for the store. Countryman testified on cross-examination that Squibb's DES was "cheaper to the customer" and that he did not believe that it was "a great deal" cheaper to the store. 5

The testimony of Mr. Taylor and Mr. Countryman was the only direct evidence offered to show that the Conrad-Marr drugstore carried DES manufactured by any company other than Lilly. A reasonable jury could have disbelieved these witnesses altogether, even though the full extent of the contradictions in the witnesses' testimony was not before the jury. See supra notes 3 & 4. They could have noted the uncanny similarities in the witnesses' testimony, which both witnesses changed, regarding the relative prices of Squibb's and Lilly's DES. The jury might also have questioned the remarkable specificity of the witnesses' memories about a product sold at a store where they had worked more than a quarter century ago. In assessing Mr. Taylor's credibility, the jury may also have noted that he could not recall the address of his residence when he lived in Midwest City. And finally, the jury could have given some weight to the fact that only plaintiffs' witness, Mr. Casey, worked at the Conrad-Marr store in April 1955, when the DES taken by Mrs. McMahon's mother was purchased.

As with other elements of proof in a civil action, product identification need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill.2d 543, 553, 1 Ill.Dec. 497, 502, 356 N.E.2d 779, 784 (1976). The question in this case is a close one. However, we have concluded that the testimony of Daniel B. Casey and Stanley Chrisman was sufficient to support a jury verdict identifying the DES as Lilly's.

b. Foreseeability

Plaintiffs introduced expert testimony reviewing and summarizing published medical research available prior to 1955. These publications reported experiments showing that exogenous estrogens (including DES) could cause physical abnormalities in the reproductive tracts of animals exposed to the drug in utero. The literature before 1955 contained suggestions that the experimental results for laboratory animals might portend dangers for humans as well. On this basis, plaintiffs' expert testified that Lilly and other manufacturers should have included a label warning physicians of these experimental...

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