McManemy v. Tierney

Citation970 F.3d 1034
Decision Date17 August 2020
Docket Number No. 18-3554,No. 18-3519, No. 18-3520,18-3519
Parties Charles MCMANEMY, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Bruce TIERNEY; Kiley Winterberg; Curt Lubben; Jennifer Degroote; Karson Roose; Dewayne Viet; John/Jane Doe(s), in each individual's capacity as a law enforcement officer/jailer/dispatcher for the Butler County Sheriff's Office; Jennifer Becker, in her individual capacity as a nurse for Butler County, Iowa; Kirk Dolleslager, in his individual capacity as a law enforcement officer for the Grundy County Sheriff's Office; Sheriff Jason Johnson, in his individual capacity; Sheriff Rick Penning; Butler County; Grundy County, Defendants - Appellees Charles McManemy, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Bruce Tierney; Kiley Winterberg; Curt Lubben, Defendants - Appellants Jennifer Degroote; Karson Roose; Dewayne Viet, Defendants John/Jane Doe(s), in each individual's capacity as a law enforcement officer/jailer/dispatcher for the Butler County Sheriff's Office, Defendant - Appellant Jennifer Becker, in her individual capacity as a nurse for Butler County, Iowa; Kirk Dolleslager, in his individual capacity as a law enforcement officer for the Grundy County Sheriff's Office, Defendants Sheriff Jason Johnson, in his individual capacity, Defendant - Appellant Sheriff Rick Penning, Defendant Butler County, Defendant - Appellant Grundy County, Defendant Charles McManemy, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Bruce Tierney; Kiley Winterberg; Curt Lubben; Jennifer Degroote; Karson Roose; Dewayne Viet; John/Jane Doe(s), in each individual's capacity as a law enforcement officer/jailer/dispatcher for the Butler County Sheriff's Office; Jennifer Becker, in her individual capacity as a nurse for Butler County, Iowa, Defendants Kirk Dolleslager, in his individual capacity as a law enforcement officer for the Grundy County Sheriff's Office, Defendant - Appellant Sheriff Jason Johnson, in his individual capacity, Defendant Sheriff Rick Penning, Defendant - Appellant Butler County, Defendant Grundy County, Defendant - Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant/cross appellee was Christopher Clark Stewart, of Des Moines, IA. The following attorney(s) also appeared on the appellant/cross-appellee brief; Matthew M. Boles, of Des Moines, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees/cross appellants Butler County, Mr. Bruce Tierney, Ms. Kiley Winterberg, Curt Lubben, Jennifer Degroote, Karson Roose, Dewayne Viet, John/Jane Doe(s), Jennifer Becker and Jason Johnson, and appeared on the brief was Jason Palmer, of Des Moines, IA. The following attorneys also appeared on the appellee/cross appellant brief: Catherine Lucas, of Des Moines, IA; and Thomas Boes, of Des Moines, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees/cross appellants Kirk Dolleslager, Rick Penning and Grundy County and appeared on the brief was David E. Schrock of Cedar Rapids, IA.

Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

STRAS, Circuit Judge.

Charles McManemy believes that deputies used excessive force against him after he led them on a high-speed chase. Although he suffered physical injuries during the ensuing arrest, the district court1 granted summary judgment to the deputies based on qualified immunity. We affirm.

I.

The deputies believed that McManemy was on his way to making a drug delivery. Hoping that they would have the chance to stop him, they seized the opportunity when he ran a stop sign. Even flashing lights and a siren, however, did not stop McManemy. For the next 10 minutes, he led them on a high-speed chase through rural highways, gravel roads, and a private farm.

With their other options exhausted, the deputies finally rammed McManemy's vehicle. McManemy eventually emerged from the disabled vehicle after trying to make a call and lighting a cigarette. When he did, he laid face down on the road with his arms and legs spread.

Still, the deputies had difficulty arresting him. Although the parties dispute how much he resisted and why, the dash-cam video shows his legs flailing, and he admits to having failed to comply with orders to "[q]uit resisting" and to "knock it off." See Oral Arg. at 1:44–1:50 (conceding that the dash-cam video "clearly" shows that he was resisting "up until a point"). In the end, subduing McManemy took two interlocked sets of handcuffs and six deputies.

This case is all about what happened during the scuffle. McManemy claims that one deputy tased him up to five times and that another used a knee to repeatedly bash him in the head. The blows to the head allegedly caused damage to his eye, first bruising and later problems with light sensitivity and "floaters."

McManemy brought excessive-force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the deputies and other government defendants. Also included are claims against the other deputies on the scene, who allegedly failed to intervene and protect him. These basic theories are mirrored in several Iowa state-law claims, too.

Neither side is satisfied with how the district court decided the case. On one hand, McManemy believes that the court should not have granted summary judgment to the defendants on his federal claims. At the same time, the defendants are disappointed that the court did not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McManemy's state-law claims. Both appeal the parts of the ruling that they lost.

II.

We review the district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Morgan v. Robinson , 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc). "Summary judgment [was] appropriate [if] the evidence, viewed in [the] light most favorable to [McManemy], shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and the [defendants were] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Phillips v. Mathews , 547 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

For McManemy's federal claims, it all comes down to whether the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity, which depends on the answer to two questions. First, did they violate a constitutional right? Second, was the right clearly established? See Morgan , 920 F.3d at 523. If the answer to either question is "no," we will affirm. See id. (making clear that we may answer the questions in either order).

A.

The first allegedly unconstitutional act was the use of a taser against McManemy. See Jackson v. Stair , 944 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2019). In addition to suing Deputy Kirk Dolleslager, who used the taser, McManemy alleges that a nearby officer, Deputy Curt Lubben, violated clearly established law by failing to intervene on his behalf. Hicks v. Norwood , 640 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the duty to intervene). Both claims depend on whether using the taser was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ; Hicks , 640 F.3d at 843.

1.

As in many qualified-immunity cases, the parties have "two different stories" about what happened. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). McManemy claims that Deputy Dolleslager "sadistically" tased him in drive-stun mode,2 once before handcuffing him and two-to-four times afterward. Deputy Dolleslager says that he only tased him twice, once before placing the handcuffs on his right wrist and once more to get them on his other wrist.

In an appeal from a summary-judgment ruling on qualified immunity, we typically credit the plaintiff's version of the facts. See id. at 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769. In some cases, however, the record so "blatantly contradict[s]" the plaintiff's account that "no reasonable jury could believe it." Id. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769. In those instances, we do not "adopt th[e plaintiff's] version of the facts" in evaluating whether the officers were entitled to summary judgment. Id.

This is one of those cases. Many tasers have logs that record when and how they are used. The log on Deputy Dolleslager's device revealed that it had only been discharged twice—each for three seconds, fifteen seconds apart. McManemy has never challenged the log's accuracy, so the record "blatantly contradicts" his account that he was tased between three and five times. See Oral Arg. at 2:10–2:25 (conceding that the log accurately reflects the number and timing of the taser bursts).

With the taser having been discharged only twice, McManemy's admissions take on central importance. See Tokar v. Armontrout , 97 F.3d 1078, 1081–83 (8th Cir. 1996) (relying heavily on a plaintiff's admissions when affirming a qualified-immunity ruling). The first key admission is that he was not yet handcuffed when Deputy Dolleslager tased him the first time. Under our precedent, it is reasonable for an officer to tase an uncuffed suspect who appears to be resisting arrest. See Ehlers v. City of Rapid City , 846 F.3d 1002, 1011 (8th Cir. 2017) ; Carpenter v. Gage , 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012).

The second tasing was reasonable too because of McManemy's other admission: in the intervening 15 seconds between taser discharges, the deputies had to get the handcuffs on his other wrist. Construing the remaining disputed facts in McManemy's favor, it is possible that Deputy Dolleslager tased him for the second time just after he was fully handcuffed. Even so, we have already held that discharging a taser in drive-stun mode under similar circumstances is objectively reasonable. See Brossart v. Janke , 859 F.3d 616, 626 (8th Cir. 2017) ; see also Franklin v. Franklin Cty. , 956 F.3d 1060, 1062–63 (8th Cir. 2020) (discussing cases allowing the use of drive-stun taser bursts on suspects who are already handcuffed). After all, here it came at the tail end of a "tumultuous" struggle between McManemy and the deputies. Rudley v. Little Rock Police Dep't , 935 F.3d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 2019).

It makes no difference if, as McManemy argues, one of the deputies knew that he had a...

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