McManus v. State

• Citation: 814 N.E.2d 253
• Decision Date: 31 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 82S00-0104-DP-188.,82S00-0104-DP-188.
• Parties: Paul M. McMANUS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

814 N.E.2d 253

Paul M. McMANUS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 82S00-0104-DP-188.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

August 31, 2004.

Timothy R. Dodd, John P. Brinson, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General, Scott A. Kreider, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Paul Michael McManus was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death. He challenges the constitutionality of Indiana's death penalty statute and argues that his conviction is invalid due to evidentiary errors and his incompetence to stand trial. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

On February 26, 2001, Paul McManus murdered his wife and two children. Prior to the murders, McManus separated from his wife and was arrested for domestic battery. In the course of the battery, he threatened to kill "everyone." During the weeks immediately preceding the murders, McManus spoke of suicide and killing his family.

On the morning of February 26, 2001, McManus's wife served him with divorce papers. That same day, McManus took a taxi to a gun store, purchased ammunition, and retrieved a handgun from his brother's house. At about 7:45 p.m., McManus entered his wife's house and shot her once in the leg and three times in the head. He then shot his eight-year-old daughter three times in the head and his two-year-old daughter once in the head.

Police investigators later retrieved a cassette tape recorded by McManus. The transcript of the cassette reads in part:

Well, if you're listening to this tape, I guess I've done what I had to do. I don't expect you guys to understand, but I had to do it.... I want you to make sure that I am buried with my kids and my wife. No matter what, I want you to make sure that happens.

Tr. at 701.

On February 27, 2001, the State filed a three-count information alleging that McManus knowingly killed his wife and two daughters,¹ and later amended it to request the death penalty.² On May 7, 2001, McManus filed a notice of intent to assert the defense of insanity.

Voir dire commenced on April 24, 2002, and the trial began on April 29th. On the 29th, McManus displayed symptoms of a panic attack, and the trial court granted him a recess until the following day. The next day, McManus again became ill and moved for a continuance or mistrial. The trial court denied his motions, and the State continued to present evidence. On May 1st, McManus again became ill and renewed his motion for mistrial. The court continued the trial until May 8th so that a psychiatrist could examine him.

On May 6th, McManus filed a written motion for mistrial, contending that the medications as prescribed rendered him incompetent. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion.

On May 9th, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. The following day, the jury heard evidence in the penalty phase and returned a recommendation for death. After a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court found the existence of aggravating circumstances, found one mitigating circumstance, concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance, and sentenced McManus to death.

On July 5, 2002, McManus filed a motion to correct errors, contending that he was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court denied his motion. McManus now appeals.

I. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute

McManus challenges the constitutionality of the version of Indiana's death penalty statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, claiming that it violates the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.³ A statute is presumed constitutional; a challenger must rebut this presumption. State v. Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653 (Ind.2000).

A. Sixth Amendment

McManus argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the Indiana death penalty statute in effect at the time of his sentencing was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Specifically, he argues that under those cases the jury must find not only the aggravating circumstances, but must also find the mitigating circumstances and determine the balance between them. He says the statute is defective because the jury's finding is not the final legal event but merely a prelude to the judicial finding contained in the court's sentencing order.

Under Indiana's statute as it read at the time of McManus's trial, a jury could recommend death only if it found the existence of at least one statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.⁴ All of our post-Ring case law concludes that a defendant whose jury has made such a finding has received what Ring and Apprendi require. Our re-examination of Apprendi and Ring provide us with no reason to change that interpretation.⁵

McManus makes a very similar contention about how the weighing of aggravators and mitigators must occur. We have previously held that "the determination of the weight to be accorded the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a `fact' which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is a balancing process." Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind.1994); see also Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 55 (Ind.1998)

. After examining Apprendi and Ring, we recently re-affirmed the constitutionality of Indiana's statute against arguments substantially similar to those raised by McManus. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind.2004).⁶

B. Eighth Amendment

McManus argues that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated because the jury was informed that its sentencing recommendation was not binding on the trial court and the sentencing determination therefore lacked the heightened standard of reliability required in capital cases under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).

In Caldwell, the prosecutor urged the jury not to view itself as responsible for determining whether the death penalty was appropriate for the defendant because the death sentence would be reviewed automatically by the state's highest court. The defendant challenged the validity of his death sentence on the grounds that these statements were inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment's need for heightened reliability in a capital case. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Quoting Justice Harlan, the Court based its holding on the assumption that "jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision...." Id. at 329-30, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971)). Belief in the truth of this assumption, the Court said, is "indispensable to ... the Eighth Amendment's need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Id. at 330, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court clarified Caldwell's holding in Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). In Romano, the defendant was found guilty of murder, and during the subsequent penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence of a previous conviction and death sentence. The defendant argued that the admission of the prior death sentence undermined the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court noted that Caldwell was a plurality opinion and because the fifth vote was supplied by Justice O'Connor, who "concurred on grounds narrower than those put forth by the plurality, her position is controlling." Id. at 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004.

Accordingly, we have since read Caldwell as relevant only to certain types of comment — those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. Thus, to establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.

Id. (internal quotations omitted). Consequently, the Court held that admitting evidence about the prior death sentence did not violate Caldwell because the evidence was neither false at the time it was admitted nor pertained to the jury's role and because the trial court's instruction emphasized the importance of the jury's role. Id.

McManus argues that because the jury was instructed that its sentencing recommendation was not binding on the trial judge, it had a diminished sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell. We dealt with this exact claim in Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23 (Ind.1998). Citing Romano, we said:

This Court previously has held that it is not unconstitutional to instruct the jury that the ultimate sentencing responsibility rests with the trial judge because such an instruction accurately reflects the requirements of Indiana law. An Indiana jury does not impose a sentence, but instead makes a sentencing recommendation to the judge, who in turn decides what sentence to impose.

Id. at 53, 114 S.Ct. 2004 (citing Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1044 (Ind.1994)); see also Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1156, 1167 (Ind.1997)

("It is not error to inform the jury that its sentencing decision is a recommendation, because this is a correct statement of Indiana law."). McManus argues that Wisehart and Wrinkles cannot control this case because an "advisory jury"...