McMaster v. City of Troy
| Decision Date | 13 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1715,88-1715 |
| Citation | 1990 WL 116540,911 F.2d 733 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. William D. McMASTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF TROY, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before MERRITT, Chief Circuit Judge, and KRUPANSKY and MILBURN, Circuit Judges.
William D. McMaster appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 and his claim for damages filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
McMaster's misfortune began on February 14, 1984, when the Michigan Secretary of State suspended his driver's license for a period of one year following his unsuccessful appeal from the automatic suspension of his license for failure to take a breathalyzer test. On April 23, 1984, McMaster was arrested by a City of Troy, Michigan, police officer for driving with a suspended license. McMaster subsequently sought judicial review of the Secretary of State's suspension of his license in the Oakland County Circuit Court, and on September 12, 1984, the court denied McMaster's petition to set aside the suspension of his license. McMaster then filed a petition for rehearing on the matter.
On January 9, 1985, McMaster was tried and convicted on the charge of driving with a suspended license in violation of a City of Troy ordinance. The state district court denied McMaster's request that the trial be adjourned pending the outcome of his challenge to the legality of his license suspension. Following his conviction, McMaster was sentenced to fifteen days in jail and assessed a fine and costs of $200. McMaster appealed his conviction, and he remained free on bond.
On June 19, 1985, the Oakland County Circuit Court issued an order setting aside the suspension of McMaster's license. The suspension was set aside because "the administrative hearing officer did not properly determine the issue enumerated in MCLA 257.625(f)(2)(d)," which requires that a motorist arrested for an alcohol related traffic offense be advised of his right to a chemical test to determine blood alcohol content.
McMaster's appeal of his conviction for driving with a suspended license eventually reached the Michigan Court of Appeals. In Ciyt of Troy v. McMaster, 154 Mich.App. 564, 398 N.W.2d 469 (1986) (per curiam), the court rejected McMaster's allegations of trial errors, but at the conclusion of its opinion the court noted that his license suspension had been set aside, and it remanded the case to the state district court "for further proceedings consistent herewith." Id. at ---, 398 N.W.2d at 473.
In the state district court, McMaster sought to have his conviction set aside on the ground that an essential element of driving with a suspended license had been extinguished by the circuit court's revocation of his license suspension. The state district court denied McMaster's motion, and after unsuccessful appeals to the Oakland County Circuit Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals, McMaster began serving his fifteen-day jail sentence on December 14, 1987. On December 17, 1987, McMaster filed with the Michigan Supreme Court an emergency application for leave to appeal and an application for bond pending appeal, and on December 18, 1987, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Oakland County Circuit Court. The circuit court ordered that McMaster be released on a personal bond pending determination of his request for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
On December 30, 1987, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and on January 5, 1988, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the merits of McMaster's state habeas corpus action. The court ruled that although McMaster's license suspension had been set aside, public policy considerations precluded setting aside his conviction. The court dismissed the habeas corpus petition and ordered McMaster to commence serving the remaining days of his jail sentence at 5:00 p.m. on January 6, 1988. McMaster completed his jail sentence on January 12, 1988.
On January 6, 1988, at 12:44 p.m., McMaster filed in the federal district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming the City of Troy and Oakland County as defendants. The petition alleged that McMaster was free from incarceration at the Oakland County jail until 5:00 p.m. that date. The petition also alleged that his conviction for driving with a suspended license was void because the underlying license suspension had been set aside by the state circuit court. McMaster alleged that he exhausted his state remedies, and he requested the issuance of an order to show cause and an order granting his release on a personal bond pending further action by the district court. The district court refused to issue an order to show cause or to order McMaster's release on bond, and the petition for writ of habeas corpus was not served on the named defendants. However, the district court did not dismiss the petition.
On May 4, 1988, McMaster filed a first amended complaint naming the City of Troy as the only defendant. Count I of the amended complaint sought the same habeas corpus relief as the original petition, and Count II added a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The City of Troy did not file an answer to the amended complaint, and on June 3, 1988, the district court clerk entered a default against the City. On June 7, 1988, McMaster filed a motion for entry of default judgment as to Counts I and II.
On June 8, 1988, the district court on its own initiative entered a one-page order of dismissal. The court dismissed the petition as moot because McMaster "is not at present in the custody of any official of the defendants or the State of Michigan." The district court dismissed the section 1983 action "for failure to state a claim of deprivation of any federal constitutional right ... as it is undisputed that [McMaster's] license was in fact suspended on April 23, 1984, the date he was arrested ... and charged with the offense of driving while license is suspended." McMaster filed a notice of appeal on July 5, 1988, but this appeal was delayed because the district court denied a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b). However, in an order dated August 14, 1989, this court granted McMaster's application for a certificate of probable cause.
The principal issues on appeal are whether the district court erred by dismissing the habeas petition as moot, and whether the district court erred by dismissing the section 1983 action for failure to state a claim.
The federal habeas statute requires that the habeas petitioner be "in custody" at the time his petition is filed. Maleng v. Cook, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 1925 (1989) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(a). A habeas petitioner is not required to be physically confined in order to satisfy the custody requirement. However, the Supreme Court has never held "that a habeas petitioner may be 'in custody' under a conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction has fully expired at the time his petition is filed." Maleng, 109 S.Ct. at 1925 (emphasis in original). Moreover, "once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual 'in custody' for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it." Id. at 1926.
McMaster was in custody at the time he filed his original petition because he was subject to a court order to report to jail to serve the remainder of his sentence. Release on personal recognizance pending execution of a sentence constitutes custody. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1973). However, when McMaster filed his amended complaint on May 4, 1988, he was no longer in custody because he had fully served his sentence by that date. Therefore, it is necessary to decide whether the amended complaint satisfies the custody requirement.
The rules governing section 2254 cases are silent on whether a petition may be amended. However, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2242 states that a petition "may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs the amendment of pleadings. Rule 15 provides that a party may amend his pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Id.
In the present case, McMaster filed the amended complaint without requesting leave of the court to do so. However, since no responsive pleading had been filed, McMaster was entitled to amend his petition once as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a). Therefore, amendment of the petition was proper, and the amendment relates back to the date the original habeas petition was filed for purposes of satisfying the custody requirement.
The City of Troy argues that it is not a proper respondent because McMaster was not in the City's custody when he filed the petition. Therefore, the City contends that a writ of habeas corpus cannot issue against it. The City of Troy asserts that the proper respondent is either the circuit court judge who ordered McMaster to return to jail or the Sheriff of Oakland County, who had custody of McMaster upon his arrival at the jail.
The federal habeas corpus statute requires that a habeas petition allege the name of the person who has custody of the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. Sec....
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