McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay
Decision Date | 17 December 1984 |
Citation | 105 A.D.2d 46,482 N.Y.S.2d 773 |
Parties | Robert McMINN, et al., Appellants-Respondents, v. The TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Gerald P. Halpern, P.C., Mineola (Winifred Pasternack, Mineola, of counsel), for appellants-respondents.
Robert Schmidt, Town Atty., Town of Oyster Bay, Oyster Bay (Farrell, Fritz, Caemmerer, Cleary, Barnosky & Armentano, P.C., Mineola of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
Before LAZER, J.P., and BRACKEN, O'CONNOR and BROWN, JJ.
LAZER, Justice Presiding.
The issue is the constitutionality and statutory validity of a zoning restriction that, with a limited exception for two persons 62 years of age or over, restricts occupancy of one-family homes to persons related by blood, marriage or adoption. While the proffered theories of illegality are numerous, we conclude that the restriction is fatally unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause of the State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6).
Oyster Bay is a large but typical suburban town largely zoned for single-family residential use with more than 90% of its housing consisting of one-family homes and a population in excess of 246,000 people in its unincorporated areas. The Oyster Bay zoning ordinance defines "family" as "any number of persons related by blood, marriage or legal adoption, living and cooking on the premises together as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit" or any two persons not so related who are 62 years of age or over and live and cook together on the premises as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit (Building Zone Ordinance of the Town of Oyster Bay, art. 1, § 1). The current controversy originated when Robert and Joan McMinn rented their four-bedroom house in the D Residence District to four unrelated young men. The only residential use permitted in the D District is one-family housing. In December, 1976, the Oyster Bay building inspector instituted criminal proceedings in the Nassau County District Court against the McMinns, charging violation of the zoning ordinance in that they were "renting to more than one family".
The McMinns and their four tenants responded with this action against the town, its supervisor and its building inspector, to enjoin the District Court prosecution and for a declaration that the zoning ordinance violates their constitutional right to equal protection and due process and is legally inconsistent with a portion of the Human Rights Law, specifically section 296 of the Executive Law. The District Court proceedings were adjourned during the trial of this action and have now been enjoined pending the outcome of these appeals.
At the trial the tenants testified that their relationships with each other were those of friends and coworkers. They had grown up in the area and wished to continue living in the vicinity of their families and friends, but no longer wanted to reside with their parents. They did not wish to live alone, however, and were unable to afford regular apartments. By living together they were able to share rent, utility and cleaning obligations. During the proceedings, it was revealed that after the commencement of this action the McMinns had contracted to sell the house and relinquished possession to the vendee, without conveying title. The four tenants had moved to another single-family residence within the Town of Oyster Bay, and the sole occupants of the house were thus the vendee, her adopted daughter, and an unrelated man who lived there with them--again a violation of the ordinance.
Much of the expert testimony produced at the trial dealt with demographic trends of national and townwide import. It was thus revealed that the percentage of American households consisting of unrelated persons living together in 1980 had doubled since 1970, although the trend had been resisted in Oyster Bay because the zoning ordinance prevented any substantial number of unrelated persons from obtaining housing. According to plaintiffs' experts, the ordinance contributed to the fact that Oyster Bay's population had undergone a decrease since 1970 and that the average occupancy of the dwelling units in unincorporated areas was reduced from 4.05 persons in 1970 to 3.47 persons in 1980. These experts were of the belief that voluntary formation of households consisting of unrelated persons stems from the desire to overcome isolation and to avoid the high cost of living alone. The testimony also indicated that households consisting of unrelated persons have been achieving greater acceptance in society and, even more significantly, that their stability actually approximates that of traditional families in first marriages. The experts thus concluded that unrelated persons should be permitted to occupy homes in the same numbers as traditional families would under normal circumstances.
The town's experts believed that Oyster Bay's definition of family is reasonable because persons who move to the suburbs seek neighborhoods that permit them to pursue family values. Rejecting the idea that young single adults have moved from Oyster Bay because of the lack of available housing, these witnesses ascribed the exodus to the fact that community facilities and life styles in Nassau County are inappropriate to the needs of the young. No evidence was offered, however, to show how or whether occupancy of a single-family residence by unrelated persons disturbs the character of single-family residential areas, increases parking and traffic problems, results in overcrowding, or creates any similar problems.
At the trial's end, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the action as moot and subsequently held that the ordinance was unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited occupancy of a one-family dwelling by two unrelated persons because the exception permitting two unrelated individuals 62 years of age or older to occupy a one-family house violated the State equal protection rights of persons younger than 62. The court also decided that the prohibition against two unmarried persons residing together in a one-family house illegally conflicted with section 296 of the Executive Law (see McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 111 Misc.2d 1046, 445 N.Y.S.2d 859).
The plaintiffs have appealed seeking a declaration that the ordinance is invalid as it relates to occupancy by more than two persons unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption living together as a single housekeeping unit. The town has cross-appealed to reverse the determination that the ordinance is partially invalid.
Plaintiffs contend that the Oyster Bay zoning ordinance is invalid because (1) it contravenes the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status set forth in the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 5, par. cl. ); (2) it violates the equal protection clause of the State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 11); (3) it is constitutionally impermissible exclusionary zoning; and (4) it violates the due process clause of the State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6). In their complaint, plaintiffs expressly limited the scope of this action to their claims that the ordinance violates New York State constitutional and statutory provisions, specifically declared that they were asserting "no federal claims whatever", and, "pursuant to England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964), expressly reservethe right to litigate all federal claims in a federal forum". The trial court limited its decision to the State issues confronting it.
Contrary to the defendants' contention, the issues have not been mooted, nor have plaintiffs been deprived of standing, by either the McMinns' contract to sell the house or by the tenants' move to another one-family house within the Town of Oyster Bay (see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669; cf. Group House of Port Washington v. Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 271, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 N.E.2d 207). The criminal prosecution is still pending, and the McMinns, who are the owners of several other houses within the Town of Oyster Bay, at least one of which is concededly subject to the same ordinance, have asserted a claim that the ordinance has had a negative effect on the value of their property. As to the tenants, they remain in violation of the ordinance in their new home.
Turning to the first of plaintiffs' attacks upon the validity of the ordinance, we are compelled to reject their argument and the trial court's determination that the ordinance conflicts with the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, art. 15). Subdivision 5 of section 296 of the Executive Law provides in part that:
Under the interpretation adopted in Hudson View Props. v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428, 450 N.E.2d 234, a restriction against occupancy by persons who have no familial relationship does not constitute illegal discrimination based on "marital status" under the statute (see, also, Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 51 N.Y.2d 506; Maryland Comms. on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, 300 Md. 75, 475 A.2d 1192).
Despite their categorical disavowal of any intention to assert any Federal claims in this action and their election to rely entirely upon the provisions of the State Constitution and the Executive Law, the plaintiffs have turned to the Federal Constitution to support their equal protection argument. They thus assert that the restrictive definition of "family" is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis under the State Cons...
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