McMurphy v. State

Decision Date02 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-499.,98-499.
Citation757 A.2d 1043
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesBonnie McMURPHY, et al. v. STATE of Vermont and Town of Rutland.

James W. Runcie of Ouimette & Runcie, Vergennes, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Cathy Nelligan Norman and Scott A. Whitted, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee State of Vermont.

Joseph A. Farnham of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Town of Rutland.

PRESENT: DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ., and GIBSON, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

MORSE, J.

In this wrongful death action following the death of their daughter in an automobile accident, plaintiffs Bonnie McMurphy and James Hart appeal a summary judgment ruling that defendants State of Vermont and Town of Rutland were immune from suit. Plaintiffs argue that, under the Tort Claims Act, the State waived its sovereign immunity, and, by purchasing excess liability insurance, Rutland waived its municipal immunity up to $1,850,000. Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that Rutland is liable under the theory of breach of contract, a claim that is not subject to immunity. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Plaintiffs are parents of Shannah Hart, who died in a motor vehicle accident in Rutland on December 7, 1995. The accident occurred at the intersection of Town Highway No. 1 (Post Road) and U .S. Route 7. The deceased, heading southbound on Post Road, drove through the intersection and collided with a pickup truck traveling northbound on Route 7. The State designed and built the intersection, completing the work in 1981. At that time, the State contracted with Rutland to assume responsibility for maintaining the intersection.

Plaintiffs individually and McMurphy, as administratrix of her daughter's estate, sued, claiming that the State failed to properly design and construct the intersection and Rutland failed to adequately maintain it. Post Road and Route 7 intersect at a relatively narrow angle. Post Road's southbound lane curves sharply to the right, so that its end point, which is marked by a stop sign, forms a "T" with Route 7. Traffic traveling northbound from Route 7 onto Post Road bypasses this "T" via a one-way exit lane, which routes traffic directly from the northbound lane of Route 7 onto Post Road's northbound lane. Plaintiffs believed that those traveling southbound on Post Road may easily mistake this one-way, northbound exit ramp as a two-way continuation of Post Road, rather than follow Post Road's sharp turn to the right to its end. They alleged that the intersection was negligently designed, constructed, and maintained, particularly in that it lacked the necessary and appropriate warning signage.

The superior court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, finding no issues of material fact with regard to whether it negligently failed to comply with design standards. The court similarly granted Rutland's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Town was immune from suit under the doctrine of municipal immunity and was not liable under a third-party beneficiary theory for breach of its contract with the State to maintain the intersection. This appeal followed.

I. Sovereign Immunity
A. The State

"Sovereign immunity protects the state from suit unless immunity is expressly waived by statute." LaShay v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 160 Vt. 60, 67, 625 A.2d 224, 228 (1993). Under 12 V.S.A. § 5601, the Tort Claims Act, Vermont has expressly waived immunity from certain lawsuits: "The state of Vermont shall be liable for injury to persons or property or loss of life caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the scope of employment ...." 12 V.S.A. § 5601(a). Subsection (e)(8) of the Act, however, declares that waiver does not apply to "[a]ny claim arising from the selection of or purposeful deviation from a particular set of standards for the planning and design of highways." Id. § 5601(e)(8).

The trial court ruled that the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on sovereign immunity preserved under subsection (e)(8).1 Plaintiffs challenge that ruling, arguing that the statute does not shelter the State from suits alleging that it negligently failed to comply with a given set of design standards. We agree.

When we interpret a statute, "our obligation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999). Our first step is to look at the statute's language with the presumption that the Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language. See id. We presume that language is inserted advisedly and that the Legislature did not intend to create surplusage. See Payea v. Howard Bank, 164 Vt. 106, 107, 663 A.2d 937, 938 (1995). We also consider the reason and spirit behind the statute as well as its effects and consequences. See In re P.S., 167 Vt. 63, 70, 702 A.2d 98, 102 (1997).

As noted, under subsection (e)(8), the State is immune from "[a]ny claim arising from the selection of or purposeful deviation from a particular set of standards for the planning and design of highways." 12 V.S.A. § 5601(e)(8). This language plainly and ordinarily means that the State is immune from claims arising from the State's choice of highway design standards or its conscious decision to depart from the requirements of chosen standards. To construe the statute as providing the State with comprehensive immunity for highway design would require overlooking this clear and deliberate language. Such a construction would also render the word "purposeful" surplusage. The Legislature would not have specified "purposeful deviation" if it intended to retain immunity for an unintentional deviation as well.

We believe that the Legislature did not intend to retain sovereign immunity from every claim alleging negligent highway design. Whereas subsection (e)(8) shelters the State from liability for all of its deliberate design decisions, allowing it to design highways in the manner that it sees fit, the statute preserves liability in circumstances where the State has unintentionally failed to comply with the chosen design standards. Thus, if a plaintiff can prove that the State intended to comply with certain standards, but failed to do so, the State would be liable for any injury caused if the plaintiff can also prove that the noncompliance was negligence.

One source for the standards used in the design of the intersection at issue here was the United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). MUTCD sets national standards and guidelines for the use of traffic control signs, signals, and markings. Vermont adopted MUTCD effective March 1973. See 23 V.S.A. § 1025. The Vermont Agency of Transportation drafted the design plans for this intersection in 1976 and 1977 following the standards set forth in MUTCD. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the State submitted the affidavit of an agency employee, who declared: "In choosing the signs to use and their approximate location[,] I followed the [MUTCD]." Thus, the State admittedly designed the intersection with the intention to follow, rather than purposefully depart from, the manual's standards.

To survive summary judgment, however, plaintiffs must raise a material issue of fact as to whether the State actually complied with MUTCD's requirements and, if not, that the State was negligent in failing to do so. See V.R.C.P. 56(e) (once motion for summary judgment is made and supported, nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" to survive motion); Lussier v. Truax, 161 Vt. 611, 612, 643 A.2d 843, 844 (1993) (mem.). We hold that plaintiffs did raise such issues of fact.

In order to determine if there exists a material issue of fact as to whether the State complied with the standards set forth in MUTCD, we look at the manual itself. In explaining the purpose of traffic signs, MUTCD provides:

The purpose of traffic control devices and warrants for their use is ... to provide such guidance and warnings as are needed to insure the safe and in[]formed operation of individual elements of the traffic stream.
Traffic control devices are used to direct and assist vehicle operators in the guidance and navigation tasks required to traverse safely any facility open to public travel.

Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Dept. of Trans., Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 1A-1 (1988). The manual also states that, in order to be effective, traffic signs should meet the following basic requirements: (1) fulfill a need; (2) command the attention and respect of operators; (3) convey a clear, simple meaning; and (4) give operators adequate time for response. See id. Furthermore, with regard to warning signs, the manual dictates that such signs "should provide adequate time for the driver to perceive, identify, decide, and perform any necessary maneuver." Id. 2C-3.

In their supporting memoranda, plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of their expert, who stated that, under the manual, the State should have placed signage warning those traveling southbound on Post Road of the intersection's sharp curve to the right. He also contended that one particular sign that faced these travelers—a "Stop Ahead" sign bearing a straight arrow—was directly contradictory to the layout of the intersection. Plaintiffs' expert calls into question whether the signage, or lack thereof, conveyed to southbound drivers a clear, simple understanding of the intersection's layout and provided adequate time for them to perceive, identify, decide, and perform the necessary maneuvering required to safely navigate the intersection. We find, therefore, that plaintiffs have established that there is a material...

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