McMurray v. New York State Div. of Housing and Community Renewal

• Decision Date: 18 February 1988
• Citation: 524 N.Y.S.2d 693,135 A.D.2d 235
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR of Frank McMURRAY, Petitioner-Appellant, for a Judgment Dismissing the Application for a Certificate of Eviction v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, Rent Administration, Manuel Mirabel, Deputy Commissioner, George Wild and Christel Wild, Respondents-Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 693

524 N.Y.S.2d 693

135 A.D.2d 235

In the Matter of the Application pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR of Frank McMURRAY, Petitioner-Appellant for a Judgment Dismissing the Application for a Certificate of Eviction v.NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWALRent Administration, Manuel Mirabel, DeputyCommissioner, George Wild and Christel Wild, Respondents-Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

Feb. 18, 1988.

Robert J. Kaplan, New York City, for petitioner-appellant.

Daniel E. Koenig, of counsel(Dennis B. Hasher, attorney), for State respondents-respondents.

Steven B. Sperber, of counsel(Lindenbaum & Young, P.C., Brooklyn, attorneys), for respondents-respondents Wild.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and SANDLER, SULLIVAN and ELLERIN, JJ.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

The New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Control Law as well as its implementing regulations provide for the issuance of a certificate of eviction where a landlord seeks in good faith to recover a housing accommodation for his own personal use and occupancy or that of his immediate family because of immediate and compelling necessity, provided, however, that the tenant is not otherwise protected.In 1984the Legislature amended the rent control law (L.1984, ch. 234, sec. 1) to exempt from such eviction senior citizens and long-term and disabled tenants.

In his May 23, 1986 opinion the Deputy Commissioner for Rent Administration ruled that the landlords of the subject housing accommodation had established the requisite good faith and necessity and, on the basis of a finding that the tenant could not have moved into the accommodation on a permanent basis until the spring of 1967, at the earliest, that the tenant was not protected from eviction as a twenty-year resident.The tenant commenced this CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the issuance of the certificate of eviction.The court hearing the matter dismissed the petition and granted the landlords' cross-motion to toll the statutory provision protecting from eviction tenants occupying a housing accommodation for twenty years or more.This appeal ensued.

Our disagreement with our dissenting brother revolves around the fact that subsequent to the entry of the judgment from which this appeal is taken, the tenant accumulated the requisite twenty years of occupancy to qualify him for protection from eviction.Chapter 234of the Laws of 1984 amended section Y51-6.0(b)(now renumbered 26-408) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, inter alia, to exempt from eviction in a proceeding to recover possession of a housing accommodation for a landlord's own personal use and occupancy or that of his immediate family tenancies in which "a member of the household lawfully occupying the housing accommodation ... has been a tenant in a housing accommodation in that building for twenty years or more...."

The landlords' application for a certificate of eviction has a long and tortured administrative history.The original application, filed on May 27, 1983, was denied for failure to prove an immediate and compelling necessity.On June 7, 1984, on administrative appeal, the Deputy Commissioner for Rent Control held that the immediate and compelling necessity requirement was inapplicable under the law then in effect, since the building contained less than thirteen units.Accordingly, he remanded the proceeding to the District Rent Director for a finding on the issue of good faith.After a hearing, the District Rent Director, on May 29, 1985, accepting the hearing officer's finding of good faith and following his recommendation, granted the certificate of eviction.The tenant filed an administrative appeal on July 1, 1985.

While the proceeding had been in remand, Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1984, which had also amended section Y-51-6.0 of the Administrative Code to require that landlords of all rent controlled accommodations seeking certificates of eviction for their personal use and occupancy establish an immediate and compelling necessity, as well as good faith, had been enacted.The District Director, however, had failed to consider the effect of the new legislation in issuing his determination, and, as a result, the Deputy Commissioner, on administrative appeal, held two hearings, de novo: one to determine good faith and immediate and compelling necessity; the other, to consider whether the tenant fell into one of the exempt categories, since he had claimed that he resided at the subject premises for over twenty years and was unable to work as a result of a physical disability.The Commissioner upheld the grant of the certificate and rejected the tenant's claim of exemption, finding that he had not suffered the requisite physical impairment and that he had not resided in the apartment for twenty years.After his request for reconsideration was denied, the tenant commenced this proceeding.

In the course of the second hearing on administrative appeal, the tenant testified that he had moved into the subject accommodation with his future wife's family in March of 1966, prior to their marriage; that he continued to reside at the premises after he and his wife were married in November 1966; that his wife's family moved out after the tenant's daughter was born in May 1967; and that he took over the lease for the apartment on August 1, 1967.Two long-time residents of the subject building, however, disputed the tenant's claim that he had moved into the apartment in 1966.On the basis of the evidence before him, the Deputy Commissioner, as already noted, found that the earliest the tenant could have moved into the subject accommodation on a permanent basis was in the spring of 1967.On this appeal, the Commissioner, while otherwise defending his findings, takes the position that the tenant is protected from eviction, inasmuch as it appears that he has now occupied the apartment for twenty years or more.

The protection afforded by Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1984 to, inter alia, long-term tenants of rent-controlled apartments is a tacit recognition of the devastating impact that evictions can have on such tenants and their communities.As the New York Assembly memorandum in support of the legislation explained: "In the present housing market, renting a new apartment can be financially devastating to a person on a retirement or limited income.Yet these people are often singled out by landlords for eviction because they often have been in the apartment for many years and thus pay lower rents."The Budget Report on Bills, contained in the Governor's Bill Jacket, A-3586-B, also noted that long-term tenants, "by virtue of their longevity, have become an integral part of their community and have not violated their obligations to the landlord ... should be afforded protection from eviction since forcing them out of their housing accommodations after 20 years could have a devastating effect on them and their community."

The constitutionality of the statutory protection against eviction afforded to twenty-year residents has been repeatedly upheld.( See, e.g., Lavalle v. Scruggs-Leftwich, 133 A.D.2d 313, 519 N.Y.S.2d 218;Matter of Lopez v. Mirabel, 127 A.D.2d 771, 512 N.Y.S.2d 164;see, also, Matter of Guerriera v. Joy, 64 N.Y.2d 747, 485 N.Y.S.2d 979, 475 N.E.2d 446.)Moreover, the statute is clearly remedial in nature.( Lavalle v. Scruggs-Leftwich, supra, 133 A.D.2d at 315, 519 N.Y.S.2d 218.)As part of the 1984amendments, Chapter 234provided:

This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to any tenant in possession at or after the time it takes effect, regardless of whether the landlord's application for an order, refusal to renew a lease or refusal to extend or renew a tenancy took place before this act shall have taken effect.

Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to carry out the reform intended and to spread their beneficial results as widely as possible.( Post v. 120 East End Ave. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 19, 24, 475 N.Y.S.2d 821, 464 N.E.2d 125;McKinney's Statutessec. 321.)In Matter of Sommer v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 93 A.D.2d 481, 485-486, 462 N.Y.S.2d 200, affd.61 N.Y.2d 973, 475 N.Y.S.2d 280, 463 N.E.2d 621, this court noted that provisions affording protections to tenants are to be liberally construed as implementing the purposes for which the rent laws were enacted while provisions excluding a tenant from possession were to be strictly construed as running counter to the purpose of the rent laws.In Lavalle v. Scruggs-Leftwich, supra, 133 A.D.2d 313, 519 N.Y.S.2d 218, this court, in rejecting the argument that the twenty-year period under Chapter 234 was to be computed as of the time of the landlord's application, had occasion to note, "Assuming that there is much latitude for interpretation of the subject amendment, at best a doubtful proposition, there would seem no way, consistent with a liberal reading, that respondent tenant who remained in possession of the subject premises after the amendment's effective date and had, as of that time lived there for over 20 years, could be evicted in a 'personal use action'."( Id. at 315, 519 N.Y.S.2d 218.)

The language of Chapter 234 which applies "to any tenant in possession at or after the time takes effect ...", makes it clear that the Legislature intended the twenty-year rule to be applied whenever a tenant in possession reaches the twenty-year milestone.In Matter of Cirella v. Joy, 69 N.Y.2d 973, 516 N.Y.S.2d 649, 509 N.E.2d 344, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Commissioner to determine "the landlord's present entitlement to a certificate of eviction"(id. at 975, 516 N.Y.S.2d 649, 509 N.E.2d 344), despite a previous determination that the landlord was entitled to the certificate.The 1984amendments, which became effective after the issuance of the certificate, had added the requirement that a landlord also prove an immediate and compelling...