McMurtrey v. Cleveringa

• Decision Date: 06 January 2022
• Docket Number: C20-4048-LTS-KEM
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
• Parties: RYAN MCMURTREY, Plaintiff, v. KYLE CLEVERINGA, in his individual and official capacity, Defendant.

RYAN MCMURTREY, Plaintiff, v. KYLE CLEVERINGA, in his individual and official capacity, Defendant.

No. C20-4048-LTS-KEM

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division

January 6, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEONARD T. STRAND, CHIEF JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before me on a motion (Doc. 12) for summary judgment by defendant Kyle Cleveringa and a motion (Doc. 25) for partial summary judgment by plaintiff Ryan McMurtrey.^[1] Each party has filed resistances (Docs 13, 17, 26) and replies (Docs. 16, 27). I find oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c). McMurtrey filed his complaint (Doc. 1) on September 30, 2020, asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 based on alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Cleveringa filed his answer (Doc. 4) on October 19, 2020. A jury trial is scheduled to begin February 14, 2022.

II. RELEVANT FACTS

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed for purposes of the pending motions.

A. Traffic Stop and Subsequent Search/Seizure

At approximately 1:15 a.m. on October 2, 2018, Cleveringa was on duty as a Woodbury County Deputy Sheriff when he conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle that did not appear to have a front license plate, as required by Iowa law. Doc. 12-3 at 4-5. The vehicle contained a male driver, who turned out to be McMurtrey, and a female passenger, Rebecca Hemmelman. Id. While standing outside the passenger window, Cleveringa smelled alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. Id. at 5. Cleveringa asked McMurtrey to step out of the vehicle to determine whether he was under the influence of alcohol. Doc. 12-1 at 2.

Cleveringa asked McMurtrey to take a seat in his patrol car, and McMurtrey complied. Cleveringa ultimately issued McMurtrey a warning citation for improperly displaying his front license plate. Id. While in the patrol car, McMurtrey did not display signs of impairment and explained that his passenger had consumed alcohol earlier. Doc. 12-3 at 14. Cleveringa asked McMurtrey if there were any open containers inside the vehicle and McMurtrey said there were not. Id. Cleveringa then asked, “Do you mind if I do a quick search of the vehicle just to make sure there's no, uh, alcohol containers inside there?” BCV 8:58.^[2] After McMurtrey consented to this “quick search, ” Cleveringa told a second officer, Deputy Simoni: “We're just [going to] search just to make sure . . . she's been drinking so . . . he said we could search just to make sure there's no open containers or nothing.” BCV 9:13. Cleveringa asked Hemmelman to step outside the vehicle as he conducted the search. Doc. 12-3 at 14. He told her: “He said . . . you had a couple of drinks or something, so we're just making sure there's no open containers or anything like that.” BCV 9:29.

While conducting the search, Cleveringa unzipped a backpack in the back seat and found syringes. Id. When Cleveringa asked McMurtrey and Hemmelman about the syringes, Hemmelman said she was a Type II diabetic. Doc. 12-1 at 3. Cleveringa resumed the search and found a bag with a lock affixed to the zipper. Id. Cleveringa asked McMurtrey to open the bag, but he declined. Id. Cleveringa then reached into the passenger-side backseat pocket, where he found an alleged “tooter”^[3] that, he believed, contained white residue. Id. Cleveringa did not perform a field test on the alleged tooter and proceeded to search various other items, including a wallet, zipped bag, purse, and makeup bag. Id. Ultimately, Cleveringa seized the locked bag without a warrant. Id.

On October 8, 2018, Cleveringa signed an application for a search warrant and, after obtaining the warrant (Doc. 12-3 at 3), located multiple small baggies of methamphetamine and marijuana in the locked bag, along with several unlabeled pill bottles with prescription pills. Doc. 12-3 at 37-38. On December 18, 2018, state prosecutors charged McMurtrey with the following based on evidence collected from the seized bag:

• Count 1: Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance,

• Count 2: Drug Stamp Tax Violation,

• Count 3: Possession of a Controlled Substance (Second Violation) and

• Count 4: Unlawful Possession of a Prescription Drug. Doc. 12-3 at 38.

B. State Proceedings

McMurtrey moved to suppress all evidence recovered from the search, claiming Cleveringa violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing the locked bag without probable cause, consent or a warrant. See Doc. 12-3 at 26. The state argued that Cleveringa conducted the search with McMurtrey's consent, relying on Cleveringa's allegation that he asked McMurtrey “if he would allow me to search the vehicle, to ensure that there was no open containers inside of the vehicle or anything else that was not supposed to be inside the vehicle. He did say that he would consent to a brief search of the vehicle.” Doc. 12-3 at 6 (emphasis added).

The Iowa District Court granted the motion to suppress, taking issue with Cleveringa's testimony on grounds that it “depart[ed] markedly” from the in-camera audio and video recording of the encounter. See Doc. 12-3 at 38-39. The court stated:

In contrast to Deputy Cleveringa's recollection, he did not ask McMurtrey for permission to search for “open containers or anything else that may be illegal.” Rather, Cleveringa's question to search McMurtrey's vehicle was limited to the scope of searching merely for open containers.

At 9:52 in the video, Deputy Cleveringa asks McMurtrey, “Hey do you mind if I do a quick search of the vehicle to make sure there's no open alcohol containers inside there.” At 9:57, McMurtrey responds, “Ahh yea if you want to look really quick, I don't mind . . .” When Cleveringa and McMurtrey exit the vehicle Cleveringa tells another officer, “We are just going to search to make sure there's no open containers or nothing.” Later, as Cleveringa approaches the vehicle to ask the female passenger to exit the vehicle so that he can perform his search, he advises her, “Can you just jump out real quick, and stand by this other guy . . . we are just going to make sure . . . he said you had a couple of drinks or something . . . making sure there's no open containers or anything like that . . .” There is no indication in that video that McMurtrey is asked to extend the scope of his search of the vehicle beyond a mere container search, and there is also no indication that McMurtrey volunteered to do so on his own accord.

Doc. 12-3 at 38-39. The court held that given the limited nature of McMurtrey's consent, Cleveringa had no authority to search the driver's seatback, the passenger's make-up cases, or the backpack, and thus suppressed all evidence gained from the search. Doc. 12-3 at 40. The state later dismissed all charges against McMurtrey. Doc. 12-3 at 43.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A material fact is one that “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, “the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. Facts that are “critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not. Id.

An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question.” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative, ” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.

As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we ...