Mcnabb v. State, 30206.
| Decision Date | 17 March 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 30206.,30206. |
| Parties | McNABB . v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The trial judge has a discretion to control the right of cross-examination within reasonable bounds and an exercise of this discretion will not be controlled by a reviewing court unless abused; there was no such abuse in this case.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.
J. H. McNabb was convicted of possessing burglary tools with unlawful intent, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
James R. Venable and Frank A. Bowers, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., Durwood T. Pye, L. W. Camp, Sol., and J. R. Parham, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
The defendant, J. H. McNabb, was convicted under an indictment which charged him and one Sargent with possessing burglar tools with intent to employ them in committing burglary and larceny, with the intent to allow them to be used in the commission of burglary and larceny, and knowing that same were to be used in the commission of burglary and larceny. He made a motion for a new trial, the motion was overruled, and he excepted.
1. On cross-examination, Sargent, a witness for the State, was asked if he knew one Robert Croker. Sargent replied that he did not know Croker. Mrs. Sargent, another witness for the State, while on cross-examination, also denied knowing Croker. Kilpatrick, a witness for the defendant, testified that he had seen Croker and the Sargents together frequently. Croker was then introduced as a witnessfor the defendant and testified, in effect, that he knew the Sargents well; that he had been in their home while a fugitive from prison; that the burglary tools in question had been shown to him by Sargent, who claimed ownership of them; Croker also testified as to the location of the Sargent home and said further: "I know Sargent's whole family; his father, mother, and brother." The defendant's counsel then asked Croker the following question: "Do you know where his father is, or what he is doing?" The State's objection to this question, on the ground of irrelevancy, was sustained. This is the ruling excepted to. No precise and universal test of the relevancy of testimony is furnished by the law. The question must be determined in each case according to the facts of that particular case and in accordance with the teachings of reason and judicial experience. Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. 11 Cyc. 174; Walker v. Roberts, 20 Ga. 15; Sample v. Lipscomb, 18 Ga. 687. A concrete application of the general tests of relevancy of testimony to the facts of this case will determine whether the judge erred in the admission of the testimony in question.
Croker had already testified at length as to his acquaintance with the Sargents; that he knew "his whole family, his father, mother, and brother." The whereabouts of the father of Sargent, or his present employment, under these circumstances, was of no substantial consequence in showing the acquaintance of Croker with Sargent. It was a statement of unnecessary particulars as to why he was acquainted with Sargent, and because of its remoteness and irrelevancy, it should not be admitted. The judge did not commit reversible error in sustaining the objection.
2. Mrs. Sargent, a witness for the State, on recross-examination, testified, in part, as follows:
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