McNair v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 12 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 98-T-915-S. |
| Citation | 307 F.Supp.2d 1277 |
| Parties | Willie McNAIR, Petitioner, v. Donal CAMPBELL, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Randall S. Susskind, Cathleen I. Price, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Beth Jackson Hughes, J. Clayton Crenshaw, Michelle R. Stephens, James Roy Houts, Attorney General's Office State of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
Petitioner Willie McNair brings this petition under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction in Alabama state court for the capital murder of Ella Foy Riley. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, evidence was taken on several claims that had not been defaulted. Briefing by the parties followed, and McNair now maintains 14 separate grounds for relief.1 For the reasons that follow, the court finds that McNair is entitled to relief on one ground: ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. On all other grounds, his petition is denied.
The complicated procedural history of this case is concisely summarized in McNair v. State, 706 So.2d 828, 831-33 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). McNair was convicted on April 18, 1991, for the capital offense of murder committed during the commission or attempt of a robbery in the first degree. McNair was first sentenced on May 16, 1991, when the trial judge adopted the jury's majority recommendation that McNair be sentenced to death. The sentence was thrice remanded to the trial court for a proper sentencing order. On February 26, 1993, after the first remand, McNair was again sentenced to death after the trial judge rejected the new sentencing jury's recommendation of life without possibility of parole. Two remands later, the state trial court entered an acceptable sentencing order. The appeals court affirmed the conviction and sentence on January 21, 1994, McNair v. State, 653 So.2d 351 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), and the Alabama Supreme Court likewise affirmed on September 2, 1994, Ex parte McNair, 653 So.2d 353 (Ala.1994). The United States Supreme Court denied a certiorari petition on February 21, 1995. McNair v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 1159, 115 S.Ct. 1121, 130 L.Ed.2d 1084 (1995).
McNair filed a petition for post-conviction review under Ala. R.Crim. P. 32 on July 5, 1995. The state trial court dismissed all but three claims as procedurally barred: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) withheld exculpatory evidence; and (3) racially-biased imposition of the death penalty. At the Rule 32 hearing, the court also allowed testimony concerning another of McNair's claims.2 This claim was raised in McNair's second amended petition for Rule 32 relief and challenged his conviction on the ground that the jury considered extraneous evidence during its deliberations.3 All of McNair's remaining claims were denied on November 13, 1995, and the state appellate court affirmed the denial on July 3, 1997. McNair v. State, 706 So.2d 828 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).
McNair filed the present § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 18, 1998. This court determined that the case should proceed in two stages: in Stage I, the court determined which claims had been procedurally defaulted and which non-defaulted claims merited evidentiary hearings. McNair v. Haley, 97 F. Supp.2d 1270 (M.D.Ala.2000). Now, in Stage II, this court reaches the merits of the non-defaulted claims.
This court's review of claims adjudicated on the merits in state court is governed by § 2254(d), as modified in 1996 by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Relief from this court shall not be granted unless that adjudication:
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). For claims that have not been adjudicated on the merits in state court, and are otherwise validly before the federal court for review, the court can make its own determination of the merits. Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.1999); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir.1999).
The Supreme Court recently clarified the applicable standards of review under § 2254(d) in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The "clearly established law" requirement allows this court to grant a petition for habeas corpus only if the state court decision violates, or is an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. at 1523-24. A decision is "contrary to" clearly established law if "a state court arrives at a conclu3ion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. In so holding, the Williams Court rejected the more deferential standard that an unreasonable application can occur only if all reasonable jurists would come to a conclusion different from that of the state court, and held the standard to be one of objective reasonability. Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. at 1521; see also McIntyre v. Williams, 216 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir.2000). With these standards in mind, the court turns to the 14 grounds on which McNair currently seeks relief.
In McNair's first claim, he contends the exclusion of ten of the 11 African-American jurors through peremptory challenges by District Attorney Valeska violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The right of a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury chosen free from racial discrimination has long been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. at 1716; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879). McNair raised his Batson claim on direct appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, McNair, 653 So.2d at 323, and the Alabama Supreme Court, Ex parte McNair, 653 So.2d at 354-55. Both courts denied relief. Upon consideration of these decisions, and an independent review of the record, this court finds McNair is due no relief for the exclusion of these jurors.
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the defendant must make a prima-facie showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, if both parties meet their burdens under steps one and two, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24. However, once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation and the court has resolved the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima-facie case becomes moot. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).
The trial judge never made a finding that McNair established a prima-facie case of race discrimination. Ex Parte McNair, 653 So.2d at 355. Nonetheless, he required the prosecutor to articulate his reasons for striking the 11 African-American jurors in question.4 Those reasons were:
Juror McAllister: "not being in Henry County."5
Juror Boatwright: 6
Juror Marsh: "based on [assistant District Attorney Durell Whiddon] knowing him ... his reputation in the community."7
Juror Kelley: "`unstable per family members,' that he was not a stable individual in relationship, in his demeanor, appearance, or actions."8
Jurors Brackin, Rivers, Thomas, and Brady: all struck for being close to defendant's age.9
Juror Ford: "`many criminal violations and anti-law per LE (law enforcement).'"10
Juror Chitty: 11
A prosecutor meets his burden at the second stage of the Batson test by offering a merely plausible explanation for the strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). At issue in stage two is only the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation, as the burden of proof remains on the defendant to prove intentional discrimination. Id."Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral." Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. McNair does not argue that any of the government's...
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