McNair v. School Dist. No. 1 of Cascade County
| Decision Date | 22 May 1930 |
| Docket Number | 6697. |
| Parties | McNAIR v. SCHOOL DIST. No. 1 OF CASCADE COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Cascade County; H. H. Ewing, Judge.
Suit by Chester S. McNair against School District No. 1 of Cascade County and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Art Jardine, of Great Falls, for appellant.
Clift & Glover and Cooper, Stephenson & Hoover, all of Great Falls for respondents.
Chester S. McNair, a taxpaying freeholder of Cascada county, has appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered in an injunction proceeding instituted by him to prevent school district No. 1 of Cascade county, and its board of trustees from selling certain bonds. To the complaint filed the defendants interposed a demurrer, which was sustained, and, the plaintiff refusing to further plead, judgment for the defendants followed.
It appears that school district No. 1 of Cascade county, which includes the city of Great Falls, recently completed a million dollar high school, and thereupon more than 20 per cent. of the qualified electors and taxpayers of the district petitioned the board of trustees to call an election to determine whether or not the board should issue and sell bonds for two distinct purposes, the first question to be presented being the issuance of bonds to raise $150,000 for the furnishing and equipping of the high school; the second: "Shall the board * * * be authorized to issue and sell bonds * * * in the amount of * * * $90,000 * * * for the purpose of constructing an outdoor gymnasium and athletic field in said district, furnishing and equipping the same."
McNair's complaint challenges the board's authority, under the law, to issue and sell the bonds for this second purpose. It shows that all steps taken for the holding of the election, the conducting of the election, and the issuance of the bonds were duly and regularly taken, and that the prescribed notice of sale has been given, under which, unless restrained, the board will on June 2, 1930, offer for sale, and sell to the highest bidder for cash, this $90,000 bond issue. Thus the only question presented for our determination is: Has the board of trustees of a school district the power and authority to issue and sell bonds for the purpose of constructing and equipping an outdoor gymnasium and athletic field in connection with a high school?
A school district is a political subdivision of the state, created for the convenient dispatch of public business. State ex rel. Redman v. Meyers, 65 Mont. 124, 210 P. 1064. It is a public corporation. Henderson v. School District, 75 Mont. 154, 242 P. 979; State ex rel. School District v. Urton, 76 Mont. 458, 248 P. 369. The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes the board of directors and managing officers of the corporation, and may exercise only those powers expressly conferred upon them by statute and such as are necessarily implied in the exercise of those expressly conferred. The statute granting power must be regarded both as a grant and a limitation upon the powers of the board. "This is the rule of construction applicable to all statutes granting and defining the powers of such municipal or quasi municipal bodies." Bean v. Lyons, 37 Mont. 354, 96 P. 922, 925.
The latest expression of the Legislature as to the power of such a board in this regard is found in chapter 147, Laws of 1927, wherein (section 1) it is declared that "the Board of Trustees of any school district within this State is hereby vested with the power and authority to issue and negotiate coupon bonds on the credit of the school district for any one or more of the following purposes:
(a). For the purpose of building, enlarging, altering, repairing, or acquiring by purchase one or more school houses in said district; furnishing and equipping the same, and purchasing the necessary lands therefor.
(b). For the purpose of constructing or acquiring by purchasing one or more teacherages in said district, furnishing and equipping the same, and purchasing the necessary lands therefor.
(c). For the purpose of constructing or acquiring by purchasing one or more dormitories in said district, furnishing and equipping the same, and purchasing the necessary lands therefor.
(d). For the purpose of constructing or acquiring by purchasing one or more gymnasiums in said district, furnishing and equipping the same, and purchasing the necessary lands therefor. * * *"
Under the above rules, if these defendants have power to issue and negotiate the bonds in question, their authority therefor must be found in one of the four subdivisions just quoted.
The intention of the Legislature in enacting a statute is the consideration which must control in its construction (section 10520, Rev. Codes 1921), and, to ascertain that intention, recourse must first be had to the language employed ( State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 Ann. Cas. 717) and the apparent purpose to be subserved (State ex rel. Vickers v. Board, 77 Mont. 316, 250 P. 606). State ex rel. Keane v. Board of County Commissioners, 83 Mont. 540, 273 P. 290, 293.
What, then, did the Legislature intend should be the extent of the power and authority of a school board with reference to providing for the education of our children and youths, when that body enacted chapter 147 of the Laws of 1927?
Construing that enactment literally, as counsel for the plaintiff would have us do, no authority is found in the statute for the establishment and equipment of laboratories, domestic science rooms, manual training shops or playgrounds; yet it is a matter of common knowledge that all these modern adjuncts to education were maintained in, and in connection with, schools at the time the act was passed.
Speaking literally, the "necessary lands" for the erection of the buildings enumerated would be only sufficient to accommodate them; yet no one will contend that a school board in a city had performed its whole duty by the erection of a schoolhouse on the plan of a grocery store, covering the entire lot purchased and opening directly upon the street and compelling the pupils to remain indoors throughout the school day, and, on dismissal, pass directly into the street.
Under the heading "Education," our Constitution declares that "it shall be the duty of the legislative assembly of Montana to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free, common schools." Section 1, art. 11. This is "a solemn mandate" to the Legislature (Evers v. Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462) which has been obeyed by the enactment of our school laws, in which the matter of providing and carrying out the details of establishment and maintenance is necessarily delegated to the school officials.
What then, constitutes a "thorough" system of education in our public schools? By its voluntary act, the state has assumed the function of education primarily resting upon the parents, and by laws on compulsory education has decreed that the custody of children be yielded to the state during the major portion of their waking hours for five days in the week, and, usually, nine months in the year. In doing so, the state is not actuated by motives of philanthropy or charity, but for the good of the state, and, for what it expends on education, it expects substantial returns in good citizenship. With this fact in mind, it is clear that the solemn mandate of the Constitution is not discharged by the mere training of the mind;...
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