McNair v. State

• Decision Date: 23 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-KA-00832-COA.,2000-KA-00832-COA.
• Citation: 814 So.2d 153
• Parties: Matthew McNAIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

814 So.2d 153

Matthew McNAIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2000-KA-00832-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

October 23, 2001.

Rehearing Denied January 15, 2002.

Certiorari Denied April 18, 2002.

John M. Colette, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.

Office of the Attorney General, by Dewitt T. Allred, III, Attorney for Appellee.

Before McMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS, and CHANDLER, JJ.

McMILLIN, C.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. This is an appeal from a criminal conviction for aggravated assault returned by a Hinds County Circuit Court jury against Matthew McNair. McNair seeks to have his conviction set aside based on claims (a) that his counsel was unreasonably hampered in his efforts to cross-examine the alleged victim, (b) that his trial attorney's performance was so fundamentally deficient as to deprive him of his constitutionally-grounded right to representation by counsel, and (c) that the State violated the discovery rules when it failed to produce a record of the alleged victim's felony convictions. We find these issues to be without merit and affirm McNair's conviction.

I.

Facts

¶ 2. The State presented evidence to show that McNair, apparently believing that Theophilus Mason had some involvement in the earlier theft of McNair's truck, approached Mason in the parking lot of an apartment complex and shot him twice in the legs with a shotgun. As a result, Mason lost his right leg above the knee and suffered substantial medical complications regarding his left leg.

¶ 3. McNair did not deny the shooting. He defended his actions by claiming that he fired the first shot in self-defense when Mason lunged at him during a conversation regarding the stolen truck. The second shot, according to McNair, was the result of an accidental discharge of his weapon.

II.

Restrictions on Cross-examination of Mason

¶ 4. McNair points out that, in the defense of a criminal prosecution, the defendant is entitled to pursue a vigorous cross-examination of the witnesses who testify against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miss. Const. art. 3 § 26; Shaffer v. State, 740 So.2d 273, 281 (Miss.1998); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 488 (Miss.1988). He claims that he was effectively denied that right on two separate occasions during the cross-examination of the victim, Theophilus Mason.

¶ 5. In the first instance, defense counsel sought to inquire as to whether Mason had any prior misdemeanor or felony convictions. The State objected to this broad inquiry on the ground of relevance and the court sustained the objection. During a discussion out of the jury's presence, defense counsel indicated that the inquiry was relevant to his contention that the initial shot was fired in self-defense, because of the question's potential to uncover "any crime of violence" for which Mason may have been convicted.

¶ 6. On appeal, McNair adds the additional contention that the response would have been helpful to demonstrate bias on the part of this witness. An objection to the introduction of evidence must be accompanied by a statement of the "specific ground of objection...." M.R.E. 103(a)(1). A witness's bias, either in favor of or against the defendant, is a means of impeaching the credibility of a witness covered by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 616. Demonstrating that the victim of an alleged assault was a violent person such that the defendant would have good cause to defend himself is an entirely different matter covered by Rule 404(a)(2). We decline to consider whether the barred line of inquiry somehow prevented McNair from showing that Mason was biased against him as having been improperly raised for the first time on appeal. Farmer v. State, 764 So.2d 448, 456(¶ 26) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000).

¶ 7. If defense counsel's purpose was to develop the fact that Mason had a violent disposition known to McNair, thereby making more credible McNair's defense that he fired the shotgun in self-defense when he saw Mason lunging toward him, then the inquiry was certainly overly broad and objectionable on that ground alone. Even had the inquiry been more narrowly tailored to seek only information tending to show a history of violent behavior on Mason's part, the trial court's ruling could be considered error only if it were accompanied by an offer of proof from the defense demonstrating "the substance of the evidence" alleged to be wrongfully excluded. M.R.E. 103(a)(2). There is no indication in the record that any such convictions existed or were known to McNair at the time of the shooting. In order to be relevant in a claim of self-defense, the victim's nature as a potential aggressor must not only be demonstrated, but it must also be shown that the defendant was aware of that nature, since only that combination of facts affects the reasonableness of the defendant's alleged fear of harm at the victim's hands—which is a relevant source of inquiry by the jury in assessing a claim of self-defense. Rice v. State, 782 So.2d 171, 174(¶ 16) (Miss.Ct. App.2001).

¶ 8. Thus, even if we assume error on the trial court's part for simply cutting off altogether the inquiry into the possibility of the victim's history of violent criminal behavior instead of guiding defense counsel down a more appropriately narrow line of questioning, the error cannot be reversible because there is no indication that the ruling affected a substantial right of the defendant. M.R.E. 103(a).

III.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 9. On appeal, McNair contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and recites a litany of complaints regarding his trial attorney's lack of diligence in investigating the case and preparing for trial. There is a strong presumption that an attorney's performance fell within the acceptable limits of professionally competent representation required by the Sixth Amendment. Vielee v. State, 653 So.2d 920, 922 (Miss.1995). In order to prevail on a claim of constitutionally deficient representation, the defendant must show (a) that the attorney's performance fell outside those acceptable limits, and (b) that, but for the attorney's defective performance, there is a substantial likelihood that the outcome of the case would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476 (Miss.1984).

¶ 10. McNair's complaints include allegations that his trial attorney (a) failed to timely seek discovery (though discovery was sought), (b) did not investigate the possibility of an insanity defense, (c) did not search for alibi witnesses, (d) did not call any...