McNair v. U.S. Postal Service

• Decision Date: 19 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-2499,84-2499
• Citation: 768 F.2d 730
• Parties: 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2147, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,644 Darrell D. McNAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 730

768 F.2d 730

120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2147, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,644

Darrell D. McNAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 84-2499.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 19, 1985.

Hill, Ghiselli & Moser, Bertrand C. Moser, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

Henry K. Oncken, U.S. Atty., James R. Gough, Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., John C. Oldenburg, Senior Asst. Reg. Labor Counsel, Office of Labor Law, U.S. Postal Service, Memphis, Tenn., Kevin B. Rachel, Stephen E. Alpern, Office of Labor Law, U.S. Postal Service, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, RANDALL and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Darrell McNair, a former postal worker, alleges that the United States Postal Service wrongfully terminated his employment in violation of the terms of its collective bargaining agreement with McNair's union, the National Association of Letter Carriers. He filed this suit, notwithstanding an arbitrator's decision that his employment had been terminated for just cause, seeking reinstatement and backpay from the date of termination. We hold that McNair lacks standing to attack the arbitrator's decision and that, although the district court should not have granted summary judgment, the case was properly dismissed. We remand the case to the district court for the entry of a new judgment reflecting the true ground for dismissal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

In 1981, Darrell McNair (McNair) was a letter carrier at the United States Post Office in LaPorte, Texas. He was also a member of the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (NALC), which is the exclusive bargaining agent for letter carriers at LaPorte and around the country. A collective bargaining agreement between NALC and McNair's employer, the United States Postal Service (USPS), governed the terms and conditions of his employment. McNair is not himself a party to the agreement.

On December 11, 1981, postal inspectors arrested McNair for allegedly stealing from the mail a radio that had, as part of an undercover investigation, been placed among the material entrusted to him for delivery. It is undisputed that the inspectors discovered the radio in the bedroom of McNair's home. The parties disagree sharply, however, on how it got there. The inspectors' version of the story can be summarized as follows. In response to an anonymous tip that McNair had been stealing mail, they placed an electronic beeper inside a package containing a radio and mailed the package to a nonexistent address on McNair's assigned route. The package was given to McNair for delivery on December 11, 1981. The inspectors, by monitoring the beeper, determined that McNair kept the package with him throughout the workday and returned with it to the post office after completing his route. They then saw McNair carrying the package from the post office to his car and, through further monitoring of the beeper, determined that he brought it to his home. After the beeper's alarm sounded, indicating that the package had been opened, the inspectors knocked on McNair's door and secured his home. Several hours later, they obtained a search warrant and discovered the radio in McNair's bedroom.

McNair agrees with this account until the point at which, according to the inspectors, he left the post office with the package containing the radio. McNair maintains that, having determined that the package was undeliverable, he simply left it at the post office before going home for the day. According to McNair, the package that he was observed carrying from the post office to his car was a box of cookies that had been given to him that day by a postal customer that lives along his route. He maintains, moreover, that, during the interim between his initial confrontation with the postal inspectors and the search of his home, someone planted the radio in his bedroom.

Based upon his alleged possession of the radio, McNair's superintendent formally charged him with "mistreatment of mail matter" ¹ and notified him of USPS' intention to terminate his employment. The charge specifically informed McNair of his right to contest the superintendent's allegations and to appeal an adverse decision through the grievance process of the collective bargaining agreement. McNair's employment was formally terminated on January 8, 1982.

On January 11, 1982, a federal grand jury indicted McNair for stealing the radio, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1709, ² and for "knowingly and willfully obstruct[ing] and retard[ing] the passage" of the radio through the mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1701. ³ A jury acquitted McNair of all charges. Following the acquittal, McNair sought reinstatement to his former job, but USPS refused to rehire him. NALC filed a grievance on McNair's behalf which, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, culminated in submission to an arbitrator of the question whether USPS had "just cause" to terminate McNair's employment. ⁴ The union represented McNair before the arbitrator, and the adequacy of that representation has not been challenged. On December 15, 1982, following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the arbitrator determined that USPS had just cause for its actions and, indeed, that there is "not ... a single reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the grievant." Although the arbitrator consciously applied the burden of proof mandated in criminal cases, the specific issue before the arbitrator, of course, was not whether McNair is guilty of a criminal offense. Rather, the issue was simply whether, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, USPS had just cause, because McNair had allegedly mistreated mail matter, to terminate his employment.

On March 14, 1983, McNair, claiming jurisdiction under 39 U.S.C. Sec. 409, ⁵ filed this lawsuit against USPS. The complaint seeks a judgment vacating the arbitration decision and ordering USPS to reinstate McNair to his former position, with full backpay from the date of termination. The complaint alleges that McNair's constitutional rights have been violated. The complaint does not specifically allege, however, that McNair's termination violated the Constitution. Rather, the complaint alleges that, because the arbitrator resolved against McNair the same issue--whether on December 11, 1981, he stole a radio from the mail--that the criminal jury resolved in his favor, the arbitration hearing did not afford him due process, in violation of the fifth amendment.

USPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) the district court, because of a defect in service of process, lacked personal jurisdiction over USPS; (2) McNair, because he was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement or to the arbitration itself, lacked standing to vacate the arbitrator's decision; and (3) the court, assuming arguendo that McNair has standing, must defer to the arbitrator's decision because, even if it is erroneous, it is neither violative of public policy nor in manifest disregard of the law. McNair filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On August 13, 1984, the district court, without assigning reasons, granted USPS' motion for summary judgment and denied McNair's motion. McNair filed a timely appeal.

II. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL.

All parties agree that, under normal circumstances, NALC and USPS would be the only parties with standing to attack the arbitrator's decision and that the scope of judicial review would be quite narrow. McNair argues, however, that this case presents special circumstances. He reports that his "entire argument derives from one fundamental premise--the jury in the criminal trial determined that Mr. McNair did not steal the radio." Appellant's Brief at 23. He proceeds from that premise to the ultimate conclusion that we should reverse the district court's judgment and direct the entry of judgment in his favor through a tortuous combination of concessions and distinctions. His argument, we think, goes like this. (1) An aggrieved employee normally lacks standing to attack in court a final decision from a mandatory, bargained-for grievance procedure which has been conducted on his behalf by the union. (2) This rule does not, however, preclude an employee from asserting certain independent causes of action against his employer, even though they arise from the same conduct that was the subject of a grievance. (3) The Supreme Court has held that causes of action for the violation of certain statutes that protect fundamental rights, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, are among the claims that, notwithstanding an unsuccessful grievance, may be independently asserted by an aggrieved employee. (4) A general claim that an arbitrator's decision has deprived an employee of constitutional rights, although it lacks a specific statutory base, it follows, must also be among those that may be independently asserted. (5) Adherence to the doctrine of collateral estoppel is required by the Constitution, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). (6) Because an adverse grievance ruling does not preclude the assertion of constitutional claims, an arbitrator's decision that does not give collateral estoppel effect to the results of a criminal trial cannot stand and may be avoided by the employee, even though he is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. (7) Collateral estoppel does not apply to fact questions that were not necessarily decided in the first proceeding or that are governed by a less stringent standard of proof in the second proceeding. (8) In McNair's case, the arbitrator could have upheld the discharge by deciding a narrower question than the...