McNamara v. State
| Decision Date | 24 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | 25,081 |
| Citation | 181 N.E. 512,203 Ind. 596 |
| Parties | McNamara v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. STATUTES---Construction---Rule of Ejusdem Generis---Statement of the Rule.---Where words of particular description in a statute are followed by general words that are not so specific and limited, unless there is a clear manifestation of contrary purpose, the general words are to be construed as applicable only to persons or things of like kind as are designated by the particular words. p. 600.
2. STATUTES---Construction---Language Considered---Including the Title of the Act.---Ordinarily, in construing a statute, a court will not only look to the words of the statute to ascertain the intent of the Legislature but will consider the title of the act. p. 601.
3. STATUTES---Section Defining "Blackmail"---How Construed.---Since the title of the act concerning public offenses, known as the Criminal Code, is so general that it gives no aid whatever in construing any section of the act the section defining "blackmail" (2440 Burns 1926) must be construed solely with reference to its own language p. 601.
4. STATUTES---Rule of Ejusdem Generis---Application Thereof.---For a general term in a statute to be ejusdem generis to particular words therein, the particulars must be of the genera and not of the species. If the definition of the things is general, there is nothing to which ejusdem generis may apply. p. 601.
5. BLACKMAIL---Statute Defining Offense---Rule of Ejusdem Generis not Applicable to Expression "Pecuniary Advantage."---In that part of the statute defining "blackmail" (2440 Burns 1926) which penalizes threats made with the intent to extort or gain "any chattel, money or valuable security or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever," the expression "pecuniary advantage" is not ejusdem generis to "chattel," "money" or "valuable security." p. 602.
6. BLACKMAIL---Indictment---Charging Intent to Extort or Gain "Pecuniary Advantages"---Without Describing such Advantages---Insufficient on Motion to Quash.---An indictment charging blackmail by making threats to do injury to the person or property of another with the intent to extort or gain from such person "certain pecuniary advantages," without describing what such advantages were, was insufficient as against a motion to quash. p. 602.
7. INDICTMENT AND AFFIDAVIT---Sufficiency---When Attacked for Uncertainty---Rule Stated.---In ruling on a motion to quash an indictment for uncertainty, the true test is whether the averments of the essentials of the crime are such that they will apprise the defendant of the character of the charge against him. p. 602.
8. BLACKMAIL---Essential Elements of the Crime---The Thing to be Extorted or Gained is One.---The thing intended by the perpetrator of the crime of blackmail to be extorted or gained is an essential element of the crime. p. 603.
9. INDICTMENT AND AFFIDAVIT---Essential Elements must be Definitely Pleaded.---The essential elements of a crime must be definitely pleaded. p. 603.
10. INDICTMENT AND AFFIDAVIT---Crime Defined in General Terms---Indictment must Specify Particular Acts done by Accused.---Where the crime charged in an indictment is defined in general terms, the indictment must specify the particular acts which were done by the accused. p. 603.
11. INDICTMENT AND AFFIDAVIT---Sufficiency---Essential Element of Crime Unknown to Grand Jury---Insufficient on Motion to Quash.---An indictment which alleges that an essential element of the crime charged was unknown to the grand jury is subject to a motion to quash. p. 603.
12. INDICTMENT AND AFFIDAVIT---What may be Averred to be Unknown to Grand Jury.---Matters of description may be stated as unknown to the grand jury, but an essential element of the crime may not be so pleaded. p. 603.
13. BLACKMAIL---Indictment and Affidavit---Sufficiency Thereof---When Language of Statute Insufficient.---In a prosecution for blackmail by threatening to injure another with intent to extort or gain a "pecuniary advantage" (2440 Burns 1926), the allegation of the thing sought to be extorted or gained cannot be pleaded in the language of the statute, but the averment must descend to particulars, not necessarily to descriptive matter. p. 604.
14. BLACKMAIL---Indictment---Averment that Defendant Made Threats to Injure Another---With Intent to Extort "Certain Pecuniary Advantages"---Held Insufficient.---An indictment charging that the defendant made threats to injure another with intent to extort or gain "certain pecuniary advantages" (2440 Burns 1926) the exact nature of which was unknown to the grand jury, was insufficient on motion to quash, as it omitted one of the essential elements of the crime. p. 604.
From Marion Criminal Court (57,920); Fred C. Gause, Special Judge.
John J McNamara was convicted of blackmail, and he appealed.
Reversed.
Charles E. Cox, Charles B. Welliver and Madison Welsh, for appellant.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Attorney-General, Edward J. Lennon, Jr., Deputy Attorney-General, William H. Remy and Ephraim Inman, for the State.
OPINION
Appellant appeals from the judgment against him, which was rendered upon a verdict that he is guilty of the crime of blackmail, as defined by § 2440 Burns 1926, Acts 1905 p. 584, ch. 169, § 370. The question presented for decision is pleaded by the assigned error, predicated upon the action of the court overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment. The objections to the indictment are that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a public offense, and that the indictment does not state the facts with sufficient certainty. The indictment, omitting the caption and indorsements, is as follows: "The Grand Jurors for the County of Marion and State of Indiana, upon their oaths, present that Ben Staggenborg, on or about the 15th day of November, A. D. 1923, at and in the County of Marion and State aforesaid, was then and there employed by Seth C. Niman and Miles T. Niman (a partnership) to perform certain work for the said Seth C. Niman and Miles T. Niman (a partnership) in connection with the installation of certain boilers in what is commonly known as the Elks Building, located in the City of Indianapolis, Marion County and State of Indiana, that on or about the said 15th day of November, A. D. 1923, the said Ben Staggenborg did then and there engage in the work of assisting with the installation of said boilers in said Elks Building, located in the City of Indianapolis, Marion County and State aforesaid; that on or about the said 15th day of November, A. D. 1923, one John J. McNamara (who was then and there the Secretary and Business Agent of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Local Union Number 22, located in the City of Indianapolis, County of Marion and State of Indiana, did then and there, to, and in the presence of said Ben Staggenborg, unlawfully, feloniously and verbally threaten to do injury to the person and property of said Ben Staggenborg with the unlawful and felonious intent to extort and gain from the said Ben Staggenborg certain pecuniary advantages, the exact nature of which said pecuniary advantages is to the Grand Jurors unknown for the benefit of him, the said John J. McNamara and third persons, whose names are to the Grand Jurors unknown, which said certain pecuniary advantages, the exact nature of which is to the Grand Jurors unknown, were then and there possessed by and under the control and disposition of the said Ben Staggenborg and with the further unlawful and felonious intent to compel the said Ben Staggenborg, the person so as aforesaid threatened, by means of said threats to do an act against his will, to-wit: to compel the said Ben Staggenborg to abandon his said employment with the said Seth C. Niman and the said Miles T. Niman (a partnership) against his will, with the intent aforesaid."
The question points to the allegation in the indictment, concerning the thing sought to be extorted, to-wit, a "certain pecuniary advantage, the exact nature of said pecuniary advantage is, to the Grand Jurors, unknown," etc. The specific point, made to the first reason to quash, is that the thing to be extorted and gained by the defendant, pleaded in the language of the statute, to-wit, "pecuniary advantage," is contrary to the well-established rule that things comprehended by a general designation in a statute must be ejusdem generis to the particulars in the definition; and the point made to the second reason to quash is that the words of description are not sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of § 13 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. This rule -- ejusdem generis -- is particularly well stated by this court in the opinion of the case of Miller v. State (1889), 121 Ind. 294, 23 N.E. 94, as follows: " Where words of a particular description in a statute are followed by general words that are not so specific and limited, unless there be a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose, the general word or words are to be construed as applicable to persons or things, or cases of like kind, as are designated by the particular word or words."
The word "pecuniary" has reference to that which relates to money. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) It is more broadly defined to be that which consists of money; exacted or given in money; also, entailing a money penalty; as, a pecuniary penalty, reward or offense; and also that which pertains to pecuniary affairs or losses. (Webster's Dictionary.) It is defined, also, as that which is monetary relating to money, consisting of money. (Black's Law Dictionary.) It has been judicially decided that a verbal promise to pay a debt in full is a "pecuniary" consideration within the...
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