McNeal v. Central Greyhound Lines, Civil Action No. 21870.

• Citation: 66 F. Supp. 581
• Decision Date: 17 April 1945
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 21870.
• Parties: McNEAL v. CENTRAL GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

66 F. Supp. 581

McNEAL v. CENTRAL GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

Civil Action No. 21870.

District Court, N. D. Ohio, N. D.

April 17, 1945.

Marvin C. Harrison, of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

William H. Thomas and Arnold M. Edelman, both of Cleveland, Ohio, and Hayes Kennedy, of Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

WILKIN, District Judge.

This is an action for overtime compensation plus liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S. C.A. § 201 et seq. There were three defenses: 1. Defendant claimed the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 2. That the plaintiff was exempt from the Act because he was an executive or administrative employee as defined in the Regulations adopted pursuant to Section 13(a) (1). And 3. That the plaintiff had given a receipt and release for the claim set forth in the complaint. Submitted on the evidence and briefs.

The limitation relied on is that set forth in Section 11225, G.C. of Ohio, which limits an action for a penalty to one year after its accrual. In view of the holding of the Supreme Court that the liquidated damage provision of the Act is not penal or punitive (Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682, and Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L. Ed. 1296), this court concludes that the Ohio statute is not effective to bar this action. Counsel for defendant points out that in these cases in which the Supreme Court held that additional damages were not a penalty, the court was not construing a statute of limitations. But what the court says about the legislative policy behind the Act constrains this court to hold that the Act should not be construed as imposing such a penalty as is mentioned in Section 11225, G.C. of Ohio.

Coming to the second defense, this court was convinced by the evidence that the plaintiff is exempt from the Act. Counsel admitted at time of trial that he served as an executive or administrative officer after August, 1941. During the period prior to that date, which was affected by the Act, the plaintiff was employed as paymaster. His chief duty was the preparation of pay rolls and the "coding" of pay rolls. There were other employees in the pay roll department, but it was the plaintiff's duty to see "that the work got done". He had complete jurisdiction over the employees in his department. His suggestions and recommendations as to salaries, increases, discharge, and discipline, were acted upon. He had supervisory jurisdiction and exercised discretion. During the period in question he received from $160 a month to $200 a month. He was never compensated on...