McNeil v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.
Decision Date | 14 April 2005 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 04-CV-199-JM. |
Citation | 365 F.Supp.2d 206 |
Parties | Scott McNEIL v. NISSAN MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Stephen R. Fine, Law Office of Stephen R. Fine, Manchester, NH, for Scott McNeil.
Mary M. McGoldrick, Richard P. Campbell, Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy PC, Boston, MA, for Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., et al.
The Court has before it for consideration four motions pending in the above-captioned matter. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Questions of Law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court (document no. 20) is denied. Defendants' Motion to File a Third Party Complaint (document no. 16) is granted. Defendants' memoranda of law, denominated as motions, pertaining to the issue of whether comparative negligence applies to crashworthiness actions under New Hampshire law (document no. 21), and to issues concerning joint tortfeasors, impleader, and apportionment (document no. 22) are deemed moot.
This action arises out of a single car, single occupant, car accident that occurred on November 16, 2003 in Manchester, New Hampshire, while the Plaintiff was driving a 1996 Nissan Maxima that was manufactured and/or sold by the Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he while he was driving the car, the car went out of control resulting in a rear end collision with a tree. "As a result of the ... collision, Plaintiff's seatback collapsed rearward, negating the protective effect of the head restraint and causing Plaintiff to be unrestrained in the upright seated position and not kept in place." Compl., ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that the defective design and/or manufacture of the seatback caused a collapse during the first collision that thereby caused a second collision in which Plaintiff's head was directed rearward and upward into the car's roof, thereby breaking Plaintiff's neck and causing quadriplegia. Id., ¶ 14.
The Defendants deny that there was a design or manufacturing defect with the subject car's seatback and further deny that Plaintiff's injuries resulted from any negligence on their part. Ans., ¶¶ 18-35. Defendants asserted as an affirmative defense the Plaintiff's comparative fault in causing the initial accident and in failing to use the subject car's restraints in a proper manner. The Defendants seek leave of court to file a third-party complaint against Nicholas Tolios ("Tolios") asserting that Tolios must be considered a joint tortfeasor in this action under the law of New Hampshire social host liability. Defendants allege that Tolios was reckless in his service of alcohol to Plaintiff, who was at that time a minor, prior to the car accident, and that Tolios was reckless in allowing the Plaintiff to drive, or in failing to prevent the Plaintiff from driving, a car while intoxicated, which Defendants assert caused the Plaintiff to get into the accident and to sustain the injuries complained of in this action.
Defendants filed an objection to Plaintiff's motion to certify questions of law. Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendants' motion to file a third-party complaint.
The application of the crashworthiness doctrine under New Hampshire law was discussed extensively in Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 145 N.H. 259, 761 A.2d 477 (2000). The doctrine "extends the scope of liability of a manufacturer to the situations in which the construction or design of its product has caused separate or enhanced injuries in the course of an initial accident brought about by an independent cause." Id. at 479. A manufacturer is liable "for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design." Id. at 480.
Plaintiff argues that there is no controlling New Hampshire precedent as to whether a plaintiff's accident causing comparative fault may be asserted as an affirmative defense in a crashworthiness case. Defendant responds that the applicability of a plaintiff's comparative fault in a crashworthiness case has been patently resolved in New Hampshire, and urges the Court to deny the motion to certify the question to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The Court examines the relevant authorities next.
In Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 845 (1978), the plaintiff's foot was injured by a lawn mower the defendant manufactured. Contrary to the defendant's warnings, the plaintiff mowed a steep slope on his property up and down rather than lengthwise. Id. After the plaintiff lost his balance and fell, his foot slipped under the mower's housing causing the blade to injure his foot. Id. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant was strictly liable, or liable in negligence, because the mower lacked a rear trailing guard. Id. After the jury returned a defendant's verdict, the plaintiff appealed. Id.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that unlike workmen's compensation and no-fault insurance, strict liability is not a no-fault system of compensation. Id. at 845-846. Instead, the court found, the principle of comparative causation applies in strict liability cases. Id. at 848. In reaching its decision, the court considered the California Supreme Court's discussion in Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), a case in which a driver sustained fatal injuries after a car accident during which the driver's door opened and the driver was ejected from the car. In Daly, the defendant asserted as a defense the comparative negligence of the decedent based on the decedent's alleged failure to use a seat belt or door lock despite warnings in the owner's manual. The California Supreme Court stated:
Because plaintiff's case rests upon strict products liability based on improper design of the door latch and because defendants assert a failure in decedent's conduct, namely, his alleged intoxication and nonuse of safety equipment, without which the accident and ensuing death could not have occurred, there is thereby posed the overriding issue in the case, should comparative principles apply in strict products liability actions?
Thibault, 395 A.2d at 849 (quoting Daly, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d at 1165). The California Supreme Court concluded that comparative principles should apply and the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed. Id.
As Plaintiff points out, Thibault does not address the specific issue of whether a plaintiff's accident causing fault should be treated any differently in a crashworthiness case because the injuries in Thibault were caused by a lawnmower. That the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied upon the facts and analysis of Daly, however, where the plaintiffs alleged that an car manufacturer should be found liable for enhanced injuries caused by a second collision that would not have occurred in the absence of the initial accident, provides strong support for the Defendants' contention that New Hampshire law requires the application of the principles of comparative fault in a crashworthiness action.
Subsequent New Hampshire cases further support Defendants' argument. In Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 119 N.H. 457 404 A.2d 1094, 1098-99 (1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court reiterated that a plaintiff's comparative fault may be considered in a strict products liability case.
The manufacturer or seller faced with an allegation of strict liability in tort for a defective design may have several defenses against liability, for example, product misuse or abnormal use, ..., and what was formerly termed contributory negligence or unreasonable assumption of the risk.... These defenses relate to the comparative fault of the plaintiff and are now classified as "plaintiff's misconduct."
Id. at 1098-99, overruled on other grounds, Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 534 A.2d 689, 704 (1987); see also, Chellman v. Saab-Scania AB, 138 N.H. 73, 637 A.2d 148, 152 (1993) ( ); Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 139 N.H. 193, 652 A.2d 685, 695 (1994) ( ); Kathios v. Gen. Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.1988) ( ).
The Chellman decision is particularly notable in that the plaintiff in that case alleged that injuries he suffered in a car accident resulted from design defects in the car's handling characteristics, door latch, and seat belt retraction assembly. Chellman, 637 A.2d at 152. The plaintiff alleged that the three defects were independent of one another. Id. While the alleged handling defect could be directly attributed to causing the accident, the plaintiff further alleged that he was injured because of the opening of the driver side door after the car went out of control and began to rollover, and because when the car came to rest the plaintiff was outside of the car with the seat belt pulled out of the retraction device but still strapped around him. Id. at 149. The court did not make any distinction between the three alleged defects in holding that the plaintiff's misconduct may be asserted as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's strict liability claims. The distinction that the Plaintiff attempts to make between strict liability cases generally and crashworthiness cases in particular is unpersuasive and I reject it. See, e.g., Ritch v. AM General Corp.,...
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