McNeil v. State
Decision Date | 13 April 2017 |
Docket Number | No. SC15–979,SC15–979 |
Citation | 215 So.3d 55 |
Parties | Brenton MCNEIL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in McNeil v. State , 162 So.3d 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). In a separate opinion, the district court, on a motion to certify the question, certified the following question as one of great public importance:
ARE THE COSTS IMPOSED PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 938.085, 938.08, AND 938.10, FLORIDA STATUTES (2006), ASSESSED "PER CASE" OR "PER COUNT"?
McNeil v. State , 163 So.3d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question by holding that sections 938.08, 938.085, and 938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006), call for imposition of costs on a per count basis and approve the decision in McNeil , 162 So.3d 274.
The district court explained the underlying facts as follows:
Brenton McNeil pled nolo contendere to three counts of sexual battery of a child under the age of twelve by a person under the age of eighteen in violation of section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (2006), which requires costs to be imposed under sections 938.08, 938.085, and 938.10 ; and one count of lewd or lascivious molestation in violation of section 800.04(5), Florida Statutes (2006), which requires costs to be imposed under section 938.10. The court imposed costs for each of the four convictions, resulting in costs of $603 pursuant to section 938.08, $453 pursuant to section 938.085, and $404 pursuant to section 938.10(1).
Id. at 275. The trial court imposed costs according to the following 2006 statutes:1
(Emphasis added.) McNeil was sentenced to eight years in prison followed by thirteen years of probation. He filed an appeal, contending that the trial court erroneously assessed the costs per count, instead of per case. The Fifth District affirmed, holding that the costs were properly assessed on a per count basis. McNeil , 162 So.3d at 277. The district court concluded that the plain language of these statutes reflects that the Legislature intended to impose costs per count, not per case:
By the plain language of these statutes, sections 938.08 and 938.085 require costs to be assessed for "a violation" of an enumerated statute, while section 938.10 requires assessment of costs for a nolo contendere or guilty plea to "any offense" enumerated in the statute. We believe the use of the words "a" and "any" in these statutes indicates the Legislature's intent to impose costs for each offense.
Id. at 276. However, the district court certified for this Court's determination the question of whether the costs under the applicable statutes are to be assessed per count or per case. McNeil , 163 So.3d at 662. This review follows.
At issue in this case is whether three statutes contained in chapter 938 impose costs per count or per case. The interpretation of these statutes is a purely legal matter and is subject to the de novo standard of review. See Davila v. State , 75 So.3d 192, 195 (Fla. 2011). This Court has previously held that when the question of law involves the provisions of a statute, "we must first and foremost endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent underlying that statute ...." Florida Parole Com'n v. Spaziano , 48 So.3d 714, 717 (Fla. 2010). To determine legislative intent, this Court looks first to the plain language of the statute. Montgomery v. State , 897 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 2005). When the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and conveys a clear meaning, the statute must be given its obvious meaning. Davila , 75 So.3d at 195. An unambiguous statute cannot be construed "in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications." Id. at 196. Therefore, we first look to the plain language of the statutes at issue in this case to determine whether they convey a clear and obvious meaning.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that costs imposed under sections 938.08, 938.085, and 938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006), should be assessed per count, not per case. The plain meaning of the language used in these sections—"a violation" and "any offense"—is unambiguous and reflects legislative intent that the costs be imposed for each violation or offense. There can clearly be more than one violation or more than one offense under the same statute for which a defendant is convicted, and there can be multiple violations or offenses combined under a single case, as evidenced by this case. Each violation or offense is, thus, the basis for separate assessment of costs. If the Legislature intended to impose costs per case, it could have expressly done so as it has in other cost statutes. See, e.g. , § 938.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ( ); § 938.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ( ); § 938.27(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (). (Emphasis added.) Section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1993), which has since been repealed, also contained similar language.2 The Legislature chose not to include such language in sections 938.085, 938.08, and 938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Instead, the plain language of these statutes mandates that costs be imposed for "a violation of" certain enumerated offenses or "any offense" constituting a violation of certain enumerated offenses. To construe this language to mean that costs are only to be imposed "per case" modifies the reasonable and obvious meaning of the statutes. As the district court noted, 3 McNeil , 162 So.3d at 277.
The dictionary definitions of "a" and "any" also support the conclusion that the costs here should be imposed per count. See L.B. v. State , 700 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997) () superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. A.M. , 765 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The word "a" is typically "used as a function word before most singular nouns" and is defined as "one," or "any, each." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1 (1993). The word "any" is defined as "one, no matter what one: every" or "all." Id. at 97. In the context of the statutes here, "a violation of" plainly means each violation. In other words, sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2006), mandate that a court impose a surcharge for each violation of the enumerated statutes, in addition to any sanction. Thus, multiple violations would result in multiple surcharges. Similarly, "any offense" in section 938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006), plainly means that costs should be imposed for every offense that would constitute a violation of one of the enumerated statutes.
McNeil correctly notes that appellate courts have recognized in some cases that costs should be assessed per case, albeit under different cost statutes. See, e.g. , Rafael v. State , 679 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (); Hunter v. State , 651 So.2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ( ); Hollingsworth v. State , 632 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) ( ). However, these decisions are not inconsistent with our decision today. As previously noted, these cases did not...
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