McNeil v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 March 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 20-329 (JDB)
• Parties: ROBERT A. McNEIL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)

ROBERT A. McNEIL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-329 (JDB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

March 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case has evolved out of a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request that the plaintiff, Robert McNeil, filed with the U.S. Department of State ("State") seeking documentation substantiating State's rejection of his passport application based on his apparent delinquent taxpayer status. After both parties moved for summary judgment on a FOIA claim that McNeil filed against State, McNeil requested and obtained several documents from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") responsive to the request at issue in his case against State. Based on those documents, McNeil then amended his complaint with leave of the Court to add the IRS as a defendant and to add claims challenging the IRS's determination and certification to State that he had "seriously delinquent tax debt." The Court recently resolved cross-motions for summary judgment on McNeil's FOIA claim in State's favor. This ruling left only his claims against the IRS. The Government has now moved to dismiss the remainder of the amended complaint. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant that motion.

Background

This case concerns State's denial of McNeil's passport application pursuant to § 7345 of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7345. That provision governs the "[r]evocation or denial of [a] passport in case of certain tax delinquencies." Id. Subsection (a) provides that "[i]f the Secretary [of the Treasury] receives certification by the Commissioner of [the IRS] that an individual has a seriously delinquent tax debt, the Secretary shall transmit such certification to the Secretary of State" to deny, revoke, or limit the debtor's passport. Id. § 7345(a). Subsection (b) defines "seriously delinquent tax debt," and subsection (c) explains how the reversal of a certification might come about. Id. § 7345(b)-(c). Subsection (d) requires the IRS Commissioner to "contemporaneously notify an individual of any certification under subsection (a), or any reversal of certification under subsection (c)." Id. § 7345(d). Subsection (e), which provides McNeil's cause of action, concerns judicial review of certification and reads in full:

(1) In general. After the Commissioner notifies an individual under subsection (d), the taxpayer may bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States, or against the Commissioner in the Tax Court, to determine whether the certification was erroneous or whether the Commissioner has failed to reverse the certification. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the court first acquiring jurisdiction over such an action shall have sole jurisdiction.

(2) Determination. If the court determines that such certification was erroneous, then the court may order the Secretary [of the Treasury] to notify the Secretary of State that such certification was erroneous.

Id. § 7345(e).

McNeil filed this action against State after his passport application was denied pursuant to § 7345(a) in June 2018. Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 6. In order to dispute the validity of his alleged tax liability, McNeil requested—first in written correspondence with State and subsequently via identical FOIA requests to State and the IRS submitted on August 17, 2018—"[a] copy of the signed, sworn Certification from the Secretary of the Treasury that was providedto the State department certifying that [he had] a 'seriously delinquent' tax debt." See Compl. Ex. 7 [ECF No. 1] at 33; Compl. Ex. 9 [ECF No. 1] at 41-42; Compl. Ex. 10 [ECF No. 1] at 48-49.

After unsuccessfully communicating directly with State regarding his FOIA request, McNeil filed a complaint in this Court alleging that State had "violated FOIA by failing and/or refusing to employ search methods reasonably likely to lead to the discovery" of the requested certification and thus failing to produce it. Compl. ¶ 29. McNeil and State filed cross-motions for summary judgment on June 23 and July 20, 2020, respectively. See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 11]; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 12]. After McNeil received and reviewed the evidentiary materials appended to State's motion, he submitted a further FOIA request to the IRS. See Pl.'s Consent Mot. for Enlargement of Time to Reply to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 14] at 1. When the IRS responded to McNeil's second FOIA request with additional documents, he amended his complaint "to 1) change its character from a FOIA lawsuit to a Judicial Review under 26 U.S.C. §7345(e); 2) add the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as a Defendant; [and] 3) include language requiring further pleadings, discovery, depositions and examination of witnesses to resolve [alleged IRS] errors." Pl.'s Am. Rule 15(a)(2) Mot. for Leave of Ct. to Amend Compl. and for Extension of Time [ECF No. 16] at 4.

McNeil's amended complaint incorporated by reference the entirety of his original complaint and asserted new claims against the IRS challenging, inter alia, the IRS's certification of his delinquent tax debt under § 7345.¹ Am. Compl. [ECF No. 19] ¶¶ 7, 30-38. In light of the documents produced by the IRS and the amended complaint's shift in focus away from the initialFOIA claim, the Court resolved in State's favor the then-pending cross-motions for summary judgment on the FOIA claim. McNeil v. U.S. Dep't of State, 2020 WL 7419673 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2020), ("MSJ Op."). This left the new claims against the IRS as the only remaining part of this litigation. The Government then moved to dismiss the amended complaint. U.S. Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. ("Mot.") [ECF No. 29]. In his brief opposing that motion, McNeil abandoned much of the relief he had originally sought in his amended complaint. See Pl.'s Reply in Opp'n to U.S. Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. ("Opp'n") [ECF No. 30] at 1, 5. The Court will describe in detail the relief McNeil seeks below, but in general he maintains a challenge against the IRS's certification to State that he had "seriously delinquent tax debt" and has dropped broader claims disputing the debt itself. See id. The motion to dismiss is now fully briefed and ripe for the Court's consideration.²

Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary, to provide the "grounds" of "entitle[ment] to relief," plaintiffs must furnish "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papapsan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factualmatter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); accord Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Determining the plausibility of a claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).

The Court accepts McNeil's factual allegations as true for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. In addition, "[a] document filed pro se," like all of McNeil's filings, must be "liberally construed." Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc., 897 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94). McNeil is entitled to "the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged," Irving v. D.C., No. 19-cv-3818, 2021 WL 495041, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2021) (quoting Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Although pro se complaints are "held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers' . . . 'a pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted,' as required by Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at *3 (first quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and then quoting Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted)). "In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which it may take judicial notice." Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

Analysis

Because of the shifting nature of McNeil's filings, identifying the relief he seeks here requires somewhat more analysis on the front end than it would in most cases. In his amendedcomplaint, McNeil requested injunctive relief that would order the IRS to do four things: (1) "inform the state department that the certification [of McNeil as having seriously delinquent tax debt] was erroneous"; (2) "remove [McNeil's] name and all other personal information from its list of Americans with 'seriously delinquent federal tax debt'"; (3) "classify [his] alleged 'debt' as uncollectible for the years 2000 thru 2018 because no Notice of Determination or Notice of Deficiency was sent to [him]"; and (4) "return ALL monies unlawfully confiscated from [him] during the years 2000 thru 2018 . . . plus interest." Am. Compl. at 14.³ In his response to the Government's motion to dismiss, McNeil informed the Court that "upon further research and reflection, [he] concede[s] that much of the relief sought in [his] Amended Complaint is...