McNorrill v. Gibbs

• Decision Date: 01 June 1942
• Docket Number: No. C/A 661.,C/A 661.
• Citation: 45 F. Supp. 363
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: McNORRILL v. GIBBS.

45 F. Supp. 363

McNORRILL v. GIBBS.

No. C/A 661.

District Court, E. D. South Carolina, Aiken Division.

June 1, 1942.

Roy V. Harris and Henry T. Chance, Jr., both of Augusta, Ga., and Dorcey K. Lybrand, of Aiken, S. C., for plaintiff.

Lee, Congdon & Fulcher, of Augusta, Ga., and Edgar A. Brown, of Barnwell, S. C., for defendant.

TIMMERMAN, District Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of Congress, June 25, 1938, c. 676, sec. 16, 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216, to recover for himself and another double the amount of certain alleged unpaid wages due them respectively and for reasonable attorney's fees. The summons and complaint were served January 5, 1942.

The cause is now before me on two motions, one on behalf of plaintiff and the other on behalf of the defendant. Arguments were heard on both motions May 19, 1942.

The plaintiff's motion is to strike paragraph 21 of the answer, which alleges in substance that the defendant had paid the plaintiff, and the other for whom this action is brought, wages "in accordance with agreements between them and this defendant", that said employees at no time during their employment by plaintiff contended "that defendant was subject to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, or that they were to receive wages in accordance with said Act", and that they raised no question concerning their wages "until after they had been discharged by this defendant."

The Congress has declared a public policy respecting the hours of employment and rates of pay of employees engaged in interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 657, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430. And persons may not by contract defeat the manifest purpose of the Act, which is in part to keep out of the channels of interstate commerce goods produced under substandard labor conditions. United States v. Darby, supra.

The allegations of the answer, about which complaint is made, are immaterial and irrelevant and should be stricken from the answer. They state no defense to the cause of action alleged. Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 7 Cir., 123 F.2d 622, 626.

It is so ordered.

The motion of the defendant was reserved when its answer was filed. It may be divided into two main parts. The first part of it is to dismiss the entire complaint for two reasons, to-wit, (a) for "a misjoinder of parties plaintiff," in that the plaintiff and the other for whom this action is brought "do not jointly, severally or in the alternative assert any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions, or within the meaning of rule of civil procedure Number 20", and (b) for "a misjoinder of causes of action because two separate and distinct causes of action in favor of different parties and arising out of different contracts and relationship are joined in said complaint when there is no privity of interest between the parties asserting said causes of action."

The second phase of the defendant's motion is to strike from the complaint all references to an alleged cause of action in behalf of one G. A. Phillips, an employee of the defendant. The grounds upon which this part of the motion is based are substantially as follows:

(a) It does not appear that the said Phillips is a party plaintiff.

(b) It does not appear that Phillips authorized the bringing of the action in his behalf.

(c) It does not appear that Phillips properly authorized the bringing of the action in his behalf.

(d) It does not appear that Phillips is under any disability which would authorize the bringing of an action in his behalf by the plaintiff.

(e) It does not appear that Phillips has assigned his claim against the defendant to the plaintiff.

The authority for bringing this action is to be found in sec. 16, of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216, which reads in part as follows: "(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated."

This Act makes an exception to the general doctrine that an action should be maintained in the name of the real party in interest. Furthermore, it creates an exception to the general rule that two or more separate or distinct causes of action may not be joined for trial in the same case.

It is not now necessary to determine whether one employee or a group of employees, bringing an action of this character for the benefit of himself, or for themselves, could bring...