McPadden v. Morris

• Decision Date: 05 June 1940
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: McPADDEN v. MORRIS et al.

13 A.2d 679

126 Conn. 654

McPADDEN v. MORRIS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 5, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Patrick B O'Sullivan, Judge.

Action for a declaratory judgment by Mary Canfield McPadden against Harold J. Morris and others, to determine which of two claimants, plaintiff or defendant Susan M. McPadden, if either, was entitled to certain pension payments, brought to the superior court in Fairfield County and tried to the court. From a judgment determining that neither claimant was entitled to the payments, plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Where statute is unambiguous court is not concerned with the wisdom or lack of wisdom of such legislation nor with the recognition of equities which contravene the wording thereof.

Francis J. King and Isadore L. Kotler, both of Bridgeport (Alexander L. DeLaney, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellant (plaintiff).

Walter Werner and Harry Schwartz, both of Bridgeport (John V Donnelly, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellees (defendants).

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS JJ.

After the denial of applications by the widow and mother of a policeman to the board of trustees of the policemen's relief fund of Bridgeport for allowances under § 116, Bridgeport Charter, Special Act No. 296, approved May 16, 1935, 22 Special Laws, p. 170, § 2, providing for the administration of the fund, the widow instituted this action for a declaratory judgment to determine the rights of the parties.

The finding may be summarized as follows: Daniel F. McPadden was a member of the Bridgeport police department from June 1, 1915, to December 23, 1937, when he died while in active service. The plaintiff is his widow. In 1926, the deceased, then married to the plaintiff, mistreated her and ordered her out of his home. They never thereafter lived together although the plaintiff several times sought a reconciliation. In 1931, a divorce action, instituted by the deceased, was dismissed after trial. Upon the trial of the case the court concluded that neither the widow nor the mother were entitled to allowances under the act and the plaintiff widow appealed.

The trial court filed a memorandum of decision which is, in part, as follows:

One provision of Section 116 of the charter of the city of Bridgeport reads, in abridged form: ‘ When any member (of the police department) shall die, the widow of such member shall, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, receive, until her death or remarriage, a monthly sum, etc.’ Another provision recites: ‘ The term ‘ widow,’ as used in this section, shall be limited in its meaning to the surviving spouse of such member who shall have been married to him and living with him at the time of his death .'

The italicized words furnish the barrier which the plaintiff must clear if judgment is to be rendered in her favor. She attempts to do this by asking this court to add to the language defining a ‘ widow’ such appropriate wording as will permit the trustees to pay a pension to a widow who, ‘ if not living with the deceased, was separated from him with legal justification.’ If one's personal impulse were to be followed, there would be little hesitation in pursuing this suggestion because the predicament of the plaintiff is most appealing and merits considerable sympathy. However, a court is powerless to add to the wording of a statute which is clear and direct. It cannot seek out what it may conceive to be the equities of each particular case and ignore specific provisions of a law which clearly controls them. Blodgett v. New Britain Trust Co., 108 Conn. 715, 719, 145 A. 56. Where the language is unambiguous the judiciary is helpless to intervene even to remedy a mistake. To attempt so to do would be an unwarranted exercise of legislative functions. Farmer v. Bieber-Goodman Corp., 118 Conn. 299, 303, 172 A. 95.

The language of the charter is clear and direct. The definition accorded to the word ‘ widow’ expressly places a limitation for the class of surviving spouses who may qualify as beneficiaries of the pension plan. It excludes all those who are not living with their husbands at the time of his death. To live with another means to dwell, to reside, to make one's abiding place or home with that other. The phrase may also mean to cohabit. Webster's International Dictionary.

I accept the definition found in Nelson's Case, 217 Mass 467, 469, 105 N.E. 357, 358, as most in accord with sound legal logic. " With whom she lives' * * * means living together as husband and wife in the ordinary acceptation and significance of these words in common understanding. They mean maintaining a home and living together in the same household, or actually cohabiting under conditions which would be regarded as constituting a family relation. There may be temporary absences and incidental interruptions arising out of changes in the house or town of residence, or out of travel for business or pleasure. * * * The matrimonial abode may be a roof of their own, a hired tenement, a boarding house, a rented room or even a room in the house of a relative or friend, however humble or temporary it may be. ...