McPheters v. Maile

• Decision Date: 24 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 27780.,27780.
• Citation: 64 P.3d 317,138 Idaho 391
• Parties: Steven L. McPHETERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas G. MAILE, IV; Thomas G. Maile Law Offices, Inc., Terry Tentinger and Any Other Persons, Companies, Partnerships, Corporations, Organizations, or Institutions Involved in this Matter, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

64 P.3d 317

138 Idaho 391

Steven L. McPHETERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas G. MAILE, IV; Thomas G. Maile Law Offices, Inc., Terry Tentinger and Any Other Persons, Companies, Partnerships, Corporations, Organizations, or Institutions Involved in this Matter, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 27780.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2002 Term.

January 24, 2003.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 2003.

Steven L. McPheters, pro se, Boise, for appellant.

Sasser & Inglis, Boise, for respondents. Clay M. Shockley, Mountain Home, argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

Steven L. McPheters (McPheters) appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Thomas Maile (Maile) and Terry Tentinger (Tentinger) for his claims of civil conspiracy, slander of title, and negligence. This Court affirms the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November of 1995, McPheters, a builder, hired Tentinger, a commercial painter, to paint part of a home owned by McPheters. Tentinger painted the home, but McPheters refused to pay the $420 bill because he felt the job was not performed properly. Tentinger hired Maile, an attorney, to assist him in his dispute with McPheters. Tentinger recorded a mechanic's lien to secure the $420 obligation. Tentinger also recorded a lis pendens, giving notice of the mechanic's lien.

Tentinger filed suit to recover the $420 from McPheters. After a bench trial, the magistrate court entered judgment in favor of Tentinger for $420 plus $4,000 for attorney fees and $900.02 for costs. McPheters paid the entire judgment. McPheters then appealed the case to the district court before a satisfaction of judgment was recorded. The district court upheld the judgment and awarded attorney fees on appeal. McPheters appealed again and the Court of Appeals affirmed the magistrate court and again awarded Tentinger attorney fees on appeal. Tentinger v. McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 977 P.2d 234 (Ct.App.1999). Although McPheters paid the judgment in full, Tentinger never recorded a satisfaction of judgment.

During the pendency of Tentinger v. McPheters, McPheters failed to make payments to his lender, Washington Federal Savings (Washington Federal), for a deed of trust granted in the property. Washington Federal issued a notice of default in early 1997 and again in early 1998. Not receiving payment, and McPheters being in arrears $27,867.05, the home was sold at a trustees' sale on July 8, 1998. The record indicates Washington Federal purchased the home at the trustees' sale. Washington Federal then sold the home a short time later.

On June 28, 2000, McPheters filed this action against both Tentinger and his attorney, Maile, alleging civil conspiracy, slander of title, negligence, and punitive damages. McPheters alleges the actions taken by Tentinger and Maile, specifically the failure to record a satisfaction of judgment, resulted in his inability to sell his home and avoid foreclosure. On May 22, 2001, Maile and Tentinger moved to strike McPheters' claim for punitive damages and moved for summary judgment. On June 6, 2001, McPheters filed "objection to the Respondents' motion for summary judgment," a motion to strike summary judgment, and a supporting affidavit. On June 29, 2001, the district court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment as to all counts alleged in the complaint except for a contract claim and granted the motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. The district court denied McPheters' motion to strike summary judgment at the same time. On July 13, 2001, McPheters moved for reconsideration of summary judgment. On July 20, 2001, the district court issued an order denying McPheters' motion for reconsideration of summary judgment. On July 30, 2001, the district court vacated trial and granted summary judgment on the remaining contract claim. McPheters timely appealed.¹ McPheters does not challenge summary judgment on the contract claim or the motion to strike punitive damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c) (2002). This Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 838-39, 41 P.3d 263, 266-67 (2002). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. Id.

On appeal, this Court exercises free review over matters of law. Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247, 252 (2000).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment On McPheters' Claims Of Civil Conspiracy, Slander Of Title, And Negligence.

McPheters alleged the failure to record a satisfaction of judgment gave rise to liability for: (1) civil conspiracy; (2) slander of title; and (3) negligence. The respondents counter that they committed no civil wrong and that it was a matter of sound legal work to refrain from recording a satisfaction of judgment until McPheters' appeals were exhausted.

1. Civil Conspiracy Is Not Actionable Because The Proper Cause Of Action In This Case Is Negligence.

A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner. Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19, 27-28, 88 P.2d 513, 516 (1939). Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 (1963) (quoting Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386-87, 233 P. 883, 887 (1925)). The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Id. Therefore, McPheters' civil conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.

2. McPheters' Claim For Slander Of Title Fails For Lack Of Publication.

Slander of title requires proof of four elements: (1) publication of a slanderous statement; (2) its falsity; (3) malice; and (4) resulting special damages. Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000) (citing Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 760-61, 572 P.2d 861, 863-64 (1977)).

Failure to record a satisfaction of judgment cannot constitute a publication necessary to support a claim of slander of title because, rather than publication of a statement, the failure to record a satisfaction of judgment is an omission to publish or state a fact. In Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., the Court of Appeals addressed a case arising from similar circumstances. 111 Idaho 939, 729 P.2d 414 (Ct.App.1986). In Crosby, the plaintiff sued the defendant for slander of title due to the defendant's failure to record a satisfaction of judgment. Id. at 941, 729 P.2d at 416. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff's true cause of action was negligence instead of slander of title because the defendant rightfully recorded a judgment; it was the failure to record a satisfaction of judgment that created a question of causation in the case. Id. Similarly, the crux of the matter in this case is not whether it was proper to record a lien and lis pendens. It is undisputed that recording the lien and lis pendens was proper. Rather, as in Crosby, the core issue is whether Tentinger was negligent in failing to record a satisfaction of judgment. As a result, McPheters' slander of title claim fails as a matter of law because the respondents' omission in recording a satisfaction of judgment cannot be a publication, which is a necessary element for slander of title.

3. The Respondents Were Negligent In Not Recording A Satisfaction Of Judgment, But McPheters Failed To Create An Issue Of Material Fact That The Negligence Caused Damages.

The true nature of McPheters' claim is negligence. The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991).

Pursuant to Rule 58(b), a judgment creditor has a duty to record a satisfaction of judgment upon full payment by the judgment debtor. I.R.C.P 58(b) (2002). The respondents justify not recording a satisfaction of judgment on the grounds that McPheters' two appeals gave rise to an ongoing right to protect their interest in recovering attorney fees. However, there is no exception to the duty created by Rule 58(b). It does not allow a judgment creditor to postpone recording a satisfaction of judgment in order to protect its interest in collecting attorney fees that may be awarded in the future. The record reflects McPheters paid the judgment in full. Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 58(b), the respondents had a duty to record a satisfaction of judgment. It is undisputed that the respondents failed to record a satisfaction of judgment. As a result, the respondents breached their duty to McPheters to record a satisfaction of judgment. See Crosby, 111 Idaho at 941, 729 P.2d at 416.

Having established that the respondent's failure to record a satisfaction of judgment was negligence, McPheters must provide evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and damages to survive summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c) (2002). McPheters submitted an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment making only the conclusory statement that "there certainly are disputes as to the material facts." McPheters failed to provide evidence of a ready and willing buyer but for the lis pendens, or any other evidence of causation or damages. Therefore, McPheters failed to create a material...