McQuate v. White
| Citation | 389 S.W.2d 206 |
| Decision Date | 12 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 50700,No. 2,50700,2 |
| Parties | Marie McQUATE, Respondent, v. Naomi WHITE, Individually, and as Co-Executrix of the Estate of Chester A. McQuate, Naomi White, Guardian of Sonya White, Yana White, Lisa White and Eric White, Elizabeth Christopher, Individually and Co-Executrix of the Estate of Chester A. McQuate, Walter B. Christopher, Legal Guardian of Lorna Christopher and Glen Christopher, Appellants |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Sevier & Turnage, Robert F. Sevier, William E. Turnage, Liberty, for plaintiff-respondent.
Robert H. Frost, G. Raymond Speckman, Plattsburg, Derrick & Holderle and Tyree C. Derrick, St. Louis, for appellants.
Plaintiff, widow of Chester A. McQuate, filed suit seeking a declaration that a marriage agreement entered into on November 17, 1954, be declared void, that the record thereof be expunged, and that she be declared to have the same interest in two described tracts of real estate as she would otherwise have had. The husband died on September 11, 1961, and his will was duly probated. Plaintiff, on May 23, 1962, filed her election to renounce the will and take her 'legal share' of his estate. The trial court entered a judgment finding generally that the contract should be set aside, and it ordered, adjudged and declared that it be 'set aside and for naught held.' Motions for judgment and a new trial were filed and overruled. After an untimely notice of appeal was filed in the Circuit Court, this Court granted a special order allowing a notice to be filed and it was filed. The defendants are the executrices, the two daughters of the deceased, and the guardians of his grandchildren who were the devisees of the two principal tracts of the controverted real estate.
The 'marriage contract' recited that each party was possessed of property, had made full and frank disclosure to the other, and had been advised of his or her legal rights; the expressed considerations, pro and con, were one dollar and other 'good and sufficient and satisfactory consideration.' By the terms of the contract the husband agreed that the wife (plaintiff) should own, hold that enjoy all of her present and future property as her separate and sole estate with the full right to convey or mortgage it or to dispose of it by will, and that he thereby released to her and her heirs, representatives, assigns, legatees and devisees all rights and claims thereto which he might have by reason of the marriage; for the identical expressed considerations, the wife made the same agreements and the same release with reference (only) to two specifically described tracts of real estate owned by the husband; from the descriptions one would appear to have consisted of 240 acres and the other of 80 acres, located in different sections. Each party agreed that if it should be deemed necessary he or she would execute any documents required to carry out the terms of the contract.
Plaintiff's second amended petition sought a declaration of invalidity upon the following grounds: that she had been induced to sign the agreement by false and fraudulent representations of the decedent as to the value of the real estate and also that it was not necessary for her to consult with counsel; that she was then possessed only of personal property of the value of approximately $6,000, whereas the real estate in question was of the value of $65,000; that she already had, in law, the full right to deal with her own property and that she acquired nothing by virtue of the agreement, in fact, not even the one dollar mentioned or any other recited 'satisfactory considerations'; that the agreement was executory and unilateral, and wholly void. The defendant bank was made a party because it admittedly held one or more deeds of trust on the real estate. Plaintiff also alleged: that subsequent to date of the marriage and without prior discussion she had been taken by decedent to the office of an attorney where the marriage agreement was signed; that no benefit had accrued to her under the agreement; that by the will of decedent she was given less than her statutory share of the estate and that she had filed her election to renounce the will and claim a one-third interest in all the real and personal property.
The answers admitted the formal allegations of the petition and denied all substantive allegations. It will not be necessary to further detail the pleadings, except to say that the defendant bank alleged that it held liens evidenced by two recorded deeds of trust with an aggregate balance of $51,467.12 as of September 1, 1963. No one disputes the bank's claim.
The evidence was very incomplete, due in large part to the fact that all proposed testimony of the plaintiff was excluded under the Dead Man's Statute, Sec. 491.010, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; thus, she was not permitted to give any testimony concerning the extent of her property at the time of the contract. By the will of the decedent, filed for probate on September 15, 1961, decedent devised to plaintiff a 77-acre tract (being one of those described in the contract) and all personal property, the latter being subject to all debts, claims, expenses and 'real estate mortgages.' One tract of 240 acres, described as the 'Home Place' and covered by the marriage contract, was devised to the White grandchildren; another tract of 240 acres, apparently acquired later, was devised to the Christopher grandchildren. We are not interested in the other provisions, except perhaps that the testator ordered that his personal property be sold at auction. Two applications for letters testamentary were introduced, the second supplying the names of some of the legatees; these estimated the value of decedent's real property at $87,500, and of his personal property at $40,000, and recited that decedent died on September 11, 1961, at the age of 71. Letters were issued on September 15, 1961. The inventory was objected to as constituting no evidence of values at the time of the contract, but it was received and we think properly so. It had some relevancy in the attempt to arrive at an estimate of the value of deceased's property at that time. Egger v. Egger, 225 Mo. 116, 123 S.W.2d 928, loc. cit. 935. The inventory listed three tracts of real estate, appraised the 77-acre tract at $8,855, and the two 240-acre tracts at $48,000 and $65,000, respectively, all subject to a balance due under deed of trust of $51,311.36, leaving a net value for the real estate of $69,543.64. The listed personal property was appraised at $96,176.80, much of it consisting of livestock and farm machinery. There was no evidence concerning other debts, claims or expenses.
The marriage agreement had been recorded and the record was offered and received in evidence. There was some oral evidence concerning the real estate values; it is a little difficult to evaluate this, because of the somewhat indefinite references to the specific tracts. It reasonably appears, however, that the tract of 77 acres devised to plaintiff and mentioned in the contract, was thus valued at $15,400, and the 'Home Place' 240 acres at from $48,000 to $50,400, all as of 1954. As to the other 240 acres, presumably acquired later, we have only the inventory appraisement of $48,000. The defendants stood upon an oral motion to dismiss and offered no evidence.
The first point of plaintiff's brief consists of a motion to dismiss the appeal under Rule 83.05, V.A.M.R. for insufficiency of the jurisdictional statement and of the statement of facts, and also because the Points asserted are merely abstract statements of law. We have examined the brief in the light of these contentions and do not find the deficiencies to be of sufficient moment to justify a dismissal. The Appellants' Points and Authorities are not models, but they do affirm in varying language the contentions that the marriage contract was fair on its face and was supported by consideration, and that there was no evidence to support the judgment which, consequently, was rendered erroneously. There was and is only one ruling from which the defendants thus appealed, namely, the judgment invalidating the contract. No party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law; the case was, by its very nature, in equity. There being but a 'single obvious question' in the case, the motion is overruled. Milanko v. Austin, 362 Mo. 357, 241 S.W.2d 881, 882, cert. denied 342 U.S. 906, 72 S.Ct. 298, 96 L.Ed. 678; Bringer v. Barr, Mo.App., 318 S.W.2d 524, 527. And see generally Ellis v. Farmer, Mo., 287 S.W.2d 840, 843.
Plaintiff's counsel next assert that there is no jurisdiction in this Court because the title to real estate is not directly involved. This question is frequently troublesome. It was recently well stated in the case of In Re Schell's Estate, Mo.App., 370 S.W.2d 816, loc. cit. 818: In the present case plaintiff seeks a declaration that she is entitled to an undivided interest in all of the decedent's real estate. The Court made no such declaration, but the issue was within the pleadings. It was and is obvious that if plaintiff should be adjudged to be the owner of an undivided one-third of any of the real estate, the devisees of that part would receive one-third less. On this point counsel cite In Re Ellis' Estate, Mo., 127 S.W.2d 441, and First National Bank of Kansas City v. Schaake, 355 Mo. 1196, 200...
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