McQueen v. Com.

Decision Date16 February 1984
PartiesHarold McQUEEN, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Jack Emory Farley, Public Advocate, Linda K. West, Mark Posnansky, Asst. Public Advocates, Frankfort, for appellant.

Steven L. Beshear, Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Penny R. Warren, Virgil W. Webb, III, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

GANT, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of first degree robbery and murder in the course thereof and sentenced to 20 years and death, respectively. The crimes occurred on January 17, 1980, during an armed robbery of a Minit Mart, the store clerk being shot in the head from a distance of three to six inches and then through the back of the neck. The evidence of guilt was so overwhelming it will not be discussed herein, except as it relates to assignment of error by appellant.

The first group of errors asserted by appellant relates to the jury, its selection and assorted problems. The first allegation relates to the discharge of one juror after she had been seated on the panel, fourteen jurors having been originally qualified. Briefly, the court received unsolicited evidence that the juror had briefly discussed the case, specifically discussing her ability to assess the death penalty, with fellow schoolteachers on one occasion and with members of her family on another. An inquiry was conducted in chambers, during which the juror unequivocally denied expressing any opinion. It should be pointed out that it is uncontradicted that any alleged conversations were instigated by others, not by the juror, and that her greatest impropriety, if any, was in not reporting those persons to the court. However, RCr 9.70 requires that jurors be admonished, as they were herein, that they shall not permit anyone "to speak to, or communicate with, them on any subject connected with the trial ...." The trial court must be vested with discretion in this matter and, in this instance, he exercised that discretion and dismissed the juror on the appearance of impropriety and on her violation of the admonition not to permit persons to discuss the case with her. It was not based on her alleged statement of doubt about her feelings in regard to the death penalty, and we find no abuse of the discretion of the lower court, and hence no error.

The next error alleged is that young adults were materially underrepresented on the jury panel, denying appellant a "fair cross section of the community" as mandated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). We have disposed of this argument in Ford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 304 (1983), and note in passing that both this case and Ford involved communities in which colleges and universities are located, which has a tendency to distort the "young adults" picture. Having held that Kentucky does not recognize young adults as an identifiable group, exclusion of which would be prohibited, we find no error. We would also note at this point that we have upheld the constitutionality of KRS 29A.040 in Ford, supra, which point was also raised by appellant.

Appellant next asserts that the jury commissioners granted automatic exemptions to various groups, including doctors, lawyers, policemen, unemployed, elderly who were ill, troublemakers, etc., basing this allegation solely on the transcript of another case which was tried some four years prior to this case. No evidence whatever is presented to indicate that this practice still exists, if it ever did, and we are furnished with no evidence from which we may make a determination.

Appellant next contends that it was error to deny him funds to secure the service of experts for two purposes. The first was to conduct a search to determine proper representation of a cross section of the community on the jury panel. There was not one shred of evidence herein which indicated any irregularity or underrepresentation. We disposed of this argument in Ford, supra, when we said:

We do not conceive that employment of statisticians and mathematicians to examine the representation of recognizable groups on jury venires, especially in the absence of specific knowledge of irregularities, to be included in necessary services. We know of no statute or principle which would authorize expenditures of public funds to conduct such a witch hunt. Cf. Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1983).

Second, appellant asks for an expert "to show that death qualified juries are unconstitutionally more conviction prone than other juries." It is admitted that the expert sought had published works on the subject, and we see no way his personal attendance at a hearing, if any could be held, would enhance his treatises. The court sustained a motion to provide the defendants with a ballistic expert and a toxicologist. We find no abuse of discretion in denying either the statistician or the expert on death qualified jurors. The standard has been determined in this Commonwealth in the case of Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 585 S.W.2d 378, 379 (1979), to be that the experts must be "reasonably necessary." We see no reasonable necessity for these two experts in the instant case.

Although the transcript of the voir dire consumed some 860 pages, appellant complains that he was prejudicially harmed by the exclusion of several questions he desired be asked of the jurors. An examination of the record indicates that the excluded questions were either redundant, irrelevant or improper and no error occurred. Also, during voir dire, counsel for appellant's co-defendant went into questioning failure of his client to testify, suggesting that one reason might be that he did not want "to testify against his brother," the appellant herein. No objection was made by appellant to this question and, if any error existed, it was quickly cured by an admonition from the court. We find no error in this.

Again complaining about voir dire, appellant argues that it was error to excuse a juror for cause who said, "One of the defendants is the son of an ex-employee and fellow worker of mine and I wouldn't want to sit in judgment of that case." This complaint is patently absurd. Even the Commonwealth is entitled to "a tolerably fair trial."

Having disposed of the jury selection phase of the trial, appellant moves on to the guilt phase. He first argues that the mere mention of the word "polygraph" constitutes reversible error. This allegation and the subsequent allegation concerning search of a trailer require a factual background. The most devastating witness in this action was appellant's girlfriend, Linda Rose. She testified that she had accompanied appellant and his half-brother, the co-defendant, Burnell, to the Minit Mart, where the two men left their parked car and entered the store, appellant having a gun in his possession. She heard gunshots, the two men returned to the car carrying three small bags and another bag which contained a dummy camera taken from the store. Appellant told Linda that he had shot the clerk twice. The three drove to a pond, where the men threw the camera into the water, and on the next day Linda moved in with the appellant into a trailer which appellant had rented for himself and his "wife."

Three days later, appellant and Linda learned of Burnell's arrest and, according to Linda, appellant left the trailer with two guns in a white plastic sack, returning without them. In addition to her totally destructive testimony, Linda gave the police her consent to search the trailer, where money and food stamps which were subsequently identified as coming from the Minit Mart were found. She took them to the pond where the camera was recovered, and personally dug up the guns, one of which was determined to be the murder weapon, and gave them to the police.

Linda Rose was taken into custody shortly after the murder, both for suspicion of having taken a gun from her father (which she had), and suspicion of being connected with the murder. In an effort to discredit the testimony of Linda Rose, counsel for Burnell questioned one of the officers exhaustively, which officer, parenthetically, was the officer who had been present when a polygraph examination was administered to Linda. This latter fact was known to counsel for both appellant and Burnell. Defense counsel, being aware that Linda was, in fact, a suspect at one time, and apparently seeking to imply that her testimony was tainted because a deal had been struck, engaged in the following dialogue with the witness:

X23 When did you conclude, if you did, that Ms. Rose was not involved in the crime or have you made that conclusion?

A Yes, sir, I'd say after talking to her in Frankfort.

X24 At that time you were in fact waiting to interrogate the Defendant Burnell and then decided not to; isn't that true?

A At what point, sir?

X25 At the time that you interrogated Miss Rose--

A In Frankfort?

X26 Yes, sir.

A No, sir, that was not my decision up there. The polygraph examiner said he could not--

THE COURT:

Mr. Estes, just confine it to yes or no.

A No, sir.

We cannot construe this indefinite, ambiguous reference to the "polygraph examiner" as prejudicial error. There was no statement that any test had ever been administered or, if so, to whom it had been administered. Even the words "said he could not ..." seem to imply that no test was given. The mere mention of the words "polygraph" or "polygraph examiner" is not fatal, per se. There must arise a clear inference that there was a result and that the result was favorable, or some other manner in which the inference could be deemed prejudicial. See 29 Am.Jur.2d Sec. 831, p. 925.

Also, the search of the trailer was not invalid. It should be noted that the most damning evidence--the gun and the dummy camera--were not the fruits of any search of the trailer. All the evidence--that of Linda Rose and the officers--evinces the inescapable conclusion that...

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