McQueen v. Green

• Decision Date: 21 April 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 126666
• Citation: 2022 IL 126666,202 N.E.3d 268,460 Ill.Dec. 726
• Parties: Fletcher MCQUEEN, Appellant, v. Lavonta M. GREEN et al. (Pan-Oceanic Engineering Company, Inc., Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2022 IL 126666

202 N.E.3d 268

460 Ill.Dec. 726

Fletcher MCQUEEN, Appellant,

v.Lavonta M. GREEN et al. (Pan-Oceanic Engineering Company, Inc., Appellee).

Docket No. 126666

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed April 21, 2022.

Michael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Yao Dinizulu, of Dinizulu Law Group, Ltd., of counsel), for appellant.

Daniel G. Suber, of Daniel G. Suber & Associates, of Chicago (Jennifer L. Barron, of Barron Legal, Ltd., of Naperville, of counsel), for appellee.

Dominic C. LoVerde, of Motherway & Napleton LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Steve Grossi, of Bruce Farrel Dorn & Associates, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Defense Counsel.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether (1) an employer who admits liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior may be independently liable for its own negligence, even if the jury finds that its employee was not negligent, and (2) the appellate court erred in granting the employer's request for a new trial after determining that the jury rendered legally inconsistent findings. For the following reasons, we reverse the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Pan-Oceanic Engineering Company, Inc. (Pan-Oceanic), is a general contractor located in Chicago, Illinois. During the relevant period, Pan-Oceanic employed Lavonta M. Green. His responsibilities included hauling equipment that Pan-Oceanic would need for its construction jobs.

¶ 4 On August 17, 2012, Green's supervisor, Savinder Singh,¹ asked him to pick up a skid steer—a piece of equipment commonly used for digging—from Patten Industries, Inc. (Patten). The average skid steer weighs more than three tons. Upon Green's arrival, Patten employees loaded the skid steer onto a trailer. Green saw that the skid steer had not been loaded properly, and he asked for it to be reloaded. Patten employees refused. Green called Savinder to inform him that the skid steer had not been correctly loaded. He described it as "crooked." After speaking with a Patten employee, Savinder told Green to "be safe" and to return to Pan-Oceanic with the equipment.

¶ 5 At approximately 3 p.m., Green left with the skid steer and trailer and entered the Eisenhower expressway. Because traffic was heavy, Green initially was driving at a speed of 20 miles per hour. Traffic lightened as he approached the I-294 junction, and he accelerated to about 40 miles per hour. Green then looked in his rearview mirror and saw that the skid steer and trailer were bouncing. As he moved from one lane to another, Green stepped on the brakes, which caused his vehicle to start spinning. The trailer swung into a car driven by Fletcher McQueen and injured him.

¶ 6 McQueen filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, naming both Pan-Oceanic and Green as defendants. In count I, McQueen alleged, in part, that Green, as an employee of Pan-Oceanic, was negligent for operating his vehicle on the highway with an improperly situated skid steer. In count II, McQueen alleged that Pan-Oceanic was negligent for, among other things, failing to train Green on how to respond to an unsafe load; ordering Green to take the load onto the highway when the company knew, or should have known, that the load was in an unsafe state; and failing to simply reject the load to prevent it from traveling on the highway. In count III, McQueen sought punitive damages from both Green and Pan-Oceanic. Regarding Pan-Oceanic, McQueen alleged, among other things, that the company demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others by ordering Green to take the load on the highway when Pan-Oceanic knew, or should have known, that the load was in an unsafe state.

¶ 7 Pan-Oceanic acknowledged that Green was its agent for purposes of this case. The company further acknowledged that Green was acting within the scope of his agency at all relevant times.

¶ 8 In May 2017, the case was tried before a jury. Defendants moved to bifurcate the proceedings. In part, the trial court granted the motion. In the first proceeding, the jury would hear all evidence regarding defendants’ conduct that could constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. After the evidence was presented and after closing arguments, the jury would be given two special interrogatories to determine whether defendants’ conduct amounted to willful and wanton misconduct.

¶ 9 If the jury decided that one or both defendants had acted with willful and wanton misconduct, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, plaintiff would be allowed to present evidence on punitive damages in a subsequent hearing. At that time, defendants’ financial positions would be admissible.

¶ 10 During the first proceeding, Green testified that he called Savinder on the day of the accident because he was not sure whether the load was safe to transport. When Savinder and employees from Patten advised him that he could safely transport the skid steer and trailer, Green assumed that their assurances were correct. Green also testified that he felt he had to follow his supervisor's instructions because otherwise he might get fired. According to Green, no one at Pan-Oceanic had trained him how to respond if a skid steer was not loaded properly.

¶ 11 Pan-Oceanic's president, Gulzar Singh, explained that the company, in part, specialized in street and road construction. He testified that Pan-Oceanic held regular meetings at which safety rules were discussed. Gulzar also testified that, in general, he relied on the company's supervisors to make daily decisions, particularly as it related to safety.

¶ 12 Gulzar testified that, if Green had called his supervisor with a question about the safety of a load, the supervisor should have ensured that he understood the problem and how to fix the load. He further testified that Green was not the final decisionmaker as to whether he would drive with a load. According to Gulzar, Green was required to follow protocol that included calling his supervisor. Gulzar also acknowledged that, if any of Pan-Oceanic's employees had not been told that they could lose control of an unstable load, that would be a reckless disregard of safety rules.

¶ 13 Savinder testified that Green did not say that the load was unsafe when he called him on the day of the accident.

Instead, Green told him that the load looked crooked or "funny." Savinder did not ask what Green meant, nor did he understand the scope of the problem. According to Savinder, he "was doing a few other things at the time." Savinder testified that he told Green to "let Patten take care of it."

¶ 14 On May 9, 2017, the jury instructions conference was conducted. Among the instructions that plaintiff tendered was Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 50.01 (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (hereinafter IPI Civil No. 50.01 ), which applies when both a principal and an agent are sued and no issue as to agency exists. It reads:

"The defendants are sued as principal and agent. The defendant [principal's name] is the principal and the defendant [agent's name] is [his] [its] agent. If you find that the defendant [agent's name] is liable, then you must find that the defendant [principal's name] is also liable. However, if you find that [agent's name] is not liable, then you must find that [principal's name] is not liable." Id.

¶ 15 The notes on use for IPI Civil No. 50.01 add that,

"[i]f by the pleadings and evidence there is an issue of fact as to the liability of the principal for his own acts independent of acts of the agent, then a separate instruction appropriate to such independent basis of liability should also be used and the last sentence of this instruction should be modified or stricken accordingly."

Defendants initially questioned whether IPI Civil No. 50.02 instead applied, but they ultimately acknowledged that IPI Civil No. 50.01 was appropriate.

¶ 16 Later in the conference, the parties realized that defendants had also included IPI Civil No. 50.01 in their proposed instructions. The trial court observed that defendants did not dispute that Green was Pan-Oceanic's agent. Therefore, if the jury ruled against Green, it had to rule against Pan-Oceanic as well. Yet, the court also noted that plaintiff had raised allegations against Pan-Oceanic that did not rest on respondeat superior , or vicarious liability, making it possible for the jury to rule against Pan-Oceanic based on its own negligence. The court reserved its decision on defendants’ jury instruction but stated that the parties were free to bring alternative instructions.

¶ 17 Separately, as the parties discussed the verdict forms, defendants insisted that, because plaintiff had sued Green both individually and as an agent of Pan-Oceanic, each defendant should have its own verdict form. The trial court stated that, because Green was Pan-Oceanic's agent, there was "no conceivable way" that the jury could find against Green but not the company. The court then noted that plaintiff presented a failure to train theory against the company and, thus, it was possible for the jury to find against Pan-Oceanic but not Green. At the same time, the court suggested that "they rise and fall together because you've admitted that he's your agent."

¶ 18 When the court and the parties again discussed the verdict forms the next day, defendants stated, "I thought we had an instruction that any negligence of Pan-Oceanic is negligence against *** Green and vice versa." The trial court clarified that, because Green was the company's agent, his negligence could be attributed to Pan-Oceanic; however, the court noted that there were allegations against Pan-Oceanic that were not based on Green's conduct. Nonetheless, the court stated that there was no conceivable way the jury could find for Green, and against Pan-Oceanic, because the company had admitted agency.

¶ 19 On May 10, 2017, the parties gave closing arguments. After the trial court...