McQuilkin v. Del. River Port Auth.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11-652 (JBS/AMD) |
| Parties | JAMES McQUILKIN, Plaintiff, v. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
HON. JEROME B. SIMANDLE
APPEARANCES:
Stephen G. Console, Esq.
Andrew L. Mackerer, Esq.
CONSOLE LAW OFFICES LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff James McQuilkin
William F. Cook, Esq.
William M. Tambussi, Esq.
BROWN & CONNERY
Attorneys for Defendant Delaware River Port Authority
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is presently before the Court on the Defendant Delaware River Port Authority's ("Defendant") motion to dismiss Plaintiff James McQuilkin's ("Plaintiff") complaint for failure to state a claim. [Docket Item 8.] The instant action alleges discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination inEmployment Act. The Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed because a portion of Plaintiff's claim is time barred; the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination and retaliation; and the Plaintiff seeks compensation for damages which are not cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
The Plaintiff has filed opposition. The Plaintiff maintains that its complaint is timely, sufficiently states a claim for both retaliation and discrimination, and seeks damages which are cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion to dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
The instant action alleges that the Defendant violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA"), when the Defendant lowered the job grade level of the Grants Specialist position after the Plaintiff was offered and accepted the position.
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant on or about July 1987 as a toll collector. (Comp. ¶ 16.) On or about 1997, the Plaintiff began attending law school and was reimbursed by the Defendant for his first year of tuition. (Comp. ¶¶ 17-18.) However, the Defendant subsequentlytold the Plaintiff that he would no longer receive tuition reimbursement despite the continuing tuition reimbursement given to younger employees. (Comp. ¶ 18.) From 2001 to 2004, the Plaintiff made unsuccessful requests to the Defendant for reimbursement of his tuition expense. (Comp. ¶ 20.)
In 2004, the Plaintiff went to the EEOC office in Philadelphia, PA, and filled on an EEOC Intake Questionnaire complaining that the Defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of his age in denying him tuition reimbursement. (Comp. ¶ 23.) The Plaintiff informed the Defendant's Chief of Human Resources and Equal Employment Officer, Toni Brown, that he had filled out the EEOC Intake Questionnaire. (Comp. ¶ 24.) Shortly after his meeting with Ms. Brown, the Defendant approved Plaintiff's request for tuition reimbursement and paid the Plaintiff for his tuition expense. (Comp. ¶ 25.)
In January 2005, the Plaintiff transferred to the government relations department to work as a Grants Specialist. (Comp. ¶ 26.) When the Plaintiff applied for the position, he was informed by the head of the department that a Grants Specialist was a grade level 11. (Comp. ¶ 26.) The application for the Grants Specialist position also indicated the position was a grade level 11. (Comp. ¶ 26.)
After being offered the position as Grants Specialist, the Plaintiff learned that the Defendant had classified the positiona grade level 8 which is compensated at a lower rate than grade level 11 positions. (Comp. ¶ 26.) The Plaintiff talked to his supervisor, Linda Hayes, who agreed that the Grants Specialist position should be compensated at grade level 11. (Comp. ¶ 28.)
After several requests by Ms. Hayes, in June 2007, the Defendant hired the Hay Group, an independent Human Resources consultant, to analyze the proper grade for Plaintiff's position. (Comp. ¶ 29.) The Hay Group recommended the position of Grants Specialist be classified as grade level 10. (Comp. ¶ 29.)
From January 2009 to September 2009, Ms. Hayes' supervisor, Mr. Shanahan, met with Ms. Brown, the Chief of Human Resources, about increasing Plaintiff's job grade level to at least grade level 10 which was recommended by the Hay Group. (Comp. ¶¶ 31-32.) The Defendant continued to refuse to raise Plaintiff's grade level beyond level 8 and purportedly stated that education was the reason. (Comp. ¶ 34.)
In January 2010, the Plaintiff retired from the Defendant. (Comp. ¶ 36.) At the time the Plaintiff retired, he was still being compensated at a grade level 8 for his position as a Grants Specialist. (Comp. ¶ 36.)
The Plaintiff then filed the instant action on February 4, 2011. [Docket Item 1.] The Plaintiff was then 63 years old. (Comp. ¶ 15.) The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant's refusal to increase the grade level of the Grants Specialist positionviolated the ADEA. First, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions were retaliatory and in response to Plaintiff's complaints of age discrimination with regard to his tuition reimbursement. (Comp. ¶ 27.) The Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff's age was a motivating and/or determinative factor in Defendant's discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff. (Comp. ¶ 39.) The Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant's discriminatory failure to reclassify Plaintiff's position at the appropriate grade level adversely affected Plaintiff's salary since 2005 and Plaintiff's pension benefits. (Comp. ¶¶ 37-38.)
The Plaintiff alleges he suffered a loss of earnings, loss of benefits, pain and suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, loss of self-esteem, mental anguish and loss of life's pleasures as a result of the Defendant's conduct. (Comp. ¶ 42.) The Plaintiff also seeks liquidated damages against the Defendant as he alleges the Defendant's discriminatory and retaliatory acts were willful and intentional. (Comp. ¶ 43.)
The Defendant then filed the instant motion to dismiss. The Defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed on several grounds. First, the Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's claim as to pay received before December 27, 2008 is time-bared under the ADEA. Second, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has failed to state claim for retaliation or discrimination because there was no adverse employment action, there are nofacts pled which show a causal nexus between the tuition reimbursement and the salary for his position as a Grants Specialist and the complaint does not identify any person sufficiently younger than the Plaintiff in a similar position who was not subject to the alleged adverse action. Finally, the Defendant argues that courts have consistently held that damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress or punitive damages are not cognizable under the ADEA and Plaintiff's claims for these damages should be dismissed.
The Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss. First, the Plaintiff argues that his complaint is timely and that whether the Plaintiff can seek a claim for pay received before December 27, 2008 is a damages issue that is not properly considered at this early stage of the litigation. Second, the Plaintiff contends that he has stated a claim for both discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA. Finally, the Plaintiff concedes that he is not entitled to a recovery for emotional distress or punitive damages. However, the Plaintiff argues that his allegation for liquidated damages is appropriate and should not be dismissed.
III. DISCUSSION
The sufficiency of pleadings in federal court is governed byRule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., among others, a rule that is designed to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The rule provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This is not a high bar. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed, Thomas v. Independence Tp., 463 F.3d 285, 295 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Some facts, however, are necessary. In order to give Defendant fair notice, and to permit early dismissal if the complained-of conduct is not unlawful, a complaint must allege, in more than legal boilerplate, those facts about the conduct of each defendant giving rise to liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). These factual allegations must present a plausible basis for relief (i.e. something more than the mere possibility of legal misconduct). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
In its review of Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant toRule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., the Court must "accept all factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). And on this procedural posture, "courts generally consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claim alleging age discrimination is time-barred as to pay received before December 27, 2008. The Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff's claim is timely filed with regard to pay received on or after December 27, 2008 and therefore, the claim is not barred by a statute of limitations problem. However, in this...
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