McRae v. Rios
| Decision Date | 24 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:10-cv-001246-JLT |
| Parties | MICHAEL SCOTT MCRAE, Petitioner, v. H. A. RIOS, JR., Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING AND DISMISSING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(Doc. 1)
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO
ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE
ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE
Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On July 21, 2010, Petitioner filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 3). On August 9, 2010, Respondent filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 7).
Petitioner is in custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") serving a life sentence pursuant to a September 1, 1998 conviction in the United States District Court for Eastern District of North Carolina for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 836 (). (Doc. 10-1, Ex. 7).
Previously, on June 3, 1996, Petitioner had been convicted in the North Carolina state courts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and possession of heroin with intent to sell or deliverand sentenced to consecutive fifteen-year terms for each offense. (Id., Exs. 3 & 4). On June 7, 1996, Petitioner commenced his prison terms as a state prisoner in North Carolina. (Id., Ex. 5). On December 4, 1997, Petitioner was temporarily removed from state custody via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendam for prosecution in the Eastern District of North Carolina. (Id., Ex. 6). As mentioned, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to a life term for federal drug charges on September 1, 1998. At the time of sentence on his federal conviction, Petitioner was in the primary custody of the state of North Carolina and still serving his thirty-year state sentence. (Id., Exs. 3 & 4). On September 2, 1998, after being sentencing in federal court, Petitioner was returned to state prison for completion of his state sentence. (Id., Exs. 9 & 10). On April 10, 2009, Petitioner was released by the state of North Carolina into the custody of the United States Marshal's Service to serve the remainder of his federal sentence. Upon arrival, the BOP calculated Petitioner's sentence as commencing on the date of imposition, i.e., September 1, 1998, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Because Petitioner was still in state custody at the time, the BOP designated the state Department of Corrections as the official detention facility. (Id., Ex. 11). Until Petitioner completed his state sentence, he was receiving credits for both his state and federal sentence; however, the BOP determined that federal law prohibited any additional award of credits. Petitioner currently is in the custody of the BOP and, as one subject to a life sentence, has no projected release date. (Id., Ex. 13).
On July 12, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant petition, raising two grounds for relief: (1) cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; and (2) unconstitutional disproportionality between the sentence given here for possession of marijuana by an inmate versus possession of marijuana by a non-inmate. (Doc. 1). Respondent's answer was filed on October 1, 2010. (Doc. 10). On October 14, 2010, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (Doc. 11). On January 24, 2013, Petitioner filed additional legal arguments regarding the computation of his sentence. (Doc. 12). Respondent has neither objected to Petitioner's supplemental arguments nor filed a response to them.
Respondent concedes Petitioner exhausted all of his administrative remedies. (Doc. 10, p. 3).
Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity orconstitutionality of his conviction must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 a petitioner in federal custody must show that his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not necessarily unconstitutional, manner. See, e.g., Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1995) (); Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893-94 (); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 479 (3rd Cir. 1990) (); Brown, 610 F.2d at 677 (). A petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown, 610 F.2d at 677.
In this case, Petitioner alleges that he is being unlawfully denied credit against his federal sentence. Petitioner also contends that the sentencing court misapplied the federal sentencing guidelines in computing his sentence. To the extent that Petitioner is challenging the computation of credits, he is challenging the execution of his sentence rather than its imposition. Thus, that claim is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, to the extent that Petitioner is challenging his sentence, he must proceed, as discussed infra, by a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and not by way of a federal habeas petition. In addition, because Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of filing of the petition at the United States Penitentiary, Atwater, California, which lies within the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division, this Court has jurisdiction to proceed.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to credits on his federal sentence from the date he was originally arrested by state authorities. He also contends that he is entitled to credits pursuant to Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971). Both contentions are without merit.
The authority to compute a federal prisoner's sentence is delegated to the Attorney General, who exercises it through the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 1354-55 (1992); Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1091 (1999). "Computing a federal sentence requires two separate determinations: first, when the sentence commences; and, second, to what extent the defendant in question may receive credit for any time already spent in custody." United States v. Smith, 812 F.Supp 368, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Jimenez v. Warden, FDIC, Fort Devens, Mass., 147 F.Supp.2d 24, 27 (D.Mass.2001); Chambers v. Holland, 920 F.Supp. 618, 621 (M.D.Pa. 1996), affirmed by, 100 F.3d 946 (3rd Cir. 1996).
A federal sentence commences "on the date the defendant is received in custody. . . to commence service of sentence at the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the following facts are undisputed: (1) On June 3, 1996 Petitioner was sentenced in North Carolina's state court to a thirty-year prison term; (2) on June 7, 1006, Petitioner was committed to the North Carolina Department of Correction to serve that sentence; (3) on December 4, 1997, Petitioner was temporarily removed from state custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus prosequendum to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to face federal drug charges; (4) on September 1, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced on the federal charges to life in prison; (5) at the time of sentencing on the federal charges, Petitioner was in the primary custody of the State of North Carolina; (6) the U.S. District Judge expressly ordered that the federal sentence run concurrent with Petitioner's state sentence; (7) on September 2, 1998, Petitioner was returned to state custody in satisfaction of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and the U.S. Marshal's service filed a detainer with the State of North Carolina that advised the state of his federal conviction; (8) on April 10, 009, Petitioner was released from the custody of the State of North Carolina, having served his state sentence, thus placing him in exclusive federal custody; (9) upon his placement in federal custody, the BOP computed Petitioner's sentence, determined it commenced on September 1, 1998, and designated the state prison facility as the place for service of Petitioner's sentence. There is no dispute that Petitioner is entitled to credit against his federal sentence after September 1, 1998, and there is, likewise, no contention raised herein that he hasnot fully been given such credit. The only issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to credits for any period of time prior to September 1, 1998.
Thomas v. Brewer is dispositive of the date Petitioner's federal sentence commenced. In that case, petitioner was arrested on state charges on May 10, 1964. While in state custody, he was charged in federal court with armed bank robbery. On three occasions—June 15, 1964, June 23, 1964, and August 4, 1964--petitioner was brought to federal court on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer the federal charges. On the latter date, August 4, 1964, petitioner was sentenced to the "maximum period prescribed by law." Thomas, 923...
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