McRaven v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 20 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-3543.,08-3543. |
| Parties | Jan McRAVEN, guardian of the person and estate of Steven McFarland, an incapacitated person, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry SANDERS, individually and as Sheriff of Garland County, Arkansas; Captain Mel Steed, individually and as jail administrator for adult detention for Garland County, Arkansas, Defendants, Lt. McMurrian, individually and as a supervisory officer for Garland County, Arkansas; Sgt. Radley, individually and as 7AM-3PM shift supervisor for the Garland County Detention Center; Sgt. Dan Ansley, individually and as 3PM-11PM shift supervisor for the Garland County Detention Center, Defendants-Appellants, Cpl. Forrest L. Marks, individually and as an officer of the Garland County Sheriff's Department, Defendant, Deputy Dodge, individually and as an officer of the Garland County Sheriff's Department; Deputy J.D. Henry, individually and as officer of the Garland County Sheriff's Department; Nurse Tommy L. Harmon, LPN, individually and as nurse for the Garland County Adult Detention Center, Defendants-Appellants, Officer Nick Dodd, Certified D.R.E., individually and as a member of the Hot Springs, Arkansas Police Department, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Ralph Charles Ohm, Hot Springs, AR, argued, for appellant.
Ashley Rebecca Hudson, argued, Morgan E. Welch, on the brief, North Little Rock, for appellee.
Before BYE, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Jan McRaven sued Garland County officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark.Code § 16-123-105, on behalf of Steven Ross McFarland, an incapacitated person. The district court1 denied qualified immunity to six defendants. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
Around 8:45 a.m. on February 13, 2007, Arkansas State Police arrested McFarland for driving while intoxicated from the influence of drugs, among other charges. See Ark.Code § 5-65-103. The arresting officer's report states, "Mr. McFarland appeared to be intoxicated," "appeared to be sleepy, and at times he fell asleep."
Police took McFarland to the Garland County Adult Detention Center, where Deputy John T. Dodge, a detention facility officer, booked him in the presence of Deputy John D. Henry. A drug recognition expert took a urine sample, which tested positive for marijuana, benzodiazepines, and opiates. McFarland told the expert he had taken Seroquel, Hydrocodone, Depakote, and Ambien. McFarland possessed a prescription, issued the previous day, for 90 tablets of Chlorzoxazone, a muscle-relaxer. Twenty-one pills were missing from the bottle.
The drug influence evaluation was completed at 11:47 a.m. It states that McFarland's coordination is "poor," his speech is "slurred," his face is "flushed," and his eyelids are "droopy." "Arrestee stated that he took an unknown amount of" the pharmaceutical drugs he had mentioned before. McFarland's pulse, blood pressure, and temperature were "down." A blood alcohol test showed McFarland had not been drinking.
Lieutenant Judy Ann McMurrian was the supervising detention facility officer on February 13. Notified of the missing pills and of McFarland's symptoms, she spoke with Sergeant Ronald Radley, another detention facility officer, about transporting McFarland to a hospital. Radley suggested consulting Tommy L. Harmon, a practical nurse at the facility, before taking any action. McMurrian agreed.
McFarland entered a holding cell at about 12:30 p.m. A videotape shows him moving only once in the next five hours. Nurse Harmon examined McFarland in the cell, concluding he did not require hospitalization.2 Harmon's affidavit states that McFarland snored loudly, "as if he was sleeping off alcohol." Deputy Henry—who was with Dodge during the booking—was also present during the examination in the cell, but did not inform Harmon of McFarland's ingestion of drugs.
Officers placed another detainee in McFarland's cell at 5 p.m. A half-hour later, the detainee noticed that McFarland was not breathing; he notified officers. Sergeant Dan J. Ansley, trained in CPR, entered the cell at 5:35 p.m. The videotape shows Ansley standing over McFarland shaking him; Ansley claims he checked for and observed a weak pulse. No officer attempted to perform CPR on McFarland.
Paramedics arrived at 5:42 p.m., and transported McFarland to a hospital. He sustained severe brain injuries, stemming from airway blockage.
McRaven sued Garland County officials, on behalf of McFarland, alleging deliberate indifference to McFarland's medical need. The district court granted qualified immunity to several defendants, concluding they lacked subjective knowledge of McFarland's condition and, therefore, were not deliberately indifferent. The district court denied qualified immunity to Lieutenant McMurrian, Sergeant Radley, Deputy Dodge, Deputy Henry, Nurse Harmon, and Sergeant Ansley, concluding that disputed material facts exist about their subjective knowledge of McFarland's medical need.
"Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). "This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed." Id. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285 (footnotes omitted). An official who is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's medical needs is subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 285.
This court analyzes a pretrial detainee's § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Eighth Amendment. Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 201, 169 L.Ed.2d 37 (2007). "This makes little difference as a practical matter, though: Pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment." Id.
"Deliberate indifference has both an objective and a subjective component." Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2009). "The objective component requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an objectively serious medical need." Id. "The subjective component requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need." Id.
"In a § 1983 action, state actors may be entitled to qualified immunity." Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 962 (8th Cir.2008). "Qualified immunity protects `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Id., quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). "To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep't., 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir.2009). This court exercises its "sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id., quoting Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818.
The district court denied defendant-appellants qualified immunity. A detainee's right to medical treatment is clearly established. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285. The court concluded that McFarland objectively demonstrated medical need, and that the subjective knowledge of each defendant-appellant was a disputed material fact. This court reviews de novo denials of qualified immunity. Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 676 (8th Cir.2009).
"Intentional delay in providing medical treatment shows deliberate disregard if a reasonable person would know that the inmate requires medical attention or the actions of the officers are so dangerous that a knowledge of the risk may be presumed." Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir.2006). In Gordon, this court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity when an officer was aware of the inmate's medical issues, knew the inmate had complained of breathing trouble and chest pain, but waited for other officers to ask him to initiate medical treatment. Id. at 862-63.
McMurrian initially wanted McFarland hospitalized, but changed her mind after receiving Nurse Harmon's recommendation that hospitalization was unnecessary. McRaven asserts that Harmon, a practical nurse, is unqualified as a matter of law to determine whether or not McFarland should have been hospitalized, since Harmon was not supervised by a more senior medical professional.3 This court need not decide that issue. Instead, the question is whether McMurrian and the other defendant-officers reasonably relied on Harmon's medical opinion, whether or not Harmon should have provided a medical opinion without supervision.
A prison official may rely on a medical professional's opinion if such reliance is reasonable. Meloy v. Bachmeier 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir.2002) (); see also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006) (...
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