McReynolds ex rel. D.M. v. Ala. Dept. Youth Serv., 2:04-CV-850-MEF.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | 2:04-CV-850-MEF. |
| Citation | 426 F.Supp.2d 1247 |
| Parties | Bernice McREYNOLDS, as mother and next friend of D.M., Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Kindaka Sanders, Chestnut Sanders Sanders Pettaway & Campbell PC, Selma, AL, for Plaintiff.
Thornton Dudley Perry, Jr., Alabama Department of Youth Services, Mt. Meigs, AL, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Bernice McReynolds ("Plaintiff"), as mother and next friend of her son D.M., brings this action against Defendants Alabama Department of Youth Services, et al., alleging violations of a number of rights under federal law, the United States Constitution, and the laws of Alabama. The Plaintiff contends that D.M.'s rights were transgressed by the conditions and lack of treatment made available to D.M. at the Alabama Department of Youth Services ("ADYS"). The complaint also seeks relief in connection with a physical altercation between D.M. and ADYS security officers. The Defendants assert Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity and argue that their treatment of D.M. was well within the boundaries prescribed by federal and state law. This cause is presently before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 32) filed by the Defendants on March 11, 2005. After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the Court finds, for the reasons set forth below, that the motion is due to be GRANTED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations in support of both.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); see also Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.2004) () (citation and internal quotations omitted). In other words, a motion to dismiss only requires a court to determine whether a plaintiff's allegations, if proven, are sufficient to state a recognized claim at law upon which relief can be granted. In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229.
The Court has carefully considered all documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following facts.
The Plaintiff's son, D.M., is an African-American minor who has suffered from significant emotional problems since the age of five, when he first attempted suicide. D.M. also has a history of auditory and visual hallucinations wherein he sees and hears what appear to be dead people and has been committed to mental institutions to confront these difficulties. On June 30, 2003, D.M. was ordered into the custody of ADYS by the Juvenile Court of Dallas County, Alabama. The Juvenile Court responded to concerns about D.M.'s mental health by directing ADYS to provide D.M. with mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, drug and alcohol counseling, and treatment as a delinquent and juvenile offender. ADYS ultimately chose to assign D.M. to Mt. Meigs Juvenile Detention Complex. This placement was contrary to the expressed preference of D.M.'s psychiatrist, who advised ADYS that D.M. should be housed at Bryce State Mental Hospital, an institution with purportedly greater resources for dealing with his mental health problems.
The Plaintiff alleges that once D.M. was admitted to Mt. Meigs, those at the facility did not provide measures to ameliorate his mental and emotional illnesses. She further contends that D.M. was taken off of his medication upon entering ADYS custody, which caused him to begin hallucinating once again. During this time, the Plaintiff believes that D.M. was assaulted on several occasions with a nightstick and was the subject of unnecessary physical force at the hands of the Defendants.
In April of 2004, D.M. complained to his dormitory manager that Defendant Emerson Moore ("Moore"), an ADYS intensive treatment unit employee, had violated the mandated staff-student ratio that governs the number of persons allowed out of their rooms at one time. A few weeks prior to this complaint, D.M. had informed the dormitory manager that Moore had been permitting certain students who were on room confinement out of their rooms to watch television and engage in other activities while disallowing the same exception to other individuals. The Plaintiff believes that Moore was suspended in response to these reports.
Upon his return, Moore allegedly denied D.M. recreation time in retaliation for D.M.'s complaints. D.M. questioned this approach, and Moore replied that D.M. should not have complained about the staff-student ratio violations. In response to this comment, D.M. asked for a complaint form, but Moore denied his request. D.M. persisted in this demand, and Moore summoned Defendants Billy Ray Cox ("Cox"), James Daniel ("Daniel"), and Robert Howard ("Howard"), all security officers at the Mt. Meigs Complex, to D.M.'s room.
On their arrival, these officers removed D.M.'s mattress from his room and demanded that he take off his clothes. D.M. refused to comply with this order, and Daniel proceeded to strike him in the back of the leg with his nightstick, causing D.M. to fall to the ground. Once D.M. was on the floor, Howard held his leg while Daniel removed D.M.'s shoes, socks, and pants. During this time, Cox attempted to remove D.M.'s shirt; when this effort failed due to D.M's resistance, Cox hit D.M. in the head with his nightstick. As D.M. continued to hold on to his shirt, Cox delivered several more forceful blows to his shoulder and head. After being hit in the head three times, D.M. began bleeding profusely. As the struggle proceeded, Cox continued to strike D.M. in the effort to remove his shirt until Daniel noticed the bleeding and pointed it out to Cox. While Moore himself did not participate in the altercation, he witnessed the entire attack and did not intervene.
At the conclusion of this confrontation, Cox allegedly made several comments that indicated he had derived pleasure out of the assault. The guards then withdrew from the room and left D.M. bleeding on the floor and without medical attention. Sometime later, Daniel escorted D.M. to the emergency room at Baptist Medical Center, where he received one internal and ten external stitches for his wounds. When D.M. returned to Mt. Meigs he was disciplined for assaulting a person in authority, Cox, and given seven days of "zero level." D.M. contends that he did not at any time assault Cox and that he was disciplined in order to cover up the episode. Further, the Plaintiff alleges that she was not notified of any of the details of the incident until several days later when D.M. informed her of such during a visitation period. Some time prior to this visit, D.M.'s stitches were removed at the detention facility rather than at the hospital.
During his stay at Mt. Meigs, D.M. met with the director of institutional services on three occasions to apprise him of the mistreatment he had experienced and to complain of other adverse conditions at ADYS. The Plaintiff asserts that these concerns were never remedied, and on September 10, 2004, she commenced the instant suit. In her complaint, the Plaintiff alleges violations of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the United States Constitution, and Alabama law stemming from the April 2004 altercation and from D.M.'s general treatment at Mt. Meigs.
The Plaintiff's first claim alleges that the Defendants violated the Education for All Handicapped Children Act by failing to properly assess D.M.'s educational limitations and provide programs in accordance therewith. This act, now known as the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, outlaws discrimination against the handicapped in public education and guarantees access to educational services. Importantly, compensatory damages are not available under the statute. Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081. (11th Cir. 1983). In "exceptional circumstances," a plaintiff can recover reimbursement for the costs of providing educational services at the plaintiffs own expense where a court later finds those specific services necessary. See School Committee of Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985); Jenkins By and Through Jenkins v. State of Florida, 815 F.2d 629 (11th Cir.1987). However, the Plaintiff has not alleged that she provided any educational services at her own expense, and therefore, she is not entitled to monetary compensation under this statute. As a result, this claim must be dismissed.
The Plaintiff also alleges that D.M. is entitled to protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and that the Defendants violated this act through their discriminatory treatment of D.M. Specifically, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) in their discipline and treatment of D.M. The Plaintiff does not identify which particular Defendants are being sued under this claim, so ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Patterson v. Walden
...(See doc. 10, at 3.) Review of those cases reveals that movant's reliance is misplaced. In McReynolds ex rel. D.M. v. Alabama Dep't of Youth Services, 426 F. Supp.2d 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2006), the court did dismiss official-capacity claims against the individual defendants, but only because cla......