McRoberts v. Bowen, 87-3014
| Decision Date | 05 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-3014,87-3014 |
| Citation | 841 F.2d 1077 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17976.1 Scott McROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Peter B. Loewenberg, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., Cheryl Nikonovich-Kahn, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
J. Christopher Deem, Tampa, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before VANCE and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and O'KELLEY *, District Judge.
In this social security disability case, we affirm the district court's ruling that substantial evidence does not support the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (Secretary) finding of no disability.
At the time of the administrative hearing, Scott McRoberts, the appellee, was twenty-eight years old. He completed eleven years of formal education, obtained a G.E.D., and worked as a cosmetologist, dishwasher, cabinet maker, security guard, and carpenter.
In April, 1982, McRoberts injured his neck, back, and knees in an automobile accident. Three weeks later, his knees weakened underneath him, and he fell through a sliding glass door, sustaining injuries to his right knee, deep lacerations of the nose, and lower extremities.
Because of his injuries, in May, 1982, December, 1982, and February, 1983, McRoberts underwent three surgical procedures to his knees and physical therapy. Dr. Fishalow, the treating physician, performed arthroscopic patellar shaving and partial synovectomy of the right knee. This procedure required excision of the lining of the capsule of the knee joint. Three months later, he underwent arthroscopic patellar shaving of the left knee.
In August, 1983, McRoberts returned to work as a maintenance worker for three months. He later worked as a security guard at a marina for six months. He was unable to continue these positions because of chronic pain, primarily in the right knee. All of these events occurred before McRoberts's disability onset date of August, 1984.
McRoberts continued to complain to his physicians about pain in his knees. McRoberts consulted Dr. Lawrence Gnage, an orthopedic surgeon, in an attempt to alleviate the pain. Dr. Gnage diagnosed patellofemoral degenerative joint disease with severe medialis atrophy of the right knee. On March 14, 1985, Dr. Gnage performed a maquet osteotomy (surgical cutting of the bone) of the proximal tibial tubercle. Essentially, this surgery was performed in an attempt to alleviate stress on the patella. The surgery did not restore McRoberts's medialis function. Dr. Gnage stated that the muscle had completely atrophied.
Although the post-operative prognosis looked promising, McRoberts continued to report discomfort in the right knee. In July, 1985, he saw another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. D.J. O'Conner. McRoberts stated that he had severe constant pain in both knees and felt that his surgeries had worsened rather than improved his situation. Dr. O'Conner summarized his findings by stating that McRoberts "has sustained injuries to both lower extremities and has developed chondromalacia in both knees and has considerable arthritis in his right knee, to a lesser extent, also in the left knee." Dr. O'Conner noted that McRoberts could not perform a job which would require prolonged standing or walking, nor could he do any climbing, kneeling, or squatting.
During the next two months, McRoberts visited Dr. Harry Goldsmith, a clinical psychologist and Dr. Edward Feldman, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Goldsmith found that McRoberts was complaining primarily of pain and that he was not the type of person who would be likely to exaggerate his pain. Dr. Goldsmith also determined that in trainability (ability to learn by being shown what to do), McRoberts surpassed 93-percent of the general adult population. After an orthopedic examination, Dr. Feldman concluded that McRoberts had early signs of degenerative osteoarthritis, a permanent and progressive condition, and recommended that McRoberts be retrained to perform a sitting job.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) denied McRoberts social security disability benefits on the ground that he was not disabled as required by the Social Security Act (the Act) at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A). After his claims were denied, McRoberts requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied McRoberts's application for disability benefits, and the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services affirmed. This denial became the final decision of the Secretary.
McRoberts timely appealed to the United States District Court; the district court reversed the Secretary's denial of benefits. The Secretary brings this appeal contending that the district court applied an improper standard of review.
The ALJ denied McRoberts's application, finding that although McRoberts suffered from a severe impairment, the impairment was not of such severity that it qualified for a finding of disability. Further, the ALJ found that McRoberts could not perform his past relevant work, because he was not capable of prolonged standing, walking, climbing, kneeling, or squatting. Nevertheless, the ALJ determined that McRoberts was capable of engaging in sedentary work, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1567 (1986). 1 The ALJ concluded that based upon McRoberts's age, education, past relevant work, and residual functional capacity, he was not disabled within the meaning of the Act at any time before the date of the decision.
In reversing, the district court found that McRoberts's allegations regarding chronic pain and his inability to adapt to other jobs was supported by both medical records and testing performed by several physicians.
The two issues are: (1) whether the district court applied an improper legal standard, and (2) whether the Secretary's finding is supported by substantial evidence.
We review the Secretary's findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir.1983). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir.1982). Although the decision of the ALJ need not be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, "it cannot stand with a mere scintilla of support." Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1181 (11th Cir.1986).
In this case, the first question is whether the district court applied the proper test. The district court initially set forth the proper standard of review by stating "[t]his court's review of the decision of the Secretary is limited to a determination of whether or not the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence." This states the proper standard. After a restatement of the Secretary's evidence, the district court stated that "substantial evidence supported a finding that McRoberts was totally disabled." If this is another attempted statement of the standard--it is wrong.
Although the district court's order does not contain express language that the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, the order does indicate that the Secretary failed to evaluate this claim under the legal standards set forth by this court. This court is persuaded by the district court's initial recitation of the proper test. Because the district court, experienced in these matters, articulated the correct standard of review initially, we must assume that the district court knew the proper standard and weighed the evidence properly. Even were we to agree that the district court applied the wrong standard, on this record, we conclude that substantial evidence...
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